Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting

Abstract We consider a society confronting the decision of accepting or rejecting a list of (at least two) proposals. Assuming separability of preferences, we show the impossibility of guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes through anonymous referendum voting, except for the case of an odd number of voters confronting precisely two proposals. In this special case, majority voting is the only anonymous social choice rule which guarantees Pareto optimal referendum outcomes

The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation

The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.intergenerational cooperation, family, fertility, saving, private transfers, education, child benefits, pensions, self-enforcing constitutions, direct democracy, representative democracy, constitutions

An Analysis of Brexit’s Consequences on the United Kingdom’s Economy

Following the Brexit referendum decision made on June 23, 2016, much uncertainty surrounds the United Kingdom (UK) leaving the European Union (EU), particularly how that decision will impact its future economy. Due to high levels of globalization, genuine concern exists for the UK’s decision producing a global economic crash, similar to the financial crisis of 2008. Ultimately, the result of Brexit will depend largely on the policy created and implemented once the UK officially leaves the EU. If the UK is able to successfully navigate exiting the EU with little economic consequences, it is conceivable that other EU members could follow suit and want to leave the EU as well, which could cripple the integrity of the EU and the dynamics of Europe. Based on qualitative data analysis, this paper concludes that the UK leaving the EU will have minimal effects on the world economy, yet the ripple effect the Brexit referendum could initiate might have catastrophic effects on the European and world economies

An Enabling Mechanism for the Creation, Adjustment, and Dissolution of States and Governmental Units

The article proposes an enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of governmental units, giving autonomy to each resident as in a direct democracy. Rather than focusing on a narrow model with restrictive and specialized assumptions, and subsequent solutions, as has been common in the literature, the article takes individuals seriously acknowledging that they are best equipped to find their own solutions. The emphasis is on the practical approach of how individuals discover and implement their subjective preferences and how this discovery and implementation process can be facilitated and corresponding costs lowered. Governmental units are subjected to some of the same market forces as ordinary firms, in the spirit of Coase (1988a). This brings the interaction between governmental units closer to a market structure, and serves to eliminate or reduce many of the coercive elements of government.Territorial units, individual liberty, individual decision making, individual welfare, competitive markets, public choice, governmental units, endogenous determination of borders, constitutional economics, political economy, government, constitution

Equal representation in two-tier voting systems

The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimensional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial constituency configurations, the EU and the US are investigated by Monte-Carlo simulations. Penrose’s square root rule, which originally applies to preference-free dichotomous decision environments and holds only under very specific conditions, comes close to ensuring equal representation. It is thus more robust than previously suggested

Market Design in the Presence of Repugnancy: A Market for Children

A market-like mechanism for the allocation of children in both the primary market (market for babies) and the secondary market (adoption market) will result in greater social welfare, and hence be more efficient, than the current allocation methods used in practice, even in the face of repugnancy. Since a market for children falls under the realm of repugnant transactions, it is necessary to design a market with enough safeguards to bypass repugnancy while avoiding the excessive regulations that unnecessarily distort the supply and demand pressures of a competitive market. The goal of designing a market for children herein is two-fold: 1) by creating a feasible market for children, a set of generalizable rules and principles can be realized for designing functioning and efficient markets in the face of repugnancy and 2) the presence of a potential, credible and efficient market in the presence of this repugnancy will stimulate debate into the need for such markets in other similar areas, especially in cases creating a tradable market for organs for transplantation, wherein the absence of the transaction is often a death sentence for those who wish to, but are prevented from, participating in the market

A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy

It is often assumed that direct democratic processes - referenda and initiatives - offer the people a chance to speak more clearly than is possible through representative processes. Courts, commentators, and political leaders have defended or described direct democratic outcomes as the voice of the people themselves. Because plebiscites allow the people to speak directly, without the potential distortion inherent in representation, they seem ideally responsive to popular will. Indeed, even critics of direct democracy appear to grant as much. Critics are quick to point out, of course, that actual plebiscites often fall far short of the ideal. Uneven voter turnout, poorly drafted ballot issues, the influence of special interests, and similar factors are said to obscure popular input. Alternatively, it is frequently argued that values such as fairness, deliberation, and the protection of individual rights require that popular will be checked and balanced through representative processes, or limited through judicial review. What goes unchallenged, however, is the underlying assumption, which remains as pervasive as it is intuitively appealing: if you really want to know what the people want, take a vote. In this Commentary, Professor Clark challenges this assumption and argues that initiatives and referenda, regardless of how well and fairly they are conducted, cannot be trusted to reflect the voice of the people accurately or meaningfully. Professor Clark argues that direct democratic processes distort popular input by precluding the expression of priorities among issues. By presenting voters with one issue at a time, plebiscites offer no opportunity for voters to focus their political power on the issues of greatest concern to them. Referenda and initiatives, by giving people the chance to vote yea or nay as to this or that particular outcome, make people feel as though they have more input. In fact, however, such processes actually limit people\u27s ability to make effective use of their political power to influence the overall array of outcomes. By contrast, representation, which feels like a limitation of input, actually facilitates the effective use of political power by permitting voters to express both single-issue preferences and inter-issue priorities. Electoral and legislative logrolling - often seen as distorting or obscuring popular voice - in fact facilitates meaningful popular input by allowing voters to allocate their political power to the issues about which they feel most strongly. Representation permits, indeed requires, that voters speak not only to the question of what they want, but also to the question of what they want most

Market Design in the Presence of Repugnancy: A Market For Children

A market-like mechanism for the allocation of children in both the primary market (market for babies) and the secondary market (adoption market) will result in greater social welfare, hence be more efficient, than the current allocation methods used in practice, even in the face of repugnancy. Since a market for children falls under the realm of repugnant transactions, it is necessary to design a market with enough safeguards to bypass the repugnancy while avoiding the excessive regulations that unnecessarily distort the supply and demand pressures of a competitive market. The goal of designing a market for children herein is two-fold: 1) By creating a feasible market for children, a set of generalizable rules and principles can be realized for designing functioning and efficient markets in the face of repugnancy and 2) The presence of a potential, credible and efficient market in the presence of this repugnancy will stimulate debate into the need for such markets in other similar areas, especially in the cases of creating a tradable market for organs for transplantation, wherein the absence of the transaction is often a death sentence for those who wish to but are prevented from participating in the market