Dynamic Controllability with Overlapping targets: A Generalization of the Tinbergen-Nash Theory of Economic Policy

We generalize some recent results developed in static policy games with multiple players, to a dynamic context. We find that the classical theory of economic policy can be usefully applied to a strategic context of difference games: if one player satisfies the Golden Rule, then either all other players’ policies are ineffective with respect to the dynamic target variables shared with that player; or no Nash Feedback Equilibrium can exist, unless they all share target values for those variables. We extend those results to the case where there are also non-dynamic targets, to show that policy effectiveness (a Nash equilibrium) can continue to exist if some players satisfy the Golden Rule but target values differ between players in the non-dynamic targets. We demonstrate the practical importance of these results by showing how policy effectiveness (a policy equilibrium) can appear or disappear with small variations in the expectations process or policy rule in a widely used model of monetary policy.Policy games, Policy ineffectiveness, Static controllability, Existence of equilibria, Nash feedback equilibrium

Social Shaping for Multi-Agent Systems

Multi-agent systems have gained attention due to advances in automation, technology, and AI. In these systems, intelligent agents collaborate through networks to achieve goals. Despite successes, multi-agent systems pose social challenges. Problems include agents finding resource prices unacceptable due to efficient allocation, interactions being cooperative/competitive, leading to varying outcomes, and sensitive data being at risk due to sharing. Problems are: 1. Price Acceptance; 2. Agent Cooperation and Competition; 3. Privacy Risks. For Price Acceptance, we address decentralized resource allocation systems as markets. We solve price acceptance in static systems with quadratic utility functions by defining allowed quadratic ranges. For dynamic systems, we present dynamic competitive equilibrium computation and propose a horizon strategy for smoothing dynamic pricing. Concerning Agent Cooperation and Competition, we study the well-known Regional Integrated Climate-Economy model (RICE). It's a dynamic game. We analyze cooperative and competitive solutions, showing impact on negotiations and consensus for regional climate action. Regarding Privacy Risks, we infer network structures from linear-quadratic game best-response dynamics to reveal agent vulnerabilities. We prove network identifiability tied to controllability conditions. A stable, sparse system identification algorithm learns network structures despite noise. Lastly, we contribute privacy-aware algorithms. We address network games where agents aggregate under differential privacy. Extending to network games, we propose a Laplace linear-quadratic functional perturbation algorithm. A tutorial example demonstrates meeting privacy needs through tuning. In summary, this thesis solves social challenges in multi-agent systems: Price Acceptance, Agent Cooperation and Competition, and Privacy Risks

Self-Evaluation Applied Mathematics 2003-2008 University of Twente

This report contains the self-study for the research assessment of the Department of Applied Mathematics (AM) of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS) at the University of Twente (UT). The report provides the information for the Research Assessment Committee for Applied Mathematics, dealing with mathematical sciences at the three universities of technology in the Netherlands. It describes the state of affairs pertaining to the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008