MOVEABLE, DEPLOYABLE MICROGRID ANALYSIS

This report focuses on the assessment of the feasibility of Moveable, Deployable Microgrids (MODEMs) from an interoperability and sustainment perspective as an alternative solution to traditional backup power methods aimed at bringing critical loads back online after installation microgrid failures or operational energy needs. Prior research into microgrid solutions by MAJ Daniel Varley in his paper “Feasibility Analysis of a Mobile Microgrid Design to Support Department of Defense (DOD) Energy Resilience Goals” identified MODEM as a potential solution. This report utilized the work done by MAJ Varley and further assesses system feasibility. Base and operational energy managers will benefit from MODEMs by having access to multi-energy source systems that are both easily moveable and relatively simplistic in design. As concerns surrounding energy resiliency of defense critical infrastructure by both the DOD and Department of Energy (DOE) mount, as expressed in a March 2022 report by the Electricity Advisory Committee (EAC) titled “Strengthening the Resilience of Defense Critical Infrastructure”, there is a push to identify cost-effective solutions that utilize alternative energy sources in order to improve the overall resiliency of this infrastructure. The MODEM system has the potential to be a viable solution to the resiliency problem.Outstanding ThesisCivilian, Department of the NavyCivilian, Department of the NavyCivilian, Department of the NavyCivilian, Department of the NavyCivilian, Department of the NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Accelerating Cyber Security Improvements for Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems

This thesis study introduces operational concepts for accelerating necessary cyber security improvements for critical infrastructure industrial control systems. National critical infrastructures’ industrial control systems experienced a 20% annual increase in cyber incidents during fiscal year 2015 (DHS ICS-CERT, 2015). Industrial control systems are used in several critical infrastructure sectors to include energy, transportation, manufacturing, and water utilities. Critical infrastructures support public health and life safety, economic vitality, national defense, and overarching societal well-being. Significant damage or disruptions to a critical infrastructure could result in potentially catastrophic and cascading consequences. For example, a disruptive cyber-attack on a water utility would have life safety and health consequences when fire hydrants fail during a fire, and hospitals’ operations are impaired

Cyber Infrastructure Protection: Vol. II

View the Executive SummaryIncreased reliance on the Internet and other networked systems raise the risks of cyber attacks that could harm our nation’s cyber infrastructure. The cyber infrastructure encompasses a number of sectors including: the nation’s mass transit and other transportation systems; banking and financial systems; factories; energy systems and the electric power grid; and telecommunications, which increasingly rely on a complex array of computer networks, including the public Internet. However, many of these systems and networks were not built and designed with security in mind. Therefore, our cyber infrastructure contains many holes, risks, and vulnerabilities that may enable an attacker to cause damage or disrupt cyber infrastructure operations. Threats to cyber infrastructure safety and security come from hackers, terrorists, criminal groups, and sophisticated organized crime groups; even nation-states and foreign intelligence services conduct cyber warfare. Cyber attackers can introduce new viruses, worms, and bots capable of defeating many of our efforts. Costs to the economy from these threats are huge and increasing. Government, business, and academia must therefore work together to understand the threat and develop various modes of fighting cyber attacks, and to establish and enhance a framework to assess the vulnerability of our cyber infrastructure and provide strategic policy directions for the protection of such an infrastructure. This book addresses such questions as: How serious is the cyber threat? What technical and policy-based approaches are best suited to securing telecommunications networks and information systems infrastructure security? What role will government and the private sector play in homeland defense against cyber attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, financial, and logistical systems? What legal impediments exist concerning efforts to defend the nation against cyber attacks, especially in preventive, preemptive, and retaliatory actions?https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1527/thumbnail.jp

Web Note No. 4a

Replacing Alaska’s public infrastructure would cost nearly $59 billion, in today’s dollars. That includes, as the table shows, the costs of replacing public buildings as well as transportation and utility systems.1 This is an update of an estimate ISER made in 2007—which at that time was the first comprehensive estimate of the cost to replace Alaska’s public infrastructure.2 That 2007 estimate was considerably less—about$39.5 billion—but we emphasized at the time that it was preliminary. It did not take into account that costs to replace infrastructure in remote areas are higher, and it undercounted and undervalued certain types of infrastructure, including power and telephone systems. This revised estimate is based on an analysis of cost differences across the state, additional data on existing infrastructure, and additional consultation with engineers, architects, and cost estimators