Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.run-off, municipal elections, political bargaining, property

Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme position s of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise between these two extremes.Endogenous party formation, strong nash equilibrium, spatial competition

Party Formation and Minority Ideological Positions

We develop a model where voters differ in their exogenous income and in their ideological views, with racism as an illustration. Electoral competition takes place between an endogenous number of parties which propose platforms consisting of both an ideological and an economic dimension. Our objective is to explain the emergence of minority ideological positions and to understand the role played by political parties in this emergence. We first show that, in a pure citizen‐candidate model where parties are absent, the only equilibrium consists of the majority ideological position. We then show that allowance for the formation of political parties generates equilibria with minority ideological positions

Endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multi-party system with two dominant parties

We develop a model of endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty system with two dominant parties, in an environment of uncertainty about the outcome of the election. Using quasi-lexicographic preferences over the number of seats necessary for a party to form a single-party government we explore the choice of the electoral law by the parties. We show that the minor parties never agree to an electoral reform that distorts the Proportional Representation system (PR). We also show that when the electoral competition among the two dominant parties is non-trivial there exists a unique and stable equilibrium: a unique new electoral rule is being adapted by the parliament in substitution of the PR rule. That is we show that when uncertainty about the outcome of the elections is present and if the dominant parties have a strong desire for single-party governments then strategic incentives to collude between them and distort the PR rule kick in. Hence, by colluding they also increase the probability that the winner will form a single-party government. The paper in e¤ect shows that under an uncertain political environment the two dominant parties have an incentive to collude in favour of stability (single-party governments) by eliminating the e¤ect of the third party in the formation of government. To conclude we also show that the equilibrium with the above characteristic is also unique. In an extension we use the timing of the electoral reform as a strategic variable

Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise between these two extremesThe second author wishes to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education, projects no. PB93-0940, PB94-1504 and D.G.I.C.Y.T. mobility grantThe first author is supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The second author wishes to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education, projects no. PB93-0940, PB94-1504 and D.G.I.C.Y.T. mobility grantPublicad

Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives-to form parties before the elections. In this way Duverger\u27s hypothesis can be formally explained by the strategic behavior of political elites. If politicians care primarily about private benefits, the equilibrium policy outcome under a proportional electoralsystem coincides with the median party\u27s position. On the other hand, with quasilinear utility, the.distance from the median voter outcome may be lower with plurality rule

Interdependent policy instrument preferences: a two-mode network approach

In policymaking, actors are likely to take the preferences of others into account when strategically positioning themselves. However, there is a lack of research that conceives of policy preferences as an interdependent system. In order to analyse interdependencies, we link actors to their policy preferences in water protection, which results in an actor-instrument network. As actors exhibit multiple preferences, a complex two-mode network between actors and policies emerges. We analyse whether actors exhibit interdependent preference profiles given shared policy objectives or social interactions among them. By fitting an exponential random graph model to the actor-instrument network, we find considerable clustering, meaning that actors tend to exhibit preferences for multiple policy instruments in common. Actors tend to exhibit interdependent policy preferences when they are interconnected, that is, they collaborate with each other. By contrast, actors are less likely to share policy preferences when a conflict line divides them