Image Reconstruction from Bag-of-Visual-Words

The objective of this work is to reconstruct an original image from Bag-of-Visual-Words (BoVW). Image reconstruction from features can be a means of identifying the characteristics of features. Additionally, it enables us to generate novel images via features. Although BoVW is the de facto standard feature for image recognition and retrieval, successful image reconstruction from BoVW has not been reported yet. What complicates this task is that BoVW lacks the spatial information for including visual words. As described in this paper, to estimate an original arrangement, we propose an evaluation function that incorporates the naturalness of local adjacency and the global position, with a method to obtain related parameters using an external image database. To evaluate the performance of our method, we reconstruct images of objects of 101 kinds. Additionally, we apply our method to analyze object classifiers and to generate novel images via BoVW

On the contribution of binocular disparity to the long-term memory for natural scenes

Binocular disparity is a fundamental dimension defining the input we receive from the visual world, along with luminance and chromaticity. In a memory task involving images of natural scenes we investigate whether binocular disparity enhances long-term visual memory. We found that forest images studied in the presence of disparity for relatively long times (7s) were remembered better as compared to 2D presentation. This enhancement was not evident for other categories of pictures, such as images containing cars and houses, which are mostly identified by the presence of distinctive artifacts rather than by their spatial layout. Evidence from a further experiment indicates that observers do not retain a trace of stereo presentation in long-term memory

Categories of insight and their correlates: An exploration of relationships among classic-type insight problems, rebus puzzles, remote associates and esoteric analogies.

A central question in creativity concerns how insightful ideas emerge. Anecdotal examples of insightful scientific and technical discoveries include Goodyear's discovery of the vulcanization of rubber, and Mendeleev's realization that there may be gaps as he tried to arrange the elements into the Periodic Table. Although most people would regard these discoveries as insightful, cognitive psychologists have had difficulty in agreeing on whether such ideas resulted from insights or from conventional problem solving processes. One area of wide agreement among psychologists is that insight involves a process of restructuring. If this view is correct, then understanding insight and its role in problem solving will depend on a better understanding of restructuring and the characteristics that describe it. This article proposes and tests a preliminary classification of insight problems based on several restructuring characteristics: the need to redefine spatial assumptions, the need to change defined forms, the degree of misdirection involved, the difficulty in visualizing a possible solution, the number of restructuring sequences in the problem, and the requirement for figure-ground type reversals. A second purpose of the study was to compare performance on classic spatial insight problems with two types of verbal tests that may be related to insight, the Remote Associates Test (RAT), and rebus puzzles. In doing so, we report on the results of a survey of 172 business students at the University of Waikato in New Zealand who completed classic-type insight, RAT and rebus problems

Associating object names with descriptions of shape that distinguish possible from impossible objects.

Five experiments examine the proposal that object names are closely linked torepresentations of global, 3D shape by comparing memory for simple line drawings of structurally possible and impossible novel objects.Objects were rendered impossible through local edge violations to global coherence (cf. Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990) and supplementary observations confirmed that the sets of possible and impossible objects were matched for their distinctiveness. Employing a test of explicit recognition memory, Experiment 1 confirmed that the possible and impossible objects were equally memorable. Experiments 2–4 demonstrated that adults learn names (single-syllable non-words presented as count nouns, e.g., “This is a dax”) for possible objectsmore easily than for impossible objects, and an item-based analysis showed that this effect was unrelated to either the memorability or the distinctiveness of the individual objects. Experiment 3 indicated that the effects of object possibility on name learning were long term (spanning at least 2months), implying that the cognitive processes being revealed can support the learning of object names in everyday life. Experiment 5 demonstrated that hearing someone else name an object at presentation improves recognition memory for possible objects, but not for impossible objects. Taken together, the results indicate that object names are closely linked to the descriptions of global, 3D shape that can be derived for structurally possible objects but not for structurally impossible objects. In addition, the results challenge the view that object decision and explicit recognition necessarily draw on separate memory systems,with only the former being supported by these descriptions of global object shape. It seems that recognition also can be supported by these descriptions, provided the original encoding conditions encourage their derivation. Hearing an object named at encoding appears to be just such a condition. These observations are discussed in relation to the effects of naming in other visual tasks, and to the role of visual attention in object identification

Neural blackboard architectures of combinatorial structures in cognition

Human cognition is unique in the way in which it relies on combinatorial (or compositional) structures. Language provides ample evidence for the existence of combinatorial structures, but they can also be found in visual cognition. To understand the neural basis of human cognition, it is therefore essential to understand how combinatorial structures can be instantiated in neural terms. In his recent book on the foundations of language, Jackendoff described four fundamental problems for a neural instantiation of combinatorial structures: the massiveness of the binding problem, the problem of 2, the problem of variables and the transformation of combinatorial structures from working memory to long-term memory. This paper aims to show that these problems can be solved by means of neural ‘blackboard’ architectures. For this purpose, a neural blackboard architecture for sentence structure is presented. In this architecture, neural structures that encode for words are temporarily bound in a manner that preserves the structure of the sentence. It is shown that the architecture solves the four problems presented by Jackendoff. The ability of the architecture to instantiate sentence structures is illustrated with examples of sentence complexity observed in human language performance. Similarities exist between the architecture for sentence structure and blackboard architectures for combinatorial structures in visual cognition, derived from the structure of the visual cortex. These architectures are briefly discussed, together with an example of a combinatorial structure in which the blackboard architectures for language and vision are combined. In this way, the architecture for language is grounded in perception