Empiricism, Stances, And The Problem Of Voluntarism

Classical empiricism leads to notorious problems having to do with the (at least prima facie) lack of an acceptable empiricist justification of empiricism itself. Bas van Fraassen claims that his idea of the empirical stance can deal with such problems. I argue, however, that this view entails a very problematic form of voluntarism which comes with the threat of latent irrationality and normative inadequacy. However, there is also a certain element of truth in such a voluntarism. The main difficulty consists in finding an acceptable form of voluntarism

Voluntarism, values and community : an intersubjective reading of Bas C. van Fraassen's The empirical stance

In The Empirical Stance, Bas C. van Fraassen suggests that philosophical positions include non-factual things like values and attitudes: they are "stances" rather than factual theses. Choosing between stances is not a matter of reason or rational compulsion; rather, we choose the stance that best reflects or expresses our values. For Dien Ho and Anja Jauernig, however, this reduces philosophy to a subjective expression of personal preference (subjectivism) and, moreover, reduces philosophical debate to an irresolvable value-based dispute (relativism). In this dissertation, I offer an intersubjective reading of van Fraassen. In doing so, I seek to extend what I think is an underdeveloped appeal to community in his work. Approaching van Fraassen with reference to community helps us to appreciate better his position (comprising his voluntarism and voluntarist epistemology, permissive rationality, and stance philosophy) and, as I hope to show, to respond to subjectivist and relativist concerns. In developing this community-based account, I first consider Brandom's model of reciprocal recognition. This gives us an understanding of stance choice as a process of mutually recognising and committing to particular values and attitudes. In choosing the empirical stance, say, I recognise and commit to the values of the empiricist community. In turn, this community recognises my commitment and acknowledges me as an empiricist, as an adherent of the empirical stance. In Brandom's model, then, we find an account of stance choice as a community matter rather than something purely subjective. This leaves the relativist issue unresolved: how can we defend our stance choice to another community, whose members perhaps do not share our relevant values? In addressing this, I consider Davidson's radical interpretation and his principle of charity. As Davidson shows us, if we want to interpret (and hence communicate with) another being, we must assume a shared background of agreement. Here I suggest that we might broaden this background agreement to include not only beliefs but also things like values and commitments. In this way, if I want to communicate with someone from another community, if I want to defend my values and stance choice to this being, then I must charitably assume that we share a common background of beliefs and values. At the very least, broadening the principle helps us to make further sense of van Fraassen's own response to Ho's relativist fears. Lastly I consider the epistemic issue of scientific and conceptual revolutions, in particular of the radical changes that are involved, in the context of community. I look at the role of emotion in van Fraassen's voluntarism and its connection to his notion of the "unfollowable rule". I suggest that further reflection on this connection might help us to make sense of drastic and emotional changes in perspective as a matter of community, since the unfollowable rule itself is community-based. As I hope to show, then, much light can be thrown upon van Fraassen The Empirical Stance by considering in detail the role of community and the theme of intersubjectivity in his work. This helps us to appreciate his position and offers him a genuine and detailed way to respond to the twin worries of subjectivism and relativism

Revisiting Stance Voluntarism: In Defense of an Active Stance Pluralism

Bas van Fraassen’s stance voluntarism has raised the question of how to justify one’s own stance choice if one is to follow the voluntarist dictum that all rational stances, i.e. all those that don’t lead to ‘self-sabotage by one’s own lights’, are equally rational. van Fraassen’s response is that one justifies their stance choice based on one’s own values, but the problem is that those values only appeal to holders of the said stance and not others. In this paper I propose a pragmatist approach to justifying stance choice. I argue that we can provide stance-transcendent justification for our choice of stance based on its stance-transcendent benefits. Consequently, multiple stances having stance-transcendent benefits should all be embraced as it is the epistemically virtuous thing to do. I advocate a move away from the standard voluntarist position of being a stance monist in practice – i.e. defending and holding only one stance – while acknowledging other rational stances only begrudgingly. I defend an active stance pluralism where we strive to actively hold different (apparently conflicting) stances depending on the context. Where that’s not possible, I propose that we should at least enthusiastically encourage multiple stances (taken by others). In Section 1 I introduce epistemic stances via a discussion of stance empiricism and stance scientific realism. In Section 2 I discuss the problem of stance justification and explore a few different existing teleological proposals for stance choice. Finally in Section 3 based on numerous examples from science and philosophy, I argue for a pragmatic, active, normative stance pluralism. I conclude with some clarifications on the rationale behind active stance pluralism

Revisiting Stance Voluntarism: In Defense of an Active Stance Pluralism

Bas van Fraassen’s stance voluntarism has raised the question of how to justify one’s own stance choice if one is to follow the voluntarist dictum that all rational stances, i.e. all those that don’t lead to ‘self-sabotage by one’s own lights’, are equally rational. van Fraassen’s response is that one justifies their stance choice based on one’s own values, but the problem is that those values only appeal to holders of the said stance and not others. In this paper I propose a pragmatist approach to justifying stance choice. I argue that we can provide stance-transcendent justification for our choice of stance based on its stance-transcendent benefits. Consequently, multiple stances having stance-transcendent benefits should all be embraced as it is the epistemically virtuous thing to do. I advocate a move away from the standard voluntarist position of being a stance monist in practice – i.e. defending and holding only one stance – while acknowledging other rational stances only begrudgingly. I defend an active stance pluralism where we strive to actively hold different (apparently conflicting) stances depending on the context. Where that’s not possible, I propose that we should at least enthusiastically encourage multiple stances (taken by others). In Section 1 I introduce epistemic stances via a discussion of stance empiricism and stance scientific realism. In Section 2 I discuss the problem of stance justification and explore a few different existing teleological proposals for stance choice. Finally in Section 3 based on numerous examples from science and philosophy, I argue for a pragmatic, active, normative stance pluralism. I conclude with some clarifications on the rationale behind active stance pluralism

A Pyrrhonist Examination of Scientific Knowledge

In the recent literature in the philosophy of science there is much discussion of scientific knowledge, but rarely an explicit account of such knowledge. Employing the Pyrrhonist skeptics modes, I examine the implicit ‘justified true belief’ analysis of scientific knowledge presented by Stathis Psillos, the primitivist account offered by Alexander Bird, and Bas van Fraassen’s voluntarist epistemology. I conclude that all of these positions appear to fail. Psillos’ account relies on a theory of reference that cannot block skeptical challenges to scientific realism, nor can it identify natural kinds in a non-ad hoc manner. Bird’s account also cannot refute skeptical challenges to it, nor can it adequately show how the full truth necessary for knowledge is acquired. Van Fraassen’s voluntarist epistemology attempts to avoid skepticism at the cost of inconsistency. From this representative sample of accounts I argue that there is seemingly no account of scientific knowledge that can as yet withstand Pyrrhonist skeptical scrutiny. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I give an overview of Pyrrhonist skepticism and the neo-Pyrrhonism of Robert Fogelin and Otavio Bueno, respectively. In the second chapter, I exposit Psillos’ semantic realist position, and argue that he gives an implicit justified true belief analysis of scientific knowledge. Moreover, I examine Bird’s primitivist account of knowledge. In chapter three, I discuss van Fraassen’s philosophy of science as stated in constructive empiricism and empiricist structuralism, and his voluntarist epistemology. In chapter four, I argue that all of these different views fail to provide a compelling theory of scientific knowledge. In the fifth chapter, I consider how the traditional Pyrrhonist take on the relation of theory to practice, and the positive epistemic additions of Fogelin and Bueno’s neo-Pyrrhonisms. I conclude that the traditional Pyrrhonists were acting inconsistently when they sought out new theories to influence their practice, and that the positive epistemic additions to the skeptical modes of Pyrrhonism fall prey to the modes themselves

Science and knowledge : a post-modern approach to empiricism

Science has become the standard for determining truth and producing knowledge. This has happened alongside the diminishing value of traditions and common sense as sources of knowledge. That is, science has become the benchmark for knowledge at the expense of other possible means. The fact that science has taken such a prominent position regarding knowledge is interesting when one considers the weaknesses of the realist position in the philosophy of science. By `realism' I mean the belief that scientific theories are true, or at least approximately true. I begin by discussing arguments both for and against scientific realism, I conclude that science is a non-realist enterprise and that while useful in helping us understand the world, calling the theories of science `true' is not a safe risk. Finally, since science is the standard for knowledge, I present a theory on the implications of this view for knowledge in general

Stance Pluralism, Scientology and the Problem of Relativism

Inspired by Bas van Fraassen’s Stance Empiricism, Anjan Chakravartty has developed a pluralistic account of what he calls epistemic stances towards scientific ontology. In this paper, I examine whether Chakravartty’s stance pluralism can exclude epistemic stances that licence pseudo-scientific practices like those found in Scientology. I argue that it cannot. Chakravartty’s stance pluralism is therefore prone to a form of debilitating relativism. I consequently argue that we need (1) some ground or constraint in relation to which epistemic stances can be ranked by degrees, and (2) some way to demarcate science from pseudo-science so that we know what epistemic stances are about. Regarding (1), I argue that empirical detectability can serve as the ground in relation to which epistemic stances are ranked by degrees. Regarding (2), I argue for ranking sciences on a continuum according to established institutional criteria, rather than attempting to draw a strict demarcation

Stance Empiricism and Epistemic Reason

Some versions of empiricism have been accused of being neither empirically confirmable nor analytically true and therefore meaningless or unknowable by their own lights. Carnap, and more recently van Fraassen, have responded to this objection by construing empiricism as a stance containing non-cognitive attitudes. The resulting stance empiricism is not subject to the norms of knowledge, and so does not selfdefeat as per the objection. In response to this proposal, several philosophers have argued that if empiricism is a stance, then there can be no distinctively epistemic reasons in favor of adopting it, but only prudential or moral reasons. I defend stance empiricism against this objection by showing that stance empiricism furthers many plausibly epistemic goals, such as false belief avoidance, wisdom, and justification. I respond to three objections to my argument: that I assume a conception of epistemic reason that leads to problematic tradeoffs (I do not), that to have epistemic reason is just to be epistemically justified (it is not), and that my premise that experience is the only source of information has no empirical content (it does)

Decision-Based Epistemology: sketching a systematic framework of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy

In this paper I defend the claim that Paul Feyerabend held a robust metaphilosophical position for most of his philosophical career. This position I call Decision-Based Epistemology and reconstruct it in terms of three key components: (1) a form of epistemic voluntarism concerning the justification of philosophical positions and (2) a behaviorist account of philosophical beliefs, which allows him (3) to cast normative arguments concerning philosophical beliefs in scientific methodology, such as realism, in terms of means-ends relations. I then introduce non-naturalist and naturalist variants of his conception of normativity, which I trace back to his mentors Viktor Kraft and Karl Popper, respectively. This distinction, introduced on the metaphilosophical level, can can be put to use to explain key changes in Feyerabend’s philosophical proposals, such as the viability of his methodological argument for realism. I conclude that this Decision-Based Epistemology should be further explored by historically embedding Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy in a voluntarist tradition of scientific philosophy.publishe