Empathy and Dyspathy with Androids: Philosophical, Fictional, and (Neuro)Psychological Perspectives

The fact that we develop feelings towards androids, i.e., objects with a humanlike appearance, has fascinated people since ancient times. However, as a short survey of the topic in history, science fiction literature and film shows, our emotional reactions towards them are ambivalent. On the one hand, we can develop feelings of empathy almost as we do with real human beings; on the other hand, we feel repulsion or dyspathy when those creatures show a very high degree of human likeness. Recently, Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori coined the term “uncanny valley” to refer to this effect. The aim of this essay is, first, to give an explanation as to why we feel empathy towards androids although we know that they do not have feelings themselves. This presupposes a perception-based concept of empathy which is going to be developed on the basis of some of Theodor Lipps’ ideas. The second question to be answered is why empathy with androids turns into dyspathy when they become very humanlike. As I will argue, this is due to a particular kind of interference between perception and the imagination when confronted with very humanlike objects. This makes androids quite special objects right at the divide between humans and non-humans. They are non-human, but we feel ill at ease when treating them as mere objects

A Sociability-based Theory of Solidarity

Notwithstanding the increasing interest that solidarity recently attracted in social, political, and moral philosophers, the foundations of a philosophical research field on solidarity have still to be laid. This thesis pursues the broad aim to contribute to this foundational work and is organized and structured accordingly. The substantive goal of the whole research project that unfolds henceforth is to reach a definition of the concept of solidarity, which is not intended to overcome or dismiss our everyday intuitions and commonsensical understandings of solidarity, but rather to make sense of what is underpinned by them. The dissertation is divided into four chapters. In Chapter 1, I take the steps from Durkheim, who is by broad acknowledgment regarded as the pioneering theorist developing a systematic account of solidarity. The potentially original contribution of Chapter 1 is a conclusive focus on some questions that can be formulated out of Durkheim\u2019s framework and have been quite neglected by the commentators of his works. One of such open questions, that is, the extent to which anthropological assumptions on human nature \u336 and especially sociability \u336 may influence any theorization of solidarity, prepares the terrain for the subsequent development of the dissertation. Chapter 2 aims at shedding light on this intuition, which is elaborated in terms of an updated nomological reappraisal of human nature and a genuinely original concept that I propose, that is, the \uabanthropological load\ubb. By this concept, I mean a scalar property of social, ethical, and political concepts which indicates the extent to which the conceptual space for theorizing each of them is determined by anthropological assumptions. Following Durkheim\u2019s suggestion, I consider sociability as the most salient anthropological assumption for theorizing solidarity. Accordingly, at the end of Chapter 2, I present a possible strategy to frame the structure of the concept of sociability, that is, that of a dispositional and open cluster concept. Chapter 3 is intended to unpack some core features that compose the cluster of sociability, that is, capacity of self-categorization, the capacity of empathy, and capacity of being moved by prosocial motivation. For each of these features, it is proposed to adopt a definition borrowed from the pertinent scientific literature which will be selectively presented and discussed. To conclude, Chapter 4 takes the final and crucial step of the whole research project, that is, the definition of solidarity. The structure of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I still present seven cases that are, at least intuitively, solidarity-evoking. In so doing, a phenomenological catalog of solidarity will be provided, wide enough to give a flavor of the pervasiveness of the phenomenon; the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to the question of whether all of these cases can be covered by a concept of solidarity, to be defined. The subsequent endeavor of defining solidarity, to be attempted in the second section, shall stick to the methodological guidance offered by Chapter 2. Thus, the definition of solidarity will be developed accordingly, that is, based on the sociability-related properties unpacked in Chapter 3

Computational models of attachment and self-attachment

We explore, using a variety of models grounded in computational neuroscience, the dynamics of attachment formation and change. In the first part of the thesis we consider the formation of the traditional organised forms of attachment (as defined by Mary Ainsworth) within the context of the free energy principle, showing how each type of attachment might arise in infant agents who minimise free energy over interoceptive states while interacting with caregivers with varying responsiveness. We show how exteroceptive cues (in the form of disrupted affective communication from the caregiver) can result in disorganised forms of attachment (as first uncovered by Mary Main) in infants of caregivers who consistently increase stress on approach, but can have an organising (towards ambivalence) effect in infants of inconsistent caregivers. The second part of the thesis concerns Self-Attachment: a new self-administrable attachment-based psychotherapy recently introduced by Abbas Edalat, which aims to induce neural plasticity in order to retrain an individual's suboptimal attachment schema. We begin with a model of the hypothesised neurobiological underpinnings of the Self-Attachment bonding protocols, which are concerned with the formation of an abstract, self-directed bond. Finally, using neuroscientific findings related to empathy and the self-other distinction within the context of pain, we propose a simple spiking neural model for how empathic states might serve to motivate application of the aforementioned bonding protocols.Open Acces

Empathy, Enhancement, and Responsibility

abstract: This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions. First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people. Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible. Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE. Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.Dissertation/ThesisDoctoral Dissertation Philosophy 201

Civic Tenderness: Love\u27s Role in Achieving Justice

Martha Nussbaum’s work Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice identifies the role that compassion plays in motivating citizens in a just society. I expand on this discussion by considering how attitudes of indifference pose a challenge to the extension of compassion in our society. If we are indifferent to others who are in situations of need, we are not equipped to experience compassion for them. Building on Nussbaum’s account, I develop an analytic framework for the public emotion of Civic Tenderness to combat indifference. Civic tenderness is an orientation of concern that is generated for people and groups that are vulnerable in our society. For example, while we are all vulnerable to having material needs, some people are more vulnerable depending on their personal, social, political, economic, or environmental situations. I focus on two social injustices that largely affect African American and African descended people in America—poverty and the American Criminal Justice System. Whereas compassion responds to suffering, tenderness responds to vulnerability. Since occupying a situation of suffering implies having been vulnerable to suffering, vulnerability is prior to suffering and tenderness is prior to compassion. Civic tenderness is the expansion of tenderness among a society’s members, institutions, or systems. I argue that its expansion is initiated and sustained by a process called tenderization. Tenderization adjusts our perception of situations of vulnerability and motivates us to protect the vulnerable. Additionally, I propose a plan to initiate this process. I suggest that the state’s role will be to increase the recognition of situational vulnerability for groups like the imprisoned and the impoverished. This recognition encourages the society to adopt legislation considerate of the historical circumstances that caused a particular group’s vulnerability. In addition to legislative safety nets, I suggest the state should tenderize its citizens in order to reintegrate vulnerable citizens into society by giving them a sense of self-respect. As an exercise in non-ideal political theory, this research draws on social/political philosophy, moral and social psychology, and political science to provide an interdisciplinary perspective of the problem and possible solutions

Children's Third-Party Punishment Behaviour: The Roles of Deterrent Motives, Affective States and Moral Domains

Children engage in third-party punishment (3PP) from a young age in response to harm and fairness violations. However, several areas about children’s 3PP are still un-investigated: their motivations for engaging in 3PP; the emotional consequences of enacting 3PP; and the effect of moral domains on 3PP. In order to explore these topics, I developed two computerised paradigms: the MegaAttack game and the Minecraft Justice System. The former was used with 5- to 11-year-olds in the UK (Experiments 1-2) and Colombia (Experiment 3); the latter with British, Colombian and Italian 7- to 11-year-olds (Experiment 4). In both paradigms, as players violated different types of moral norms, children were asked to judge their behaviour and offered the opportunity to punish them. Additionally, in the Minecraft paradigm children could also compensate the victims. The type of transgression children watched did not fully predict their choice of 3PP type in terms of moral domains (Experiments 1-2), but significantly affected their severity and endorsement of 3PP (Experiment 4). Children did not appear motivated by reputational concerns, as their 3PP severity was not influenced by an audience, operationalised as cues of observation (Experiment 2) or accountability (Experiment 3). Children’s enjoyment of 3PP was generally low, although there were differences across countries (Experiments 2-3). In Experiment 4 children enjoyed compensating more than punishing. When asked whether they endorsed deterrence or retribution as their 3PP motive, children overwhelmingly chose deterrence, irrespective of their country, age and framing manipulation received. Reported deterrent motives, and lack of 3PP enjoyment or preference for compensation, together suggest that children, differently from adults, are not motivated by the retributive desire to see wrongdoers suffer. Results have implications for theoretical accounts of the cognitive and affective processes involved in 3PP, methodological implications for future research avenues and, potentially, practical implications for the development of intervention studies

Spare the Rod, the Time-Out, and Every Other Kind of Childhood Punishment Too: Why Parents Ought Not to Punish Their Children

It is a default rule of behaviour to avoid intentionally causing distress to others, which is why parental punishment of children requires justification. I consider how various theories that have been offered as justification for state criminal punishment might apply in the case of parental punishment of children. I argue that none of those theories is successful, usually largely on empirical grounds. While retributivism is unsuccessful in justifying parental punishment of children, it nevertheless gets some significant things right: the importance of censure, and the appropriateness of wrongdoers feeling bad. However, the correct kind of "feeling bad" is guilt for one's wrongdoing and sympathy for one's victim (if there is one), not the self-oriented distress that is induced by a punishment. As a matter of empirical fact, feelings of guilt and sympathy tend to motivate human beings to make amends, which is why it's appropriate for parents to encourage their children to have those feelings (or at least not interfere with them). I argue that punishing children is not an effective way to induce feelings of guilt and sympathy (indeed, punishment tends to interfere with them). Parents should use non-punitive discipline that encourages children to recognize their own wrongdoing as such, to feel sympathy for anyone they may have harmed, and they should help children to make amends. Parents ought not to punish their children.Doctor of Philosoph

Origen evolutivo del sentido de lo injusto y la venganza: estudio comparativo humanos-chimpancés = Evolutionary origins of unfairness and revenge: a comparative study between humans-chimpanzees

[spa] En la presente tesis se aborda el estudio evolutivo del castigo. La tesis se compone de cuatro experimentos: filogenia del castigo funcional (“functional punishment”) (estudio 1); ontogenia de la venganza (“functional spite”) (estudio 2) y filogenia y ontogenia de la emoción Schadenfreude (estudios 3 y 4). En el estudio 1, cuatro parejas de chimpancés jugaron al ultimátum y dictator game de manera iterativa. Nuestro objetivo era ver si se daban rechazos en repartos injustos como recurso para fomentar la futura generosidad del compañero; si los que ofrecían efectivamente variaban su generosidad dependiendo de los rechazos recibidos; si se daba reciprocidad positiva o negativa entre los sujetos participantes y si la generosidad del que ofrecía variaba entre juegos, es decir, dependiendo de la capacidad de respuesta del compañero. En el estudio 2, alrededor de 500 niños de 6 y 10 años jugaron al ultimátum game en una única interacción (one-shot). Nuestro objetivo era ver si los niños rechazaban repartos injustos aunque no pudieran obtener un futuro beneficio derivado de ese rechazo y si los que ofrecían eran capaces de anticipar un posible rechazo y ofrecían de forma generosa desde el principio. También exploramos si la edad y el sexo son factores determinantes en la tasa de rechazos y el comportamiento estratégico en niños. Por último, analizamos si chimpancés y niños de 4.5, 5 y 6 años incurrían gastos para seguir viendo cómo se castigaba a una persona que les había hecho daño previamente antes que para seguir viendo el castigo a una persona que se había portado bien con ellos (estudio 3). El estudio 4 lo llevamos a cabo solo con chimpancés. Repetimos la misma dinámica que en el estudio anterior pero esta vez el sujeto presenciaba cómo los agentes dirigían un daño o beneficio a otro chimpancé. Nuestro objetivo era ver si los chimpancés incurren gastos para disfrutar del castigo ejecutado a agentes que no interaccionaron directamente con ellos. Los estudios con chimpancés se llevaron a cabo en el Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center de Leipzig (Alemania) en colaboración con el Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology de la misma ciudad. Los estudios con niños se llevaron a cabo en diferentes centros escolares de Cataluña (estudio 1) y en el Max Planck Institute of Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences[eng] This thesis deals with the evolutionary study of punishment. The thesis consists of four experiments: phylogeny of functional punishment (study 1); ontogeny of revenge (“functional spite”) (study 2) and phylogeny and ontogeny of Schadenfreude (studies 3 and 4). In study 1, four chimpanzee dyads played the ultimatum and dictator games iteratively. Our goal was to see whether there were rejections of uneven distribution as a way to promote proposer’s future generosity; whether proposers consistently changed their behavior towards generosity based on rejections; whether there was positive or negative reciprocity between the members of the dyad and whether the proposr’s generosity varied between games, that is, depending on the recipient’s capacity to respond. In study 2, nearly 500 children aged 6 and 10 played the ultimatum game in a single (one-shot) interaction. Our goal was to see whether children rejected unfair distributions even if they could not obtain future benefits as well as whether the proposers were able to anticipate responder’s potential rejection and offered generously from the very beginning. We also explored whether age and sex were determinant factors for the rejection rate and for the existence of strategic behavior. Finally, we analyzed whether chimpanzees and children (aged 4.5, 5, and 6 years) incurred costs in order to continue watching how an agent who had previously harmed them was punished rather than continue watching an agent who was previously prosocial with them (study 3). Study 4 was only conducted with chimpanzees. We repeated the same procedure of study 3 but this time the subject witnessed how the antisocial and prosocial agents interacted with a conspecific. Our goal was to see whether chimpanzees incurred costs to enjoy watching punishment enacted towards agents who did not directly interact with them. The studies with chimpanzees were carried out at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in Leipzig (Germany) in collaboration with the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology located in the same city. The studies with children were carried out in different schools in Catalonia (study 1) and in the Max Planck Institute of Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences