Privacy Preserved Centralized Model for Counter Terrorism

Privacy preservation is an important aspect in field of counter terrorism. In the present scenario terrorist attacks are biggest problem for the mankind and whole world is under constant threat from these well-planned, sophisticated and coordinated terrorist operations. Now every country is focusing for counter terrorism. Government agencies are collecting the data from various sources and using that data to connect the dots to detect the terrorist group’s activities and prevent the peoples from terrorist attacks. There are some chances that information may be misused by agencies. Different countries are having government agencies which are dealing with the counter terrorism but they are not sharing the data with each other because they don’t want to disclose sensitive data. Alone a country can’t fight against the terrorism. In this paper we are proposing a model so that these agencies can share the information without violation of the privacy

Literacy and educational fundamentalism: an interview with Allan Luke

An interview on literacy at McGill University, 2003

Guide to Australia’s national security capability

This paper provides a single consolidated picture of the capabilities that enable Australia to achieve national security outcomes in a range of environments, including domestically, at the border, offshore and in cyberspace. Introduction The period since 2001 has been transformative for Australia’s national security and our national security challenges continue to evolve. To meet these challenges, we need new ways to coordinate and develop our capability and to shape the national security environment. Significant advances have been made in recent years to build greater collaboration and interoperability across the national security community. However, the increasing complexity of national security threats requires an even more consistent and connected approach to capability planning that complements existing individual agency arrangements. To that end, the Government has developed a security classified National Security Capability Plan to provide a single consolidated picture of the capabilities that enable Australia to achieve national security outcomes. This Guide offers an overview of Australia’s national security capability planning. It identifies the functions performed by the national security community and how these achieve the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy (2013). Capability planning is one of the tools that support Government to better consider how capabilities can be directed to meet national security objectives. This ensures that capability investment is focussed and that Government can give appropriate consideration to redirecting existing capabilities to meet new or emerging risks and opportunities. It also highlights areas where agencies’ capabilities are interdependent, identifying focus areas for collaboration and interoperability. Having a better understanding of our capabilities will help us to make more informed decisions about what we need. Australia’s national security arrangements are underpinned by a number of agencies working across areas such as diplomacy, defence, development, border protection, law enforcement and intelligence. Australia’s national security agencies include: Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) Australian Crime Commission (ACC) Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) Australian Federal Police (AFP) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO) Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Department of Defence (Defence) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA) Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) Office of National Assessments (ONA). The Capability Plan brings together, for the first time, a single view of the capabilities maintained by these agencies with the exception of Defence capabilities. Defence has a separate established capability planning process that includes the Defence White Paper (2013) and Defence Capability Plan (2012). Defence is a key contributor to Australia’s national security arrangements including leading the coordination and delivery of national security science and technology and works in close cooperation with other national security agencies. Defence capabilities will continue to be managed through existing mechanisms, principally the Defence Capability Plan. For the first time, the Capability Plan, and the accompanying Guide to Australia’s National Security Capability, presents a unified picture of the capabilities that exist across non-Defence national security agencies. Together with other strategic planning tools, this work informs the broader national security planning cycle and supports the objectives and implementation of overarching policy documents such as the National Security Strategy and the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper. The Capability Plan complements the Defence Capability Plan and does not seek to duplicate it. It should also be noted that the Guide has not been designed to signal specific initiatives or tender opportunities. Such processes will continue to be managed by individual agencies

The algorithmic regulation of security: An infrastructural perspective

This article contributes to debates on algorithmic regulation by focusing on the domain of security. It develops an infrastructural perspective, by analyzing how algorithmic regulation is enacted through the custom‐built transatlantic data infrastructures of the EU‐U.S. Passenger Name Records and Terrorism Financing Tracking Program programs. Concerning regulation through algorithms, this approach analyzes how specific, commercial data are rendered transferable and meaningful in a security context. Concerning the regulation of algorithms, an infrastructural perspective examines how public values like privacy and accountability are built into international data infrastructures. The creation of data infrastructures affects existing modes of governance and fosters novel power relations among public and private actors. We highlight emergent modes of standard setting, thus enriching Yeung's (2018) taxonomy, and question the practical effects of operationalizing public values through infrastructural choices. Ultimately, the article offers a critical reading of algorithmic security, and how it materially, legally, and politically supports specific ways of doing security

Cybersecurity: mapping the ethical terrain

This edited collection examines the ethical trade-offs involved in cybersecurity: between security and privacy; individual rights and the good of a society; and between the types of burdens placed on particular groups in order to protect others. Foreword Governments and society are increasingly reliant on cyber systems. Yet the more reliant we are upon cyber systems, the more vulnerable we are to serious harm should these systems be attacked or used in an attack. This problem of reliance and vulnerability is driving a concern with securing cyberspace. For example, a ‘cybersecurity’ team now forms part of the US Secret Service. Its job is to respond to cyber-attacks in specific environments such as elevators in a building that hosts politically vulnerable individuals, for example, state representatives. Cybersecurity aims to protect cyberinfrastructure from cyber-attacks; the concerning aspect of the threat from cyber-attack is the potential for serious harm that damage to cyber-infrastructure presents to resources and people. These types of threats to cybersecurity might simply target information and communication systems: a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on a government website does not harm a website in any direct way, but prevents its normal use by stifling the ability of users to connect to the site. Alternatively, cyber-attacks might disrupt physical devices or resources, such as the Stuxnet virus, which caused the malfunction and destruction of Iranian nuclear centrifuges. Cyber-attacks might also enhance activities that are enabled through cyberspace, such as the use of online media by extremists to recruit members and promote radicalisation. Cyber-attacks are diverse: as a result, cybersecurity requires a comparable diversity of approaches. Cyber-attacks can have powerful impacts on people’s lives, and so—in liberal democratic societies at least—governments have a duty to ensure cybersecurity in order to protect the inhabitants within their own jurisdiction and, arguably, the people of other nations. But, as recent events following the revelations of Edward Snowden have demonstrated, there is a risk that the governmental pursuit of cybersecurity might overstep the mark and subvert fundamental privacy rights. Popular comment on these episodes advocates transparency of government processes, yet given that cybersecurity risks represent major challenges to national security, it is unlikely that simple transparency will suffice. Managing the risks of cybersecurity involves trade-offs: between security and privacy; individual rights and the good of a society; and types of burdens placed on particular groups in order to protect others. These trade-offs are often ethical trade-offs, involving questions of how we act, what values we should aim to promote, and what means of anticipating and responding to the risks are reasonably—and publicly—justifiable. This Occasional Paper (prepared for the National Security College) provides a brief conceptual analysis of cybersecurity, demonstrates the relevance of ethics to cybersecurity and outlines various ways in which to approach ethical decision-making when responding to cyber-attacks

Action Stories for Counter Terrorism (extended abstract)

Due to the raised terrorist threat worldwide, there is an urgent need to research that assists security and police services to protect the public and key assets and to prevent attacks from taking place. Successful protection and prevention may require potential and known suspects to be monitored or arrested. These operations are high risk because inappropriate surveillance, interview or arrest may have damaging political, public relations and intelligence effects. In addition to better tracking information on which to base suspicions, the security and police services need to have confidence that operations will yield evidence that can demonstrate conclusively that a deceptive activity such as a terrorist attack was in the process of being planned or executed before an operation takes place