Fragmentation versus Stability in Bimodal Coalitions

Competing bimodal coalitions among a group of actors are discussed. First, a model from political sciences is revisited. Most of the model statements are found not to be contained in the model. Second, a new coalition model is built. It accounts for local versus global alignment with respect to the joining of a coalition. The existence of two competing world coaltions is found to yield one unique stable distribution of actors. On the opposite a unique world leadership allows the emergence of unstable relationships. In parallel to regular actors which have a clear coalition choice, ``neutral" ``frustrated" and ``risky" actors are produced. The cold war organisation after world war II is shown to be rather stable. The emergence of a fragmentation process from eastern group disappearance is explained as well as continuing western group stability. Some hints are obtained about possible policies to stabilize world nation relationships. European construction is analyzed with respect to european stability. Chinese stability is also discussed.Comment: 14 pages, latex, no figures, to appear in Physica

Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de las políticas en Uruguay

Uruguay genera una variedad de resultados políticos. Primero, hay políticas relativamente estables que permiten la apertura comercial y financiera del país. También, hay políticas de baja calidad e inflexibles relacionadas con políticas sociales, algunas áreas de reforma estatal (los salarios de los funcionarios del estado y mecanismos de contratación), el régimen de bancarrota, etc. Finalmente, estan los resultados volátiles que son generalmente los efectos de choques económicos, algunas veces relacionados con los gastos públicos. En los casos en que hay un precedente histórico o que la disponibilidad de mecanismos externos de cumplimento no conducen a políticas relativamente estables, la principal característica saliente de las políticas Uruguayas es la rigidez. La fuente de rigidez de las políticas Uruguayas parece ser una mezcla de factores institucionales (múltiples vetos, partidos fraccionados, y mecanismos de democracia directa) y conflictos políticos (preferencias de políticas divergentes), en los cuales es muy costoso moverse del status-quo debido a la gran amenaza de un reverso de las políticas. Las instituciones políticas en el Uruguay son propicias a alcanzar un acuerdo político a corto plazo, pero no pueden cooperar efectivamente y establecer políticas estables y flexibles al largo plazo. La dificultad está en conseguir intercambios políticos ínter temporales que son consistentes con las principales características del ambiente político: una cifra alta de principales actores políticos y vetos, una cifra considerable de maniobras políticas inobservables, una pobre aplicación de tecnología en el área económica, una burocracia políticamente influenciada, intercambios políticos que ocurren fuera del ruedo legislativo, y una particular constelación de partidos y preferencias además de un diseño costoso de políticas y cambios institucionales. (Disponible en Inglés)

Music and dance as a coalition signaling system

Evidence suggests that humans have neurological specializations for music processing, but a compelling adaptationist account of music and dance is lacking. The sexual selection hypothesis cannot easily account for the widespread performance of music and dance in groups (especially synchronized performances), and the social bonding hypothesis has severe theoretical difficulties. Humans are unique among the primates in their ability to form cooperative alliances between groups in the absence of consanguineal ties. We propose that this unique form of social organization is predicated on music and dance. Music and dance may have evolved as a coalition signaling system that could, among other things, credibly communicate coalition quality, thus permitting meaningful cooperative relationships between groups. This capability may have evolved from coordinated territorial defense signals that are common in many social species, including chimpanzees. We present a study in which manipulation of music synchrony significantly altered subjects’ perceptions of music quality, and in which subjects’ perceptions of music quality were correlated with their perceptions of coalition quality, supporting our hypothesis. Our hypothesis also has implications for the evolution of psychological mechanisms underlying cultural production in other domains such as food preparation, clothing and body decoration, storytelling and ritual, and tools and other artifacts

Lending stability to Europe's emerging market economies: On the importance of the EC and the ECU for East-Central Europe

The standard literature lists three ways in which the Western industrialised countries could support the transformation process in Europe's emerging market economies (EMEs): technical assistance, financial aid and trade access (see i.a. World Bank 1991, p. iv) . Important as such support would be, it may not suffice. This paper adresses the question whether the West could make a further major contribution: lending institutional stability to the EMEs. The starting point is the observation that an institutional deficiency or even void is one of the major causes of the transformation crisis. ' The old institutions have largely vanished; the emergence and consolidation of new and ultimately far superior institutional arrangements takes time; the nascent local institutions lack stability and credibility. Whereas the issues of credibility and institutional stability have featured prominently in the debate on some internal aspects of the transformation process, they have played no major role in the discussion on how the West could support the EMEs and how East-Central Europe could and should be incorporated into the process of European integration.

Mechanisms of Endogenous Institutional Change

This paper proposes an analytical-cum-conceptual framework for understanding the nature of institutions as well as their changes. In doing so, it attempts to achieve two things: First, it proposes a way to reconcile an equilibrium (endogenous) view of institutions with the notion of agents’ bounded rationality by introducing such concepts as a summary representation of equilibrium as common knowledge of agents. Second, it specifies some generic mechanisms of institutional coherence and change -- overlapping social embededdness, Schumpeterian innovation in bundling games and dynamic institutional complementarities -- useful for understanding the dynamic interactions of economic, political, social and organizational factors.

In Quest of the Political: The Political Economy of Development Policy Making

This paper explores some of the central debates in the application of political economy to development policy making. It is particularly concerned with the connection between theory, empirical observation, and the practice of policy decision making. It explores distinct traditions of political economy, some drawn from economics, others based in sociological theory, that generate distinct insights about why and when change is likely to occur in policies and institutions. The paper then raises the question of whether such traditions provide effective guidance about the politics of decision making and the process of policy reform and whether they generate helpful insights for reformers interested in encouraging such processes. It suggests that current approaches to political economy present a stark tradeoff between parsimony and elegance on the one hand and insight into conflict and process on the other. Both both traditions of political economy borrow assumptions about political interactions from contexts that may not be fully relevant to developing and transitional countries. In addition, when theory is compared to the extensive empirical literature that now exists about experiences for policy and institutional change, it fails to provide convincing explanations for some of the most important characteristics of real world politics--leadership, ideas, and success. Further, much theoretical and empirical work in political economy has fallen far behind in exploring the policy agendas that now confront developing and transitional countries.political economy of development, policy making in developing countries, policy reform, development policy choice

The Emergence of Institutions

This paper analyzes how institutions aimed at coordinating economic interactions may appear. We build a model in which agents play a prisoners’ dilemma game in a hypothetical state of nature. Agents can delegate the task of enforcing cooperation in interactions to one of them in exchange for a proper compensation. Two basic commitment problems stand in the way of institution formation. The first one is the individual commitment problem that arises because an agent chosen to run the institution may prefer to renege ex post. The second one is a “collective commitment” problem linked to the lack of binding agreements on the fee that will be charged by the centre once it is designated. This implies first that a potentially socially efficient institution may fail to arise because of the lack of individual incentives, and second that even if it arises, excessive rent extraction by the institution may imply a sub-optimal efficiency level, explaining the heterogeneity of observed institutional arrangements. An institution is less likely to arise in small groups with limited endowments, but also when the underlying commitment problem is not too severe. Finally, we show that the threat of secession by a subset of agents may endogenously solve part of the second commitment problem.Institution, Coordination, State of nature, Secession.

The Self-Organisation of Strategic Alliances

Strategic alliances form a vital part of today's business environment. The sheer variety of collaborative forms is notable - which include R&D coalitions, marketing and distribution agreements, franchising, co-production agreements, licensing, consortiums and joint ventures. Here we define a strategic alliance as a cooperative agreement between two or more autonomous firms pursuing common objectives or working towards solving common problems through a period of sustained interaction. A distinction is commonly made between 'formal' and 'informal' inter-firm alliances. Informal alliances involve voluntary contact and interaction while in formal alliances cooperation is governed by a contractual agreement. The advantage of formal alliances is the ability to put in place IPR clauses, confidentially agreements and other contractual measures designed to safeguard the firm against knowledge spill-over. However, these measures are costly to instigate and police. By contrast, a key attraction of informal relationships is their low co-ordination costs. Informal know-how trading is relatively simple, uncomplicated and more flexible, and has been observed in a number of industries. A number of factors affecting firms' decisions to cooperate or not cooperate within strategic alliances have been raised in the literature. In this paper we consider three factors in particular: the relative costs of coordinating activity through strategic alliances vis-a-vis the costs of coordinating activity in-house, the degree of uncertainty present in the competitive environment, and the feedback between individual decision-making and industry structure. Whereas discussion of the first two factors is well developed in the strategic alliance literature, the third factor has hitherto only been addressed indirectly. The contribution to this under-researched area represents an important contribution of this paper to the current discourse. In order to focus the discussion, the paper considers the formation of horizontal inter-firm strategic alliances in dynamic product markets. These markets are characterised by rapid rates of technological change, a high degree of market uncertainty, and high rewards (supernormal profits) for successful firms offset by shortening life cycles.Strategic Alliances, Innovation Networks, Self-Organisation