5,266 research outputs found
Emergence of Equilibria from Individual Strategies in Online Content Diffusion
Social scientists have observed that human behavior in society can often be
modeled as corresponding to a threshold type policy. A new behavior would
propagate by a procedure in which an individual adopts the new behavior if the
fraction of his neighbors or friends having adopted the new behavior exceeds
some threshold. In this paper we study the question of whether the emergence of
threshold policies may be modeled as a result of some rational process which
would describe the behavior of non-cooperative rational members of some social
network. We focus on situations in which individuals take the decision whether
to access or not some content, based on the number of views that the content
has. Our analysis aims at understanding not only the behavior of individuals,
but also the way in which information about the quality of a given content can
be deduced from view counts when only part of the viewers that access the
content are informed about its quality. In this paper we present a game
formulation for the behavior of individuals using a meanfield model: the number
of individuals is approximated by a continuum of atomless players and for which
the Wardrop equilibrium is the solution concept. We derive conditions on the
problem's parameters that result indeed in the emergence of threshold
equilibria policies. But we also identify some parameters in which other
structures are obtained for the equilibrium behavior of individuals
Differential Games of Competition in Online Content Diffusion
Access to online contents represents a large share of the Internet traffic.
Most such contents are multimedia items which are user-generated, i.e., posted
online by the contents' owners. In this paper we focus on how those who provide
contents can leverage online platforms in order to profit from their large base
of potential viewers.
Actually, platforms like Vimeo or YouTube provide tools to accelerate the
dissemination of contents, i.e., recommendation lists and other re-ranking
mechanisms. Hence, the popularity of a content can be increased by paying a
cost for advertisement: doing so, it will appear with some priority in the
recommendation lists and will be accessed more frequently by the platform
users.
Ultimately, such acceleration mechanism engenders a competition among online
contents to gain popularity. In this context, our focus is on the structure of
the acceleration strategies which a content provider should use in order to
optimally promote a content given a certain daily budget. Such a best response
indeed depends on the strategies adopted by competing content providers. Also,
it is a function of the potential popularity of a content and the fee paid for
the platform advertisement service.
We formulate the problem as a differential game and we solve it for the
infinite horizon case by deriving the structure of certain Nash equilibria of
the game
The ecology of social interactions in online and offline environments
The rise in online social networking has brought about a revolution in social
relations. However, its effects on offline interactions and its implications
for collective well-being are still not clear and are under-investigated. We
study the ecology of online and offline interaction in an evolutionary game
framework where individuals can adopt different strategies of socialization.
Our main result is that the spreading of self-protective behaviors to cope with
hostile social environments can lead the economy to non-socially optimal
stationary states
The influence of topology and information diffusion on networked game dynamics
This thesis studies the influence of topology and information diffusion on the strategic interactions of agents in a population. It shows that there exists a reciprocal relationship between the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of a population of players. In order to evaluate the influence of topology and information flow on networked game dynamics, strategic games are simulated on populations of players where the players are distributed in a non-homogeneous spatial arrangement. The initial component of this research consists of a study of evolution of the coordination of strategic players, where the topology or the structure of the population is shown to be critical in defining the coordination among the players. Next, the effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability of strategies is studied in detail. Based on the results obtained, it is shown that network topology plays a key role in determining the evolutionary stability of a particular strategy in a population of players. Then, the effect of network topology on the optimum placement of strategies is studied. Using genetic optimisation, it is shown that the placement of strategies in a spatially distributed population of players is crucial in maximising the collective payoff of the population. Exploring further the effect of network topology and information diffusion on networked games, the non-optimal or bounded rationality of players is modelled using topological and directed information flow of the network. Based on the topologically distributed bounded rationality model, it is shown that the scale-free and small-world networks emerge in randomly connected populations of sub-optimal players. Thus, the topological and information theoretic interpretations of bounded rationality suggest the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of socio-economical structures are cyclically interdependent
The influence of topology and information diffusion on networked game dynamics
This thesis studies the influence of topology and information diffusion on the strategic interactions of agents in a population. It shows that there exists a reciprocal relationship between the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of a population of players. In order to evaluate the influence of topology and information flow on networked game dynamics, strategic games are simulated on populations of players where the players are distributed in a non-homogeneous spatial arrangement. The initial component of this research consists of a study of evolution of the coordination of strategic players, where the topology or the structure of the population is shown to be critical in defining the coordination among the players. Next, the effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability of strategies is studied in detail. Based on the results obtained, it is shown that network topology plays a key role in determining the evolutionary stability of a particular strategy in a population of players. Then, the effect of network topology on the optimum placement of strategies is studied. Using genetic optimisation, it is shown that the placement of strategies in a spatially distributed population of players is crucial in maximising the collective payoff of the population. Exploring further the effect of network topology and information diffusion on networked games, the non-optimal or bounded rationality of players is modelled using topological and directed information flow of the network. Based on the topologically distributed bounded rationality model, it is shown that the scale-free and small-world networks emerge in randomly connected populations of sub-optimal players. Thus, the topological and information theoretic interpretations of bounded rationality suggest the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of socio-economical structures are cyclically interdependent
Modeling Evolutionary Dynamics of Lurking in Social Networks
Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all
large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the
behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by
others in the community without actively contributing back to the production of
social content. The amount and evolution of lurkers may strongly affect an
online social environment, therefore understanding the lurking dynamics and
identifying strategies to curb this trend are relevant problems. In this
regard, we introduce the Lurker Game, i.e., a model for analyzing the
transitions from a lurking to a non-lurking (i.e., active) user role, and vice
versa, in terms of evolutionary game theory. We evaluate the proposed Lurker
Game by arranging agents on complex networks and analyzing the system
evolution, seeking relations between the network topology and the final
equilibrium of the game. Results suggest that the Lurker Game is suitable to
model the lurking dynamics, showing how the adoption of rewarding mechanisms
combined with the modeling of hypothetical heterogeneity of users' interests
may lead users in an online community towards a cooperative behavior.Comment: 13 pages, 5 figures. Accepted at CompleNet 201
- …