Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects' understanding of the rule.Quadratic scoring rule, experimental methodology, experimental design

Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects’ understanding of the rule.quadratic scoring rule, belief elicitation, saliency, experiment

Elicitation of expectations using Colonel Blotto

We develop a mechanism based on the Colonel Blotto game to elicit (subjective) expectations in a group-based manner. In this game, two players allocate resources over possible future events. A fixed prize is awarded based on the amounts the players allocate to the realized event. We consider two payoff variations: under the proportional-prize rule, the award is split proportionally to the resources that players allocate to the realized event; under the winner-takes-all rule, the full award is given to the player who allocate the most resources to the realized event. When probabilities by which events realize are common knowledge to the players, both games are Bayesian–Nash incentive compatible in the sense that (expected) equilibrium allocations perfectly reflect the true realization probabilities. By means of a laboratory experiment, we find that in a setting where realization probabilities are common knowledge the game with the proportional-prize rule (Prop) elicits better distributions compared to both the winner-takes-all variation (Win) and a benchmark mechanism based on an individual-based proper scoring rule (Ind). Without common knowledge of realization probabilities Prop is at least as good as Ind, showing that it is possible to use a game to elicit expectations in a similar fashion to using a proper scoring rule

QUANTIFYING AND MANAGING RISK IN AGRICULTURE

Risk and Uncertainty,

The Future Prospect of PV and CSP Solar Technologies: An Expert Elicitation Survey

In this paper we present and discuss the results of an expert elicitation survey on solar technologies. Sixteen leading European experts from the academic world, the private sector and international institutions took part in this expert elicitation survey on Photovoltaic (PV) and Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) technologies. The survey collected probabilistic information on (1) how Research, Development and Demonstration (RD&D) investments will impact the future costs of solar technologies and (2) the potential for solar technology deployment both in OECD and non-OECD countries. Understanding the technological progress and the potential of solar PV and CPS technologies is crucial to draft appropriate energy policies. The results presented in this paper are thus relevant for the policy making process and can be used as better input data in integrated assessment and energy models.Expert Elicitation, Research, Development and Demonstration, Solar Technologies

Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis

Within-subject data from sequential social dilemma experiments reveal a correlation of first-and second-mover decisions for which two channels may be responsible, that our experiment allows to separate: i) a direct, preference-based channel that influences both first- and second-mover decisions; ii) an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs via a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. We find strong evidence for the indirect channel: beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. But when first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves, suggesting that the direct channel also plays a role.experimental economics, consensus effect, social dilemmas

Risk Preferences, Perceptions and Systematic Biases

Replaced with revised version of paper 07/21/06.Risk and Uncertainty,

Applying quadratic scoring rule transparently in multiple choice setting: a note

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects’ understanding of the rule