A framework for security requirements engineering

This paper presents a framework for security requirements elicitation and analysis, based upon the construction of a context for the system and satisfaction arguments for the security of the system. One starts with enumeration of security goals based on assets in the system. These goals are used to derive security requirements in the form of constraints. The system context is described using a problem-centered notation, then this context is validated against the security requirements through construction of a satisfaction argument. The satisfaction argument is in two parts: a formal argument that the system can meet its security requirements, and a structured informal argument supporting the assumptions expressed in the formal argument. The construction of the satisfaction argument may fail, revealing either that the security requirement cannot be satisfied in the context, or that the context does not contain sufficient information to develop the argument. In this case, designers and architects are asked to provide additional design information to resolve the problems

Understanding and Specifying Information Security Needs to Support the Delivery of High Quality Security Services

In this paper we present an approach for specifying and prioritizing information security requirements in organizations. It is important to prioritize security requirements since hundred per cent security is\ud not achievable and the limited resources available should be directed to satisfy the most important ones. We propose to explicitly link security requirements with the organization’s business vision, i.e. to provide business\ud rationale for security requirements. The rationale is then used as a basis for comparing the importance of different security requirements.\ud Furthermore we discuss how to integrate the aforementioned solution concepts into a service level management process for security services, which is an important step in IT Governance. We validate our approach by way of a focus group session

Arguing satisfaction of security requirements

This chapter presents a process for security requirements elicitation and analysis, based around the construction of a satisfaction argument for the security of a system. The process starts with the enumeration of security goals based on assets in the system, then uses these goals to derive security requirements in the form of constraints. Next, a satisfaction argument for the system is constructed, using a problem-centered representation, a formal proof to analyze properties that can be demonstrated, and structured informal argumentation of the assumptions exposed during construction of the argument. Constructing the satisfaction argument can expose missing and inconsistent assumptions about system context and behavior that effect security, and a completed argument provides assurances that a system can respect its security requirements

Developing Secure and Safe Systems with Knowledge Acquisition for Automated Specification

On spetsiaalsed tehnikad, mida kasutatakse riskihalduses nii turvalisuse kui ohutuse konstrueerimise domeenides. Nende tehnikate väljundid, mida tuntakse artefaktidena, on üksteisest eraldatud, mis toob kaasa mitmeid probleeme, kuna domeenid on sõltumatud ja ei ole domeeni, mis ühendaks neid mõlemat. Probleemi keskmes on see, et turvalisus- ja ohutusinsenerid töötavad erinevates meeskondades kogu süsteemiarenduse elutsükli jooksul, mille tulemusena riskid ja ohud on ebapiisavalt kaetud. Käesolevas magistritöös rakendatakse struktuurset lähenemist, turvalisuse ja ohutuse integreerimiseks läbi SaS (Safety and Security) domeeni mudeli loomise, mis integreerib neid mõlemaid. Lisaks töö käigus näidatakse, et on võimalik kasutada eesmärgipõhist KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification) keelt ohtude ja riskide analüüsiks, nii et kaetud saavad nii ohutus- kui ka turvadomeen, muutes nende väljundid e. artefaktid hästi struktureerituks, mille tulemusena toimub põhjalik analüüs ja suureneb usaldatavus. Me pakume välja lahenduse, mis sisaldab sellise domeeni mudeli loomist, milles on integreeritud ohtutuse ja turvalisuse domeenid. See annab parema võrdlus- ja integreerimisvõimaluse, leidmaks kahe domeeni vahelise kesktee ning ühendavad definitsioonid läbi nende kaardistamise üldises ontoloogias. Selline lahendus toob kokku turvalisuse ja ohutusedomeenide integratsiooni ühtsesse mudelisse, mille tulemusena tekib ohutus- ja turvalisustehnikate vahel vastastikune mõjustus ning toodab väljundeid, mida peetakse usaldusartefaktideks ning kasutab KAOSt domeeni mudeliga, mis on ehitatud juhtumianalüüsi põhjal. Peale vastloodud mudeli rakendumist viiakse läbi katse, milles analüüsitakse sedasama juhtumit, võrdlemaks selle tulemusi teiste juba olemasolevate mudelite tulemustega, et uurida sellise domeeni mõttekust. Struktureeritud lähenemine võib seega toimida liidesena, mis lihtsustab aktiivset interaktsiooni riski- ja ohuhalduses, aidates leida lahendusi probleemidele ja vastuoludele, mille lahendamiseks on vaja integreerida ohutuse ja turvalisuse domeenid ja kasutada unifitseeritud süsteemianalüüsi tehnikat, mille tulemusena tekib analüüsi tsentraalsus.There are special techniques languages that are used in risk management in both domains of safety engineering and security engineering. The outputs, known as artifacts, of these techniques are separated from each other leading to several difficulties due to the fact that domains are independent and that there is no one unifying domain for the two. The problem is that safety engineers and security engineers work in separated teams from throughout the system development life cycle, which results in incomplete coverage of risks and threats. The thesis applies a structured approach to integration between security and safety by creating a SaS (Safety and Security) domain model. Furthermore, it demonstrates that it is possible to use goal-oriented KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in automated Specification) language in threat and hazard analysis to cover both safety and security domains making their outputs, or artifacts, well-structured and comprehensive, which results in dependability due to the comprehensiveness of the analysis. The structured approach can thereby act as an interface for active interactions in risk and hazard management in terms of universal coverage, finding solutions for differences and contradictions which can be overcome by integrating the safety and security domains and using a unified system analysis technique (KAOS) that will result in analysis centrality

Hypermedia support for argumentation-based rationale: 15 years on from gIBIS and QOC

Having developed, used and evaluated some of the early IBIS-based approaches to design rationale (DR) such as gIBIS and QOC in the late 1980s/mid-1990s, we describe the subsequent evolution of the argumentation-based paradigm through software support, and perspectives drawn from modeling and meeting facilitation. Particular attention is given to the challenge of negotiating the overheads of capturing this form of rationale. Our approach has maintained a strong emphasis on keeping the representational scheme as simple as possible to enable real time meeting mediation and capture, attending explicitly to the skills required to use the approach well, particularly for the sort of participatory, multi-stakeholder requirements analysis demanded by many design problems. However, we can then specialize the notation and the way in which the tool is used in the service of specific methodologies, supported by a customizable hypermedia environment, and interoperable with other software tools. After presenting this approach, called Compendium, we present examples to illustrate the capabilities for support security argumentation in requirements engineering, template driven modeling for document generation, and IBIS-based indexing of and navigation around video records of meetings

Towards Automating the Construction & Maintenance of Attack Trees: a Feasibility Study

Security risk management can be applied on well-defined or existing systems; in this case, the objective is to identify existing vulnerabilities, assess the risks and provide for the adequate countermeasures. Security risk management can also be applied very early in the system's development life-cycle, when its architecture is still poorly defined; in this case, the objective is to positively influence the design work so as to produce a secure architecture from the start. The latter work is made difficult by the uncertainties on the architecture and the multiple round-trips required to keep the risk assessment study and the system architecture aligned. This is particularly true for very large projects running over many years. This paper addresses the issues raised by those risk assessment studies performed early in the system's development life-cycle. Based on industrial experience, it asserts that attack trees can help solve the human cognitive scalability issue related to securing those large, continuously-changing system-designs. However, big attack trees are difficult to build, and even more difficult to maintain. This paper therefore proposes a systematic approach to automate the construction and maintenance of such big attack trees, based on the system's operational and logical architectures, the system's traditional risk assessment study and a security knowledge database.Comment: In Proceedings GraMSec 2014, arXiv:1404.163

Using Problem Frames and projections to analyze requirements for distributed systems

Subproblems in a problem frames decomposition frequently make use of projections of the complete problem context. One specific use of projec-tions occurs when an eventual implementation will be distributed, in which case a subproblem must interact with (use) the machine in a projection that represents another subproblem. We refer to subproblems used in this way as services, and propose an extension to projections to represent services as a spe-cial connection domain between subproblems. The extension provides signifi-cant benefits: verification of the symmetry of the interfaces, exposure of the machine-to-machine interactions, and prevention of accidental introduction of shared state. The extension’s usefulness is validated using a case study

Discovering “unknown known” security requirements

Security is one of the biggest challenges facing organisations in the modern hyper-connected world. A number of theoretical security models are available that provide best practice security guidelines and are widely utilised as a basis to identify and operationalise security requirements. Such models often capture high-level security concepts (e.g., whitelisting, secure configurations, wireless access control, data recovery, etc.), strategies for operationalising such concepts through specific security controls, and relationships between the various concepts and controls. The threat landscape, however, evolves leading to new tacit knowledge that is embedded in or across a variety of security incidents. These unknown knowns alter, or at least demand reconsideration of the theoretical security models underpinning security requirements. In this paper, we present an approach to discover such unknown knowns through multi-incident analysis. The approach is based on a novel combination of grounded theory and incident fault trees. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach through its application to identify revisions to a theoretical security model widely used in industry

Engaging stakeholders in security design: an assumption-driven approach.

System stakeholders fail to engage with security until comparatively late in the design and development process. User Experience artefacts like personas and scenarios create this engagement, but creating and contextualising them is difficult without real-world, empirical data; such data cannot be easily elicited from disengaged stakeholders. This paper presents an approach for engaging stakeholders in the elicitation and specification of security requirements at a late-stage of a system's design; this approach relies on assumption-based personas and scenarios, which are aligned with security and requirements analysis activities. We demonstrate this approach by describing how it was used to elicit security requirements for a medical research portal