164 research outputs found

    Language and Cognition Interaction Neural Mechanisms

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    How language and cognition interact in thinking? Is language just used for communication of completed thoughts, or is it fundamental for thinking? Existing approaches have not led to a computational theory. We develop a hypothesis that language and cognition are two separate but closely interacting mechanisms. Language accumulates cultural wisdom; cognition develops mental representations modeling surrounding world and adapts cultural knowledge to concrete circumstances of life. Language is acquired from surrounding language “ready-made” and therefore can be acquired early in life. This early acquisition of language in childhood encompasses the entire hierarchy from sounds to words, to phrases, and to highest concepts existing in culture. Cognition is developed from experience. Yet cognition cannot be acquired from experience alone; language is a necessary intermediary, a “teacher.” A mathematical model is developed; it overcomes previous difficulties and leads to a computational theory. This model is consistent with Arbib's “language prewired brain” built on top of mirror neuron system. It models recent neuroimaging data about cognition, remaining unnoticed by other theories. A number of properties of language and cognition are explained, which previously seemed mysterious, including influence of language grammar on cultural evolution, which may explain specifics of English and Arabic cultures

    Neurally and Mathematically Motivated Architecture for Language and Thought

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    Neural structures of interaction between thinking and language are unknown. This paper suggests a possible architecture motivated by neural and mathematical considerations. A mathematical requirement of computability imposes significant constraints on possible architectures consistent with brain neural structure and with a wealth of psychological knowledge. How language interacts with cognition. Do we think with words, or is thinking independent from language with words being just labels for decisions? Why is language learned by the age of 5 or 7, but acquisition of knowledge represented by learning to use this language knowledge takes a lifetime? This paper discusses hierarchical aspects of language and thought and argues that high level abstract thinking is impossible without language. We discuss a mathematical technique that can model the joint language-thought architecture, while overcoming previously encountered difficulties of computability. This architecture explains a contradiction between human ability for rational thoughtful decisions and irrationality of human thinking revealed by Tversky and Kahneman; a crucial role in this contradiction might be played by language. The proposed model resolves long-standing issues: how the brain learns correct words-object associations; why animals do not talk and think like people. We propose the role played by language emotionality in its interaction with thought. We relate the mathematical model to Humboldt’s “firmness” of languages; and discuss possible influence of language grammar on its emotionality. Psychological and brain imaging experiments related to the proposed model are discussed. Future theoretical and experimental research is outlined

    Cosmology 2020

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    Cosmology 2020 – The Current State offers the reader several fresh ideas on this topic. The first chapter presents an argument that, both in theory and in reality, one cannot ignore the microscopic world to concentrate on the Universe at only the galactic level. Then we have several chapters presenting new explanations for dark energy and dark matter based on reasonable physics at the atomic level. We cover the beginnings of artificial intelligence to model a cosmological phenomenon and a chapter pointing out that better results can be culled from SNe Ia and HII data when appropriate computerised analyses are applied. We think this book will add some new ideas to the libraries of many cosmologists and astrophysicists

    Temporally scattered brain: neural mechanism apprehending the paradox of the discrete and continuous flow of consciousness

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    In dieser Dissertation werden offene Fragen über „Bewußtsein“ aus neurowissenschaftlicher, psychologischer und auch philosophischer Sicht erörtert. Es geht insbesondere darum, wie in traditionellen und modernen AnsĂ€tzen die Beziehung von zeitlicher Informations-Verarbeitung und ReprĂ€sentationen im Bewußtsein konzipiert werden. In einer historischen Aufarbeitung wird gezeigt, dass Zeit als mentale Kategorie in der psychologischen und neurowissenschaftlichen Forschung lange eher vernachlĂ€ssigt worden ist, was sich erst jetzt zu Ă€ndern scheint. Wie wichtig Informations-Verarbeitung im Zeitbereich für ein besseres VerstĂ€ndnis von Bewußtseinsprozessen ist, wird herausgearbeitet, denn alle Verhaltensweisen und alles bewußte Erleben haben notwendigerweise eine zeitliche Charakteristik. Die grundsĂ€tzliche aber bisher nicht hinreichend beantwortete Frage ist, ob diese Charakteristik, die Informations-Verarbeitung in der Zeit, als kontinuierlich oder als diskret zu verstehen ist. Neue Befunde legen nahe, dass so genannte „Zeitfenster“ bestimmter Dauer notwendig sind, um neuronale Informations-Verarbeitung zu ermöglichen, damit Bewußtseinsprozesse überhaupt entstehen können. Wenn aber diskrete Zeitfenster notwendig sind, dann stellt sich die weitere Frage, wie es paradoxerweise zum subjektiven Eindruck einer zeitlichen KontinuitĂ€t zum Beispiel in der Wahrnehmung kommen kann. Das Erleben zeitlicher KontinuitĂ€t bezieht sich nicht nur auf Prozesse der Wahrnehmng und des Erlebens, sondern auch auf den viel weiteren Rahmen der KontinuitĂ€t personaler IdentitĂ€t. Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass diese KontinuitĂ€t bei bestimmten Erkrankungen oder verĂ€nderten BewußtseinszustĂ€nden verloren gehen kann. Ein derartiger Verlust legt nahe, dass es aktive Mechanismen auf neuronaler Ebene geben sollte, die personale IdentitĂ€t über die Zeit hinweg erzeugen. Es mußt gleichsam ein „Klebstoff“ vermutet werden, der zeitlich Diskretes in anschauliche KontinuitĂ€t verwandelt. Mechanismen, die hierfür in Frage kommen könnten, sind bisher nicht bekannt. Ein erster Versuch zur AufklĂ€rung dieser Frage wird mit einem fMRT-Experiment gemacht, in dem visuelle und auditive Vorstellungen untersucht werden. Hier zeigt sich, dass in beiden ModalitĂ€ten gemeinsame neuronale Aktivierungen in bestimmten Hirnstrukturen zu beobachten sind, was möglicherweise einen ersten Hinweis auf die Erzeugung von anschaulicher KontinuitĂ€t geben könnte. Des weiteren wird am Ende der Arbeit auf die Bedeutung des Reafferenzprinzips hingewiesen, das vielleicht einen neuen Ansatz zum besseren VerstĂ€ndnis mancher PhĂ€nomene wie des DĂ©jĂ  Vu geben könnte, wenn man in dieses klassische Prinzip einen Zeitfaktor integriert, was bisher theoretisch nicht geschehen ist. WĂ€hrend der Fokus der Arbeit auf theoretischen Konzepten zu Zeit und Bewußtsein im psychologischen, neurowissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Kontext liegt, werden auch Bezüge zu den Künsten, der Dichtkunst und der Musik, offen gelegt. Dies soll darauf hinweisen, dass die Beziehung zwischen der „Zeit des Menschen“ und dem bewußten Erleben ein Menschheitsthema ist, das über den wissenschhaftlichen Rahmen hinaus weist.In this dissertation open questions about “consciousness” are discussed from a psychological, neuroscientific and also philosophical perspective. In particular, it is described how the relationship between temporal information processing and conscious representations is conceived in traditional and modern approaches. In a historical review it is shown that time as a mental category has been neglected for a long time in psychological and neuroscientific research, although this is changing recently. The importance of temporal information processing for a better understanding of conscious processes is analyzed because any behavior and all subjective experiences necessarily have a temporal characteristic. There is, however, a basic and still open question whether this characteristic, i.e., temporal information processing, is continuous or discrete. New research suggests that “time windows” of specific durations are necessary in neural information processing being the basis for conscious representations. If, however, discrete time windows are necessary the question arises how paradoxically the subjective impression of temporal continuity for instance in perception is possible. The impression of temporal continuity refers, however, not only to processes of perception and experience, but in a broader context also to the continuity of personal identity. It is indicated that this continuity can break down in certain diseases or in altered states of consciousness. Such losses suggest the existence of active mechanisms on the neural level which allow for the creation of personal identity across time. Some kind of “glue” has to be suspected that transforms what is temporally discrete into apparent continuity. Potential mechanisms for this transformation are still not known. A first attempt is made to answer this question with an fMRI-experiment in which visual and auditory images are analyzed. For both modalities’ common activations in certain brain regions are observed which possibly might be a first indication about a mechanism creating apparent continuity. At the end of the dissertation the importance of the reafference principle is stressed as it may provide a new perspective towards a better understanding of some phenomena like DĂ©ja Vu, if one includes in this classical principle a temporal factor which theoretically has not been done yet. Although the focus of the dissertation lies on theoretical concepts of time and consciousness within a psychological, neuroscientific and philosophical context, some links to the arts like poetry and music are made transparent. This shall indicate that the relationship between the “time of humans” and conscious experiences is a topic of humankind that goes beyond the scientific frame
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