522 research outputs found

    Revealed Distributional Preferences: Individuals vs. Teams

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    We compare experimentally the revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams in allocation tasks. We find that teams are significantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality while the benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar across decision makers. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that while a substantial fraction of individuals is classified as inequality averse, this type disappears completely in teams. Spiteful types are markedly more frequent among individuals than among teams. On the other hand, by far more teams than individuals are classified as efficiency lovers

    Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assignment Game

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    History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn-taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs.Learning, Teaching, Assignment Game, Laboratory Experiment, Repeated Games, Turn Taking, Common-Pool Resources

    Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 x 2 games

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    Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings captured by various widely studied 2 × 2 games. This article develops a repeated game model that allows us to systematically investigate turn-taking behavior in many 2 × 2 games, including the battle of the sexes, the game of chicken, the game of common-poolresources assignment, and a particular version of the prisoners' dilemma.We consider the "turn taking with independent randomizations" (TTIR) strategy that achieves three objectives: (a) helping the players reach the turn-taking path, (b) resolving the question of who takes the good turn first, and (c) deterring defection.We determine conditions under which there exists a unique TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We also show that there exist conditions under which an increase in the "degree of conflict" of the stage game leads to a decrease in the expected number of periods in reaching the turn-taking path. © The Author(s) 2011.published_or_final_versionSpringer Open Choice, 21 Feb 201

    Achieving Intertemporal Efficiency and Symmetry through Intratemporal Asymmetry: (Eventual) Turn Taking in a Class of Repeated Mixed-Interest Games

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    Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings. We study when and how turn taking can be supported as an equilibrium outcome in a class of repeated games, where the stage game is a symmetric two-player mixed-interest game with asymmetric joint-payoff-maximizing outcomes that may or may not be Nash equilibria. We consider the "turn taking with independent randomizations" (TTIR) strategy that achieves the following three objectives: (a) helping the players get onto a joint-payoff-maximizing turn-taking path, (b) resolving the question of who gets to start with the good turn first, and (c) deterring defection. The TTIR strategy is simpler than those time-varying strategies considered in the Folk Theorem for repeated games. We determine conditions under which a symmetric TTIR subgame-perfect equilibrium exists and is unique. We also derive comparative static results, and study the welfare properties of the TTIR equilibrium.Conflict, Coordination, Randomization, Turn Taking, Repeated Games

    Overcoming moral hazard with social networks in the workplace : an experimental approach

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    The use of social networks in the workplace has been documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread prevalence are less well known. In this paper we present evidence based on a lab experiment that suggests quite strongly that social networks are used by employers to reduce worker moral hazard. We capture moral hazard with a dictator game between the referrer and worker. The worker chooses how much to return under different settings of social proximity. Social proximity is captured using Facebook friendship information gleaned anonymously from subjects once they have been recruited. Since employers themselves do not have access to social connections, they delegate the decision to referrers who can select among workers with different degrees of social proximity to themselves. We show that employers choose referrals over anonymous hiring relatively more when they know that the referrer has access to friends, and are willing to delegate more often when the social proximity between referrer and worker is potentially higher. In keeping with this expectation, referrers also choose workers with a greater social proximity to themselves and workers who are closer to referrers indeed pay back more to the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate directed altruism as the only reason for these results

    Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups

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    We discuss how small group interactions overcome evolutionary problems that might otherwise erode vengefulness as a preference trait. The basic viability problem is that the fitness benefits of vengeance often do not cover its personal cost. Even when a sufficiently high level of vengefulness brings increased fitness, at lower levels, vengefulness has a negative fitness gradient. This leads to the threshold problem: how can vengefulness become established in the first place? If it somehow becomes established at a high level, vengefulness creates an attractive niche for cheap imitators, those who look like highly vengeful types but do not bear the costs. This is the mimicry problem, and unchecked it could eliminate vengeful traits. We show how within-group social norms can solve these problems even when encounters with outsiders are also important.

    Cooperation and the In-Group-Out-Group Bias: A Field Test on Israeli Kibbutz Members and City Residents

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    The in-group-out-group bias is among the most well documented and widely observed phenomenon in the social sciences. Despite its role in hiring decisions and job discrimination, negotiations, and conflict and competition between groups, economists have heretofore ignored the in- group-out-group bias. We question the universality of the bias by designing field experiments to test whether it extends to the cooperative behavior of one of the most successful and best-known modern collective societies, the Israeli kibbutz. The facts that kibbutz members have voluntarily chosen their lifestyle of cooperation and egalitarianism, the ease with which they could join the surrounding capitalist society, their disproportionate involvement in social and national causes and their revealed willingness to sacrifice for the benefit of Israeli society as a whole suggest that if ever there was a society of individuals whose cooperativeness extends equally to members and non-members, the kibbutz is it. Nonetheless, the findings from our field experiments indicate that kibbutz members display higher levels of cooperation when paired with anonymous kibbutz members than when paired with city residents. In fact, when paired with city residents, kibbutz members’ observed levels of cooperation are identical to those displayed by the city residents. Moreover, we present evidence that kibbutz socialization actually damages the willingness of members to cooperate with one another.cooperation, in-group-out-group bias, field experiment, self- selection, socialization, kibbutz

    Cooperation and the In-Group-Out-Group Bias: A Field Test on Israeli Kibbutz Members and City Residents

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    The in-group-out-group bias is among the most well documented and widely observed phenomenon in the social sciences. Despite its role in hiring decisions and job discrimination, negotiations, and conflict and competition between groups, economists have paid little attention to the in-group-out-group bias. We question the universality of the bias by conducting field experiments to test whether it extends to the cooperative behavior of one of the most successful and best-known modern collective societies, the Israeli kibbutz. The facts that kibbutz members have voluntarily chosen their lifestyle of cooperation and egalitarianism, the ease with which they could join the surrounding capitalist society and their disproportionate involvement in social and national causes suggest that if ever there was a society of individuals whose cooperativeness extends equally to members and non-members, the kibbutz is it. Nonetheless, our results indicate that kibbutz members display higher levels of cooperation when paired with anonymous kibbutz members than when paired with city residents. In fact, when paired with city residents, kibbutz members-observed levels of cooperation are identical to those of the city residents. Moreover, we show that self-selection rather than kibbutz socialization largely accounts for the extent to which kibbutz members are cooperative.cooperation, in-group-out-group bias, field experiment, self-selection, socialization, kibbutz

    Environmental valuation, ecosystem services and aquatic species

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    The thesis consists of an introduction and four articles that can be read independently of each other. The common topic is environmental valuation and cost-benefit analysis. The applications relates to the growing concern of invasive species, and to waterpower externalities. In broad terms, all of the articles relates to water management. Article 1: "A Cost-Benefit analysis of introducing a non-native species: the case of signal crayfish in Sweden", assesses the economic impact of introducing the signal crayfish into a Swedish lake. Two scenarios are set up and compared. The first one assumes that there is no introduction of signal crayfish, so that the noble crayfish is preserved. In the second scenario, the signal crayfish is introduced, which immediately wipes out the entire stock of noble crayfish. The values of noble- and signal crayfish populations are measured as present values of their net future revenues. The values are than compared and net benefit of an introduction is calculated. The result indicate that net benefit of an introduction is positive if the intrinsic growth rate or the carrying capacity of the noble crayfish is below 40 % that of the signal crayfish. Article 2: "Assessing management options for weed control with demanders and non-demanders in a choice experiment", estimates the benefits of having a weed management program for a lake in Sweden, and then compares them with corresponding costs. The policy recommendation from a simple cost-benefit rule is to control the weed at some specific sites of the lake. This paper also suggest how to distinguish those that have a positive WTP for at least one of the attributes (demanders) from those that have zero WTP for all attributes (non-demanders). The advantage of the suggested approach is that it facilitates to more clearly distinguish between conditional and unconditional willingness to pay. The suggested approach could also overcome some of the problems in the literature with negative welfare measures. Article 3: "Assessing transfer errors in the benefit transfer method: An application of invasive weed management using choice experiment", tests the accuracy of transferring benefits of a weed management program from one lake to another using choice experiment. The transfer errors are assessed and the convergent validity hypothesis is tested. Estimating the accuracy of benefit transfer for weed management is policy relevant as there are a number of lakes in Sweden infested with the water weed. The convergent validity was rejected for three out of five welfare estimates with a ten per cent significance level. Article 4: "Willingness to pay for environmental improvements in hydropower regulated rivers", assesses the benefits of environmental improvements along hydropower regulated rivers using choice experiments. Remedial measures that improve the conditions for fish, benthic invertebrates and river-margin vegetation were found to have a significant welfare increasing impact. The results can be of value for the implementation of the Water Framework Directives in Sweden, which aims to reform the use of all surface water and ground water in the member states
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