Effective Edge-Fault-Tolerant Single-Source Spanners via Best (or Good) Swap Edges

Computing \emph{all best swap edges} (ABSE) of a spanning tree $T$ of a given $n$-vertex and $m$-edge undirected and weighted graph $G$ means to select, for each edge $e$ of $T$, a corresponding non-tree edge $f$, in such a way that the tree obtained by replacing $e$ with $f$ enjoys some optimality criterion (which is naturally defined according to some objective function originally addressed by $T$). Solving efficiently an ABSE problem is by now a classic algorithmic issue, since it conveys a very successful way of coping with a (transient) \emph{edge failure} in tree-based communication networks: just replace the failing edge with its respective swap edge, so as that the connectivity is promptly reestablished by minimizing the rerouting and set-up costs. In this paper, we solve the ABSE problem for the case in which $T$ is a \emph{single-source shortest-path tree} of $G$, and our two selected swap criteria aim to minimize either the \emph{maximum} or the \emph{average stretch} in the swap tree of all the paths emanating from the source. Having these criteria in mind, the obtained structures can then be reviewed as \emph{edge-fault-tolerant single-source spanners}. For them, we propose two efficient algorithms running in $O(m n +n^2 \log n)$ and $O(m n \log \alpha(m,n))$ time, respectively, and we show that the guaranteed (either maximum or average, respectively) stretch factor is equal to 3, and this is tight. Moreover, for the maximum stretch, we also propose an almost linear $O(m \log \alpha(m,n))$ time algorithm computing a set of \emph{good} swap edges, each of which will guarantee a relative approximation factor on the maximum stretch of $3/2$ (tight) as opposed to that provided by the corresponding BSE. Surprisingly, no previous results were known for these two very natural swap problems.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figures, SIROCCO 201

Dynamic mechanism design

AbstractIn this paper we address the question of designing truthful mechanisms for solving optimization problems on dynamic graphs with selfish edges. More precisely, we are given a graph G of n nodes, and we assume that each edge of G is owned by a selfish agent. The strategy of an agent consists in revealing to the system–at each time instant–the cost at the actual time for using its edge. Additionally, edges can enter into and exit from G. Among the various possible assumptions which can be made to model how this edge-cost modifications take place, we focus on two settings: (i) the dynamic, in which modifications can happen at any time, and for a given optimization problem on G, the mechanism has to maintain efficiently the output specification and the payment scheme for the agents; (ii) the time-sequenced, in which modifications happens at fixed time steps, and the mechanism has to minimize an objective function which takes into consideration both the quality and the set-up cost of a new solution. In both settings, we investigate the existence of exact and approximate truthful (w.r.t. to suitable equilibrium concepts) mechanisms. In particular, for the dynamic setting, we analyze the minimum spanning tree problem, and we show that if edge costs can only decrease and each agent adopts a myopic best response strategy (i.e., its utility is only measured instantaneously), then there exists an efficient dynamic truthful (in myopic best response equilibrium) mechanism for handling a sequence of k declarations of edge-cost reductions having runtime O((h+k)logn), where h is the overall number of payment changes

Path-Fault-Tolerant Approximate Shortest-Path Trees

Let $G=(V,E)$ be an $n$-nodes non-negatively real-weighted undirected graph. In this paper we show how to enrich a {\em single-source shortest-path tree} (SPT) of $G$ with a \emph{sparse} set of \emph{auxiliary} edges selected from $E$, in order to create a structure which tolerates effectively a \emph{path failure} in the SPT. This consists of a simultaneous fault of a set $F$ of at most $f$ adjacent edges along a shortest path emanating from the source, and it is recognized as one of the most frequent disruption in an SPT. We show that, for any integer parameter $k \geq 1$, it is possible to provide a very sparse (i.e., of size $O(kn\cdot f^{1+1/k})$) auxiliary structure that carefully approximates (i.e., within a stretch factor of $(2k-1)(2|F|+1)$) the true shortest paths from the source during the lifetime of the failure. Moreover, we show that our construction can be further refined to get a stretch factor of $3$ and a size of $O(n \log n)$ for the special case $f=2$, and that it can be converted into a very efficient \emph{approximate-distance sensitivity oracle}, that allows to quickly (even in optimal time, if $k=1$) reconstruct the shortest paths (w.r.t. our structure) from the source after a path failure, thus permitting to perform promptly the needed rerouting operations. Our structure compares favorably with previous known solutions, as we discuss in the paper, and moreover it is also very effective in practice, as we assess through a large set of experiments.Comment: 21 pages, 3 figures, SIROCCO 201

Truthful Mechanisms for Delivery with Agents

We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ packages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in an undirected graph, and $k$ mobile heterogeneous agents, each being able to transport one package at a time. Following a recent model [Baertschi et al. 2017], each agent i has a different rate of energy consumption per unit distance traveled, i.e., its weight. We are interested in optimizing or approximating the total energy consumption over all selected agents. Unlike previous research, we assume the weights to be private values known only to the respective agents. We present three different mechanisms which select, route and pay the agents in a truthful way that guarantees voluntary participation of the agents, while approximating the optimum energy consumption by a constant factor. To this end, we analyze a previous structural result and an approximation algorithm given in [Baertschi et al. 2017]. Finally, we show that for some instances in the case of a single package, the sum of the payments can be bounded in terms of the optimum

On distributed virtual network embedding with guarantees

To provide wide-area network services, resources from different infrastructure providers are needed. Leveraging the consensus-based resource allocation literature, we propose a general distributed auction mechanism for the (NP-hard) virtual network (VNET) embedding problem. Under reasonable assumptions on the bidding scheme, the proposed mechanism is proven to converge, and it is shown that the solutions guarantee a worst-case efficiency of (1-(1/e)) relative to the optimal node embedding, or VNET embedding if virtual links are mapped to exactly one physical link. This bound is optimal, that is, no better polynomial-time approximation algorithm exists, unless P=NP. Using extensive simulations, we confirm superior convergence properties and resource utilization when compared to existing distributed VNET embedding solutions, and we show how by appropriate policy design, our mechanism can be instantiated to accommodate the embedding goals of different service and infrastructure providers, resulting in an attractive and flexible resource allocation solution.CNS-0963974 - National Science Foundationhttp://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/matta/Papers/ToN-CAD.pdfAccepted manuscrip

On distributed virtual network embedding with guarantees

To provide wide-area network services, resources from different infrastructure providers are needed. Leveraging the consensus-based resource allocation literature, we propose a general distributed auction mechanism for the (NP-hard) virtual network (VNET) embedding problem. Under reasonable assumptions on the bidding scheme, the proposed mechanism is proven to converge, and it is shown that the solutions guarantee a worst case efficiency of (?????) relative to the optimal solution, and that this bound is optimal, that is, no better approximation exists. Using extensive simulations, we confirm superior convergence properties and resource utilization when compared with existing distributed VNET embedding solutions, and we show how byappropriate policy design, our mechanism can be instantiated to accommodate the embedding goals of different service and infrastructure providers, resulting in an attractive and flexible resource allocation solution.This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant CNS-0963974

On distributed virtual network embedding with guarantees

To provide wide-area network services, resources from different infrastructure providers are needed. Leveraging the consensus-based resource allocation literature, we propose a general distributed auction mechanism for the (NP-hard) virtual network (VNET) embedding problem. Under reasonable assumptions on the bidding scheme, the proposed mechanism is proven to converge, and it is shown that the solutions guarantee a worst case efficiency of (?????) relative to the optimal solution, and that this bound is optimal, that is, no better approximation exists. Using extensive simulations, we confirm superior convergence properties and resource utilization when compared with existing distributed VNET embedding solutions, and we show how byappropriate policy design, our mechanism can be instantiated to accommodate the embedding goals of different service and infrastructure providers, resulting in an attractive and flexible resource allocation solution.This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant CNS-0963974