An Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue . Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue. Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

Online English Auction Scheme

Online English auction is most familiar and mostly used online auction process in the present scenario. It is the most efficient auction process which gives most desirable results in terms of revenue. Our scheme involves three parties, namely the Registration Manager(RM), Auction Manager(AM), and Bidder(B). The Registration Manager publicizes the parameters to register the bidders, allowing them to participate in the bidding process. It also protects the bidding rights and manages the information on the key. The Auction Manager is responsible for conducting the bidding after the registration is over. Our proposed scheme satisfies the following features such as anonymity, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, one-time registration, and easy revocation. The scheme uses Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as hash function

Measuring Emotions in Electronic Auctions

This book develops a structured methodology that allows to systematically analyze emotions in auctions. It provides a unified framework for emotional bidding in auctions, which comprises the bidders\u27 processes of cognitive reasoning and emotional processing, and a methodology for measuring physiological correlates of human emotional processing in economic experiments is proposed: physioeconomics. Finally, an experiment is presented which investigates the impact of clock speeds in Dutch auctions

Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy

One of the most important features of the architecture of the Internet is the Domain Name System (DNS), which is administered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Logically, the DNS is organized into Top Level Domains (such as .com), Second Level Domains (such as amazon.com), and third, fourth, and higher level domains (such as www.amazon.com). The physically infrastructure of the DNS consists of name servers, including the Root Server System which provides the information that directs name queries for each Top Level Domain to the appropriate server. ICANN is responsible for the allocation of the root and the creation or reallocation of Top Level Domains. The Root Server System and associated name space are scarce resources in the economic sense. The root servers have a finite capacity and expansion of the system is costly. The name space is scarce, because each string (or set of characters) can only be allocated to one Registry (or operator of a Top Level Domain). In addition, name service is not a public good in the economic sense, because it is possible to exclude strings from the DNS and because the allocation of a string to one firm results in the inability of other firms to use that name string. From the economic perspective, therefore, the question arises: what is the most efficient method for allocating the root resource? There are only five basic options available for allocation of the root. (1) a static root, equivalent to a decision to waste the currently unallocated capacity; (2) public interest hearings (or beauty contests); (3) lotteries; (4) a queuing mechanism; or (5) an auction. The fundamental economic question about the Domain Name System is which of these provides the most efficient mechanism for allocating the root resource? This resource allocation problem is analogous to problems raised in the telecommunications sector, where the Federal Communications Commission has a long history of attempting to allocate broadcast spectrum and the telephone number space. This experience reveals that a case-by-case allocation on the basis of ad hoc judgments about the public interest is doomed to failure, and that auctions (as opposed to lotteries or queues) provide the best mechanism for insuring that such public-trust resources find their highest and best use. Based on the telecommunications experience, the best method for ICANN to allocate new Top Level Domains would be to conduct an auction. Many auction designs are possible. One proposal is to auction a fixed number of new Top Level Domain slots each year. This proposal would both expand the root resource at a reasonable pace and insure that the slots went to their highest and best use. Public interest Top Level Domains could be allocated by another mechanism such as a lottery and their costs to ICANN could be subsidized by the proceeds of the auction

The economics of London bus tendering.

Following a period of rising costs, competitive tendering was introduced to the London bus industry in 1984. This thesis is an economic analysis of the impact of tendering on London bus services. Chapter 1 states the aims and objectives of the thesis in the context of the economics literature. The chapter is divided into two sections. In section 1 the literature is drawn upon to provide an economic interpretation of the state of the London bus industry prior to the introduction of tendering, and to provide an economic context for the introduction of tendering. In section 2 literature relating to the design of a tendering process is summarised. The focus is on the auction aspect of the tendering process and some important dimensions of contract specification. The impact of tendering on costs is analysed in chapter 2. Three questions are asked: What is the cost structure of the competitive London bus industry. Is there any evidence of strategic bidding behaviour as predicted by the auction theory literature. What level of cost saving can be attributed to tendering. The analysis is based on the full set of bid data from London bus tendering over the period 1985-1993 and is econometric in nature. The results are: there is no statistically significant difference in costs of operation between public and private sector operators under competition; bidding behaviour conforms to some features predicted by theoretical models; the estimated cost saving from tendering is 20%. Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of tendering on the demand for bus travel in London. The relationship between demand and service quality is estimated, gains to tendering are attributed in accordance with the increased service quality due to tendering. A statistically significant relationship between demand and service quality is found. The lowest estimate of revenue gained due to tendering is 9.6 million over the period 1987-1992 in 1992 prices. Chapter 4 estimates the welfare gain due to tendering, defined as the sum of changes in producer and consumer surplus due to tendering. The estimated welfare gain due to tendering is between 90 and 380 million over the period 1987-1992 in 1992 prices. An appendix to this chapter analyses the relationship between welfare and the type of contract upon which tendering is based. It is argued that a cost contract is preferable to a bottom line contract. Chapter 5 is based on an in depth series of interviews with key actors in the London bus industry. The aim here was to find out things that cannot be inferred from the data. Areas discussed include: the extent to which tendering as opposed to other factors led to change in the London bus industry; the source of cost savings; the impact of tendering on Labour; problems associated with tendering. Interviews suggested that: cost savings stemmed from wage reductions and productivity gains; there are some problems with the bidding process; there is a tension between bus planners and some bus company managers. In certain cases the tendering authority offered contract for tender in bundles. Chapter 6 analyses this policy from theoretical and empirical perspectives and asks was it optimal for the tendering authority. It is concluded that the policy should not be used by London Transport. Finally, in chapter 7, an overall assessment of the tendering process is presented. The focus is on results and policy implications for bus tendering in London and competitive tendering in general

Development of multi-criteria decision analysis models for bidding and contractor selection

Estimating and bidding a job is one of those essential processes at the heart of a contractor's business. Risk and uncertainty are major considerations in bidding decisions for construction projects. Numerous factors need to be taken into account when making bidding decisions which make them multi-criteria decisions. The present study focuses on developing multi-criteria decision making models to assist in bidding decisions. The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which is a multi-criteria decision making tool, is used to quantify risk encountered in bidding decisions. The AHP has been employed to model both the bid/no bid and mark-up decisions. The data required for this study was collected from thirty firms operating in Gaza Strip by way of a written structured questionnaire. The data was analysed using the Criterium Decision Plus Software based on the AHP. Ten factors were selected to affect bid/no bid decisions while eleven factors were chosen to influence mark-up decision. Results from the questionnaire survey supported previous studies that profit is not the most important factor in making bid/no bid and mark-up decisions. The results also indicate that the most important factors when making the bid/no bid decision are: the 'need for work' followed by the 'company strength in industry' and 'payment methods'. For the mark-up decision, the 'need for work', 'owner/client and consultant identity' and 'project size' are the most important factors. A real life case study was used to demonstrate the application of the two models. Twelve meetings were conducted with a contractor working in Gaza Strip construction industry in order to gather the required data for the validation. The case study consisted of three different projects, road works, electromechanical and building projects, and the contractor had to make a decision on which projects to bid for and then which of them will result in a higher mark-up. The validity of the two models was confirmed by applying a two-stage Linear Programming (LP) approach to the data obtained from the case study. The results from the LP approach agreed with the outcome from the AHP. The developed AHP models can be easily used by the contractors to assist in making bid/no bid and mark-up decisions. This study investigates the Fuzzy Sets Theory, which is a mathematical approach used to characterise and quantify uncertainty, as a bidding strategy. This study summarises the work that has been done to-date reviewing the fundamental concepts and applications of the Fuzzy Sets Theory in construction. Fuzzy Sets Theory was found to be used widely in construction research but most studies were found theoretical. The research also examines the challenges of using the reverse auction as an open bidding process. In construction industry, reverse auction is one such technique that uses secured Internet technology for tendering process. Advantages of on-line bidding include: the ability to submit more than one bid, time benefits, increasing competitiveness among contractors and attracting unknown bidders. The main drawback of reverse auctions is that the award of the product/service will be based on the price rather than on the quality of the product or service. Furthermore, security and legal issues need further considerations when forming e-contracts for the procurement of construction services. Selecting a suitable contractor to execute a particular project is an important decision for the client to take. Awarding construction contracts based on the price only is not always a successful strategy for contractor selection as it could result in construction delays and cost overruns. In addition to price, factors such as quality and safety need to be taken into account when making the contractor selection decision. In this study, two methods for contractor selection were compared: the points method and the Analytical Hierarchy Process. The two methods were applied to a real life case study for contractor selection. Financial and Quality factors were considered to affect the contractor selection decision. Both methods resulted in selecting the same contractor for executing the project under consderation. The Analytical Hierarchy process provides a flexible and computer based method for contractor selection decision.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo