Viewing microinsurance as a social risk management instrument

The objectives of this paper are to highlight some of the potential and limitations of microinsurance in the context of Social Risk Management (SRM) framework to stimulate further discussion. The paper draws on existing literature on SRM and microinsurance. Where relevant, it invokes lessons from microfinance. The authors conclude that there is potential for efficient and equitable risk management through microinsurance, but also limitations. Microinsurance may be an acceptable means of managing a few limited forms of risk, but not all. SRM practitioners need to recognize that effectiveness of any risk management instrument depends on the nature of risks, household and group characteristics and dynamics, and the availability of alternative risk management options. SRM options should strike a balance between household risk management activities and the multiple instruments available at different institutional levels, including informal, market-based, and publicly provided mechanisms. Microinsurance is a potential part of the SRM toolbox, but risk management can be enhanced through different mechanisms or combinations of them.Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banks&Banking Reform,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance

An asset-based approach to social risk management : a conceptual framework

There is increasing concern about the vulnerability of poor and near-poor rural households, who have limited capabilities to manage risk and often resort to strategies that can lead to a vicious cycle of poverty. Household-related risk is ususally considered individual or private, but measures to manage risk are actually social or public in nature. Furthermore, various externality issues are associated with household-related risk, such as its links to economic development, poverty reduction, social cohesion, and environmental quality. Hence the need for a holistic approach to risk management, or"social risk management,"which encompasses a broad spectrum of private and public actions. An asset-based approach to social risk management is presented, which provides an integrated approach to considering household, community, and extra-community assets and risk-management strategies. The conceptual framework for social risk management focuses on rural Sub-Saharan Africa. The report concludes with several suggestions on moving from concepts to actions.Health Economics&Finance,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banking Law,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform

Microfinance and Mechanism Design: The Role of Joint Liability and Cross-Reporting

Since the establishment of Grameen Bank in 1976 by Professor Muhammad Yunus , many economists have studied extensively, either theoretically or empirically, the success of the Grameen Bank in eradicating the poverty problem in Bangladesh. Therefore, this paper aims to apply the mechanism design theory in microfinance by examining the role of joint liability and cross-reporting mechanism in the loan contract which designing by microfinance lender. In doing so, this study simplified the joint liability mechanism proposed by Ghatak (1999, 2000) and cross-reporting mechanism by Rai and Sjostrom (2004). Based on the joint-liability mechanism, it is clearly stated that the microfinance lender can minimize or avoid the adverse selection problem in the credit market through peer selection and peer screening. In the meantime, the joint liability mechanism is better than individual lending in terms of increasing the social welfare among the poor borrower, charging lower interest rates and generating high repayment rates. In contrast, Rai and Sjostrom (2004) argue that joint liability alone is not enough to efficiently induce borrowers to help each other. Indeed, the cross-reporting mechanism is also important for lenders in order to minimize the problem of asymmetric information in the credit market. The cross-reporting mechanism is also efficient because it can influence the borrower to be truthful-telling about the state of the project and subsequently can minimize the deadweight loss (punishment) among the borrowers. In comparison, without cross-reporting, the lending mechanism is inefficient because the borrower will be imposed harsh punishment from the bank and the bank can undertake auditing or verify the state of the project and punish accordingly.Microfinance; mechanism design; joint liability; cross-reporting

Households’ Portfolio Diversification

This paper performs an efficiency analysis of households portfolios based on the comparison of observed portfolios with the mean-variance frontier of assets returns. Data on household portfolios are drawn from the 2001 Centro Einaudi survey, a representative sample of the Italian population with at least a bank account. We find that most households’ portfolios are extremely close to the efficient frontier once we explicitly take into account no short-selling constraints, while the null hypothesis of efficiency is rejected for all portfolios if we don’t consider these constraints.

Firm size, managerial practices and innovativeness: some evidence from Finnish manufacturing

In this study we use a survey data on 398 Finnish manufacturing firms for the years 2002 and 2005 to empirically explore whether and which organizational factors explain why certain firms produce larger innovative research output than others, and whether the incentives to innovate that certain organizational practices generate differ between small and large firms, and between those firms that are operating in low-tech and high-tech industries. Our study indicates that there appear to be vast differences in the organizational practices leading to more innovation both between small and large firms, and between the firms that operate in high- and low-tech industries. While innovation in small firms benefits from the practices that enhance employee participation in decision-making, large firms that have more decentralized decision-making patterns do not seem to innovate more than those with a more bureaucratic decision-making structure. The most efficient incentive for innovation among the sampled companies seems to be the ownership of a firm's stocks by employees and/or managers. Performance based wages also relates positively to innovation, but only when it is combined with a systematic monitoring of the firm's performance.Innovation, firm size; organizational practices; HRM practices

Monetary policy in a systemic crisis

This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisis from the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standard monetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through which monetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbank market. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed, central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted by standard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did not allow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design new channels for liquidity injection.

Microfinance games

Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts.Banks&Banking Reform,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Financial Intermediation,Social Accountability,Civic Participation and Corporate Governance