669 research outputs found
Composable and Efficient Mechanisms
We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good
properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms
simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms,
related to smooth games defined by Roughgarden, that can be thought of as
mechanisms that generate approximately market clearing prices. We show that
smooth mechanisms result in high quality outcome in equilibrium both in the
full information setting and in the Bayesian setting with uncertainty about
participants, as well as in learning outcomes. Our main result is to show that
such mechanisms compose well: smoothness locally at each mechanism implies
efficiency globally.
For mechanisms where good performance requires that bidders do not bid above
their value, we identify the notion of a weakly smooth mechanism. Weakly smooth
mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction, are approximately efficient under the
no-overbidding assumption. Similar to smooth mechanisms, weakly smooth
mechanisms behave well in composition, and have high quality outcome in
equilibrium (assuming no overbidding) both in the full information setting and
in the Bayesian setting, as well as in learning outcomes.
In most of the paper we assume participants have quasi-linear valuations. We
also extend some of our results to settings where participants have budget
constraints
Energy-Efficient Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication
Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks is
expected to bring significant benefits for utilizing resources, improving user
throughput and extending battery life of user equipments. However, the
allocation of radio and power resources to D2D communication needs elaborate
coordination, as D2D communication can cause interference to cellular
communication. In this paper, we study joint channel and power allocation to
improve the energy efficiency of user equipments. To solve the problem
efficiently, we introduce an iterative combinatorial auction algorithm, where
the D2D users are considered as bidders that compete for channel resources, and
the cellular network is treated as the auctioneer. We also analyze important
properties of D2D underlay communication, and present numerical simulations to
verify the proposed algorithm.Comment: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communication
Sharing of Unlicensed Spectrum by Strategic Operators
Facing the challenge of meeting ever-increasing demand for wireless data, the
industry is striving to exploit large swaths of spectrum which anyone can use
for free without having to obtain a license. Major standards bodies are
currently considering a proposal to retool and deploy Long Term Evolution (LTE)
technologies in unlicensed bands below 6 GHz. This paper studies the
fundamental questions of whether and how the unlicensed spectrum can be shared
by intrinsically strategic operators without suffering from the tragedy of the
commons. A class of general utility functions is considered. The spectrum
sharing problem is formulated as a repeated game over a sequence of time slots.
It is first shown that a simple static sharing scheme allows a given set of
operators to reach a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for mutually beneficial
sharing. The question of how many operators will choose to enter the market is
also addressed by studying an entry game. A sharing scheme which allows dynamic
spectrum borrowing and lending between operators is then proposed to address
time-varying traffic and proved to achieve perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Numerical results show that the proposed dynamic sharing scheme outperforms
static sharing, which in turn achieves much higher revenue than uncoordinated
full-spectrum sharing. Implications of the results to the standardization and
deployment of LTE in unlicensed bands (LTE-U) are also discussed.Comment: To appear in the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
Special Issue on Game Theory for Network
Distributed optimisation techniques for wireless networks
Alongside the ever increasing traffic demand, the fifth generation (5G) cellular network architecture is being proposed to provide better quality of service, increased data rate, decreased latency, and increased capacity. Without any doubt, the 5G cellular network will comprise of ultra-dense networks and multiple input multiple output technologies. This will make the current centralised solutions impractical due to increased complexity. Moreover, the amount of coordination information that needs to be transported over the backhaul links will be increased. Distributed or decentralised solutions are promising to provide better alternatives.
This thesis proposes new distributed algorithms for wireless networks which aim to reduce the amount of system overheads in the backhaul links and the system complexity. The analysis of conflicts amongst transmitters, and resource allocation are conducted via the use of game theory, convex optimisation, and auction theory.
Firstly, game-theoretic model is used to analyse a mixed quality of service (QoS) strategic non-cooperative game (SNG), for a two-user multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel. The players are considered to have different objectives. Following this, the mixed QoS SNG is extended to a multicell multiuser network in terms of signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) requirement. In the multicell multiuser setting, each transmitter is assumed to be serving real time users (RTUs) and non-real time users (NRTUs), simultaneously. A novel mixed QoS SNG algorithm is proposed, with its operating point identified as the Nash equilibrium-mixed QoS (NE-mixed QoS). Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Egalitarian bargain solutions are then proposed to improve the performance of the NE-mixed QoS. The performance of the bargain solutions are observed to be comparable to the centralised solutions.
Secondly, user offloading and user association problems are addressed for small cells using auction theory. The main base station wishes to offload some of its users to privately owned small cell access points. A novel bid-wait-auction (BWA) algorithm, which allows single-item bidding at each auction round, is designed to decompose the combinatorial mathematical nature of the problem. An analysis on the existence and uniqueness of the dominant strategy equilibrium is conducted. The BWA is then used to form the forward BWA (FBWA) and the backward BWA (BBWA). It is observed that the BBWA allows more users to be admitted as compared to the FBWA.
Finally, simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction (SMRA), altered SMRA (ASMRA), sequential combinatorial auction with item bidding (SCAIB), and repetitive combinatorial auction with item bidding (RCAIB) algorithms are proposed to perform user offloading and user association for small cells. These algorithms are able to allow bundle bidding. It is then proven that, truthful bidding is individually rational and leads to Walrasian equilibrium. The performance of the proposed auction based algorithms is evaluated. It is observed that the proposed algorithms match the performance of the centralised solutions when the guest users have low target rates. The SCAIB algorithm is shown to be the most preferred as it provides high admission rate and competitive revenue to the bidders
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