12,598 research outputs found
Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions
Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and when we predict (out of sample) bidder entry and prices for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry to small businesses substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it does increase small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, while eliminating almost all of the efficiency loss of set-asides, and only slightly decreasing the profit of larger firms. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design.set-asides, subsidies, natural resources, timber, auctions
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each
bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider
both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication
restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that
the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove
non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal
mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in,
as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are
better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the
communication complexity only by a linear factor
Characterizing Optimal Adword Auctions
We present a number of models for the adword auctions used for pricing
advertising slots on search engines such as Google, Yahoo! etc. We begin with a
general problem formulation which allows the privately known valuation per
click to be a function of both the identity of the advertiser and the slot. We
present a compact characterization of the set of all deterministic incentive
compatible direct mechanisms for this model. This new characterization allows
us to conclude that there are incentive compatible mechanisms for this auction
with a multi-dimensional type-space that are {\em not} affine maximizers. Next,
we discuss two interesting special cases: slot independent valuation and slot
independent valuation up to a privately known slot and zero thereafter. For
both of these special cases, we characterize revenue maximizing and efficiency
maximizing mechanisms and show that these mechanisms can be computed with a
worst case computational complexity and respectively,
where is number of bidders and is number of slots. Next, we
characterize optimal rank based allocation rules and propose a new mechanism
that we call the customized rank based allocation. We report the results of a
numerical study that compare the revenue and efficiency of the proposed
mechanisms. The numerical results suggest that customized rank-based allocation
rule is significantly superior to the rank-based allocation rules.Comment: 29 pages, work was presented at a) Second Workshop on Sponsored
Search Auctions, Ann Arbor, MI b) INFORMS Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh c)
Decision Sciences Seminar, Fuqua School of Business, Duke Universit
Draft Auctions
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at
each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show
that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at
equilibrium over sequential item auctions where predetermined items are
auctioned at each time step. Specifically, we show that for any subadditive
valuation the social welfare at equilibrium is an -approximation
to the optimal social welfare, where is the number of items. We also
provide tighter approximation results for several subclasses. Our welfare
guarantees hold for Bayes-Nash equilibria and for no-regret learning outcomes,
via the smooth-mechanism framework. Of independent interest, our techniques
show that in a combinatorial auction setting, efficiency guarantees of a
mechanism via smoothness for a very restricted class of cardinality valuations,
extend with a small degradation, to subadditive valuations, the largest
complement-free class of valuations. Variants of draft auctions have been used
in practice and have been experimentally shown to outperform other auctions.
Our results provide a theoretical justification
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