Financial market regulation in the wake of financial crises: the historical experience

The focus of the present volume - which originates from a workshop held at the Bank of Italy on 16 and 17 April 2009 - is the regulatory response given to financial crises in the past, across countries. Alongside the scholarly interest of such a review its aim is also to offer some insights that may be useful in re-designing regulation in the present time of distress. Financial crises have been examined under many perspectives, including that of regulatory failures. The studies assembled in this volume, which touch on a significant array of countries, can be viewed as part of a historical survey on this issue. The basic question is whether regulatory responses form a pattern, and more specifically, whether they tend to be biased with respect to an optimum, however defined. In the end, rather than finding one pattern of response, we were able to identify the "disturbances" which most often enter the post-crisis decisional process. The awareness of such factors, and some knowledge of their functioning, are instrumental in understanding (for academics) and in governing (for policy makers) the response to major financial crises.Financial crises, financial regulation, economic history

An evolutionary theory of systemic risk and its mitigation for the global financial system

This thesis is the outcome of theory development research into an identified gap in knowledge about systemic risk of the global financial system. It takes a systems-theoretic approach, incorporating a simulation-constructivist orientation towards the meaning of theory and theory development, within a realist constructivism epistemology for knowledge generation about complex social phenomena. The specific purpose of which is to describe systemic risk of failure, and explain how it occurs in the global financial system, in order to diagnose and understand circumstances in which it arises, and offer insights into how that risk may be mitigated. An outline theory is developed, introducing a new operational definition of systemic risk of failure in which notions from evolutionary economics, finance and complexity science are combined with a general interpretation of entropy, to explain how catastrophic phenomena arise in that system. When a conceptual model incorporating the Icelandic financial system failure over the years 2003 – 2008 is constructed from this theory, and the results of simulation experiments using a verified computational representation of the model are validated with empirical data from that event, and corroborated by theoretical triangulation, a null-hypothesis about the theory is refuted. Furthermore, results show that interplay between a lack of diversity in system participation strategies and shared exposure to potential losses may be a key operational mechanism of catastrophic tensions arising in the supply and demand of financial services. These findings suggest new policy guidance for pre-emptive intervention calls for improved operational transparency from system participants, and prompt access to data about their operational behaviour, in order to prevent positive feedback inducing a failure of the system to operate within required parameters. The theory is then revised to reflect new insights exposed by simulation, and finally submitted as a new theory capable of unifying existing knowledge in this problem domain

Accountants\u27 index. Twenty-fourth supplement, January-December 1975

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_accind/1026/thumbnail.jp

Accountants\u27 index. Twenty-first supplement, a bibliography of accounting literature, January 1972-December 1972 (Inclusive)

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_accind/1023/thumbnail.jp

Accountants\u27 index. Thirtieth supplement, January-December 1981, volume 1: A-L

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_accind/1037/thumbnail.jp

Accountants\u27 index. Twenty-eighth supplement, January-December 1979, volume 2: M-Z

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_accind/1034/thumbnail.jp