Effects of Time Horizons on Influence Maximization in the Voter Dynamics

In this paper we analyze influence maximization in the voter model with an active strategic and a passive influencing party in non-stationary settings. We thus explore the dependence of optimal influence allocation on the time horizons of the strategic influencer. We find that on undirected heterogeneous networks, for short time horizons, influence is maximized when targeting low-degree nodes, while for long time horizons influence maximization is achieved when controlling hub nodes. Furthermore, we show that for short and intermediate time scales influence maximization can exploit knowledge of (transient) opinion configurations. More in detail, we find two rules. First, nodes with states differing from the strategic influencer's goal should be targeted. Second, if only few nodes are initially aligned with the strategic influencer, nodes subject to opposing influence should be avoided, but when many nodes are aligned, an optimal influencer should shadow opposing influence.Comment: 22 page

Transmission errors and influence maximization in the voter model

In this paper we analyze the effects of mistakes in opinion propagation in the voter model on strategic influence maximization. We provide numerical results and analytical arguments to show that generally two regimes exist for optimal opinion control: a regime of low transmission errors in which influence maximizers should focus on hub nodes and a large-error regime in which influence maximizers should focus on low-degree nodes. We also develop a degree-based mean-field theory and apply it to random networks with bimodal degree distribution, finding that analytical results for the dependence of regimes on parameters qualitatively agree with numerical results for scale-free networks. We generally find that the regime of optimal hub control is the larger, the more heterogeneous the social network and the smaller the more resources both available to the influencers

Shadowing and shielding: Effective heuristics for continuous influence maximisation in the voting dynamics

Influence maximisation, or how to affect the intrinsic opinion dynamics of a social group, is relevant for many applications, such as information campaigns, political competition, or marketing. Previous literature on influence maximisation has mostly explored discrete allocations of influence, i.e. optimally choosing a finite fixed number of nodes to target. Here, we study the generalised problem of continuous influence maximisation where nodes can be targeted with flexible intensity. We focus on optimal influence allocations against a passive opponent and compare the structure of the solutions in the continuous and discrete regimes. We find that, whereas hub allocations play a central role in explaining optimal allocations in the discrete regime, their explanatory power is strongly reduced in the continuous regime. Instead, we find that optimal continuous strategies are very well described by two other patterns: (i) targeting the same nodes as the opponent (shadowing) and (ii) targeting direct neighbours of the opponent (shielding). Finally, we investigate the game-theoretic scenario of two active opponents and show that the unique pure Nash equilibrium is to target all nodes equally. These results expose fundamental differences in the solutions to discrete and continuous regimes and provide novel effective heuristics for continuous influence maximisation

Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.Cycles, Alternation, Public goods, Advantage, Opposition

Income Inequality, Voting Over the Size of Public Consumption, and Growth

According to a standard argument, higher income inequality fosters redistributive activities of the government in favor of the median income earner. This paper shows that if redistribution is achieved by a public provision of goods and services rather than by transfers, higher income inequality may imply a smaller size of the government in majority voting equilibrium. In addition to a static voting model, an endogenous growth model is analyzed to examine the role of saving decisions of heterogeneous individuals for both the distributional incidence of proportional factor income taxes and the voting outcome.income distribution, public consumption, majority voting, investment-driven growth

Voting over economic plans

We review and provide motivation for a one-sector model of economic growth in which decisions about capital accumulation are made by a political process. If it is possible to commit for at least three periods into the future, then for any feasible consumption plan, there is a perturbation that is majority-preferred to it. Furthermore, plans that minimize the maximum vote that can be obtained against them yield a political business cycle. If it is impossible to commit, voters select the optimal consumption plan for the median voter

Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data

Citizens are willing to abandon their short-term financial interest in free-riding considerably, if governments act in their interest, if procedures of the public decisions-making process are felt to be fair and if other fellow-citizens have to contribute also an adequate share to the community. In such a situation trustworthiness of a government and trust in a government is high. This paper provides empirical evidence that trust is crucial for fiscal performance using data for the full sample of Swiss cantons over the 1981-2001 period. In cantons with high levels of trust, the level of indebtedness is significantly lower. Trust supports fiscal discipline. In order to get a useful approximation for mutual trust among citizens and between citizens and their representatives, we use information from direct voter participation on political issues (initiatives and public referenda) held in Swiss state (cantonal) governments. Electoral support of government proposals reveals an important aspect of trust in a real world setting. Hence, our trust variable measures the behavior at the ballots thereby reducing possible subjective biases derived from surveys and questionnaires.Trust, Social capital, Fiscal performance, Indebtedness

Fiscal Policy Is Still an Effective Instrument of Macroeconomic Policy

Recent developments in macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy, what has come to be known as “New Consensus in Macroeconomics”, downgrades the role of fiscal policy and upgrades that of monetary policy. This contribution aims to consider this particular contention by focusing on fiscal policy. We consider fiscal policy within the current “new consensus” theoretical framework, which views fiscal policy as ineffective, and argue that it deserves a great deal more attention paid to it than it has been recently. We review and appraise recent and not so recent theoretical and empirical developments on the fiscal policy front. The possibility of fiscal and monetary policy coordination is proposed and discussed to conclude that it deserves a great deal more attention and careful consideration than it has been given to in the past. Our overall conclusion is that discretionary application of fiscal and monetary policy in a coordinated and focused manner as a tool of macroeconomic policy deserves serious attention paid to it than hitherto.Capitalism, Crisis, Institutional transformation

Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law

When it comes to specific business matters, it seems that an objecting shareholder can do no more than offer a precatory resolution that provides shareholder advice on the issue. Adoption of such a resolution obviously sends a strong signal to management, as do informal contacts by important shareholders, that a management seeking to avoid a control contest may be well-advised to heed. Nevertheless, management can ignore such expressions of shareholder. preference and, indeed, can pursue policies and extraordinary transactions that it knows shareholders would reject. Thus for the large public corporation the pattern of delegation gives management virtually unbounded decisionmaking authority over business matters and agenda control over significant changes in the management-shareholder relationship. The shareholders\u27 power consists almost exclusively of the power to revoke the delegation through a control contest, or more problematically, through acceptance of a hostile tender offer. There is no power of shareholder initiative. This pattern of shareholder-manager relations may be called the absolute delegation rule. The question is why this pattern has arisen and persisted and the circumstances under which it might be changed. Why shouldn\u27t Carl Icahn be able to take to shareholders for resolution the question of whether USX would be more valuable if broken up into two separate corporations? There is a substantial argument that the conglomeration of oil and steel was the result of an agency problem: management pursued diversification to protect its jobs against the bankruptcy risks of the steel business at the expense of shareholders, who could have obtained such diversification at the portfolio level more cheaply, since common ownership entails the potential cross-subsidization of steel losses from oil profits. Such agency problems could more easily be controlled were shareholder initiative available as an alternative to a full-scale control contest. Alternatively, on some particular business matters, shareholders may believe their perceptions and judgement are superior to management\u27s. Carl Icahn may in fact have had a better view of the long term comparative futures of steel and oil than the USX management. In both cases it may be that the incumbent management otherwise ably runs the enterprise, but is tempted to serve its particular interests or makes a mistaken prediction about the future. Why leave shareholders with only one avenue – an election contest aimed at the board of directors – to force a particular change in business strategy? This paper argues that the two standard justifications of the absolute delegation rule are incomplete, the first, based on management\u27s informational advantage; the second, based on the management/agent\u27s success in maintaining power over the shareholder/principal. I argue on behalf of a third explanation: that the absolute delegation rule avoids several sorts of pathologies that would emerge in the strategies of shareholder voting. Shareholders give away power because, in many circumstances, the effects of the shareholder initiative would be wealth-reducing. In particular, shareholder initiative would produce strategic behavior designed to maximize private gains at the expense of common gains. I hope to demonstrate these points with analysis drawn from the social choice and game theory literatures

Economic determinants of citizens’ support for the European Union

We investigate the determinants of public support for EU membership using a panel of fifteen countries over the 1974 - 2008 period. The results indicate that increases in inflation and unemployment rate generate a decrease in support for EU membership, while growth of GDP growth increases support. There is evidence of erosion in citizens’ support as time in the Union accumulates and when the country is under the excessive deficit procedure. Splitting the sample into different periods reveals that real economic variables were more influential in shaping citizens’ support for the EU than nominal variables during the first years of the Community, but inflation became the most relevant variable after implementation of the Treaty of the European Union.European integration, public support, economic performance, panel-data