1,079 research outputs found
Security of 5G-V2X: Technologies, Standardization and Research Directions
Cellular-Vehicle to Everything (C-V2X) aims at resolving issues pertaining to
the traditional usability of Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle to
Vehicle (V2V) networking. Specifically, C-V2X lowers the number of entities
involved in vehicular communications and allows the inclusion of
cellular-security solutions to be applied to V2X. For this, the evolvement of
LTE-V2X is revolutionary, but it fails to handle the demands of high
throughput, ultra-high reliability, and ultra-low latency alongside its
security mechanisms. To counter this, 5G-V2X is considered as an integral
solution, which not only resolves the issues related to LTE-V2X but also
provides a function-based network setup. Several reports have been given for
the security of 5G, but none of them primarily focuses on the security of
5G-V2X. This article provides a detailed overview of 5G-V2X with a
security-based comparison to LTE-V2X. A novel Security Reflex Function
(SRF)-based architecture is proposed and several research challenges are
presented related to the security of 5G-V2X. Furthermore, the article lays out
requirements of Ultra-Dense and Ultra-Secure (UD-US) transmissions necessary
for 5G-V2X.Comment: 9 pages, 6 figures, Preprin
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Discovering Network Control Vulnerabilities and Policies in Evolving Networks
The range and number of new applications and services are growing at an unprecedented rate. Computer networks need to be able to provide connectivity for these services and meet their constantly changing demands. This requires not only support of new network protocols and security requirements, but often architectural redesigns for long-term improvements to efficiency, speed, throughput, cost, and security. Networks are now facing a drastic increase in size and are required to carry a constantly growing amount of heterogeneous traffic. Unfortunately such dynamism greatly complicates security of not only the end nodes in the network, but also of the nodes of the network itself. To make matters worse, just as applications are being developed at faster and faster rates, attacks are becoming more pervasive and complex. Networks need to be able to understand the impact of these attacks and protect against them.
Network control devices, such as routers, firewalls, censorship devices, and base stations, are elements of the network that make decisions on how traffic is handled. Although network control devices are expected to act according to specifications, there can be various reasons why they do not in practice. Protocols could be flawed, ambiguous or incomplete, developers could introduce unintended bugs, or attackers may find vulnerabilities in the devices and exploit them. Malfunction could intentionally or unintentionally threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of end nodes and the data that passes through the network. It can also impact the availability and performance of the control devices themselves and the security policies of the network. The fast-paced evolution and scalability of current and future networks create a dynamic environment for which it is difficult to develop automated tools for testing new protocols and components. At the same time, they make the function of such tools vital for discovering implementation flaws and protocol vulnerabilities as networks become larger and more complex, and as new and potentially unrefined architectures become adopted. This thesis will present the design, implementation, and evaluation of a set of tools designed for understanding implementation of network control nodes and how they react to changes in traffic characteristics as networks evolve. We will first introduce Firecycle, a test bed for analyzing the impact of large-scale attacks and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) traffic on the Long Term Evolution (LTE) network. We will then discuss Autosonda, a tool for automatically discovering rule implementation and finding triggering traffic features in censorship devices.
This thesis provides the following contributions:
1. The design, implementation, and evaluation of two tools to discover models of network control nodes in two scenarios of evolving networks, mobile network and censored internet
2. First existing test bed for analysis of large-scale attacks and impact of traffic scalability on LTE mobile networks
3. First existing test bed for LTE networks that can be scaled to arbitrary size and that deploys traffic models based on real traffic traces taken from a tier-1 operator
4. An analysis of traffic models of various categories of Internet of Things (IoT) devices
5. First study demonstrating the impact of M2M scalability and signaling overload on the packet core of LTE mobile networks
6. A specification for modeling of censorship device decision models
7. A means for automating the discovery of features utilized in censorship device decision models, comparison of these models, and their rule discover
Separation Framework: An Enabler for Cooperative and D2D Communication for Future 5G Networks
Soaring capacity and coverage demands dictate that future cellular networks
need to soon migrate towards ultra-dense networks. However, network
densification comes with a host of challenges that include compromised energy
efficiency, complex interference management, cumbersome mobility management,
burdensome signaling overheads and higher backhaul costs. Interestingly, most
of the problems, that beleaguer network densification, stem from legacy
networks' one common feature i.e., tight coupling between the control and data
planes regardless of their degree of heterogeneity and cell density.
Consequently, in wake of 5G, control and data planes separation architecture
(SARC) has recently been conceived as a promising paradigm that has potential
to address most of aforementioned challenges. In this article, we review
various proposals that have been presented in literature so far to enable SARC.
More specifically, we analyze how and to what degree various SARC proposals
address the four main challenges in network densification namely: energy
efficiency, system level capacity maximization, interference management and
mobility management. We then focus on two salient features of future cellular
networks that have not yet been adapted in legacy networks at wide scale and
thus remain a hallmark of 5G, i.e., coordinated multipoint (CoMP), and
device-to-device (D2D) communications. After providing necessary background on
CoMP and D2D, we analyze how SARC can particularly act as a major enabler for
CoMP and D2D in context of 5G. This article thus serves as both a tutorial as
well as an up to date survey on SARC, CoMP and D2D. Most importantly, the
article provides an extensive outlook of challenges and opportunities that lie
at the crossroads of these three mutually entangled emerging technologies.Comment: 28 pages, 11 figures, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 201
Security Review and Study of DoS Attacks on LTE Mobile Network
The main objective of 3GPP long term evolution (LTE) is to provide a secure communication, high data rate and better communication for 4G users. LTE support all IP based data and voice with speed in order of hundreds of mega-bytes per second. Increase speed in accessing internet. Network to be attached by hackers using some attacks like spyware ,malware ,Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-Service(DDoS) .This paper associated with security problem in LTE network and brief summary of DoS attack , DDoS attack and security vulnerabilities in LTE networks
Vulnerabilities of signaling system number 7 (SS7) to cyber attacks and how to mitigate against these vulnerabilities.
As the mobile network subscriber base exponentially increases due to some attractive offerings
such as anytime anywhere accessibility, seamless roaming, inexpensive handsets with sophisticated
applications, and Internet connectivity, the mobile telecommunications network has now become
the primary source of communication for not only business and pleasure, but also for the many life
and mission critical services. This mass popularisation of telecommunications services has resulted
in a heavily loaded Signaling System number 7 (SS7) signaling network which is used in Second
and Third Generations (2G and 3G) mobile networks and is needed for call control and services
such as caller identity, roaming, and for sending short message servirces. SS7 signaling has enjoyed
remarkable popularity for providing acceptable voice quality with negligible connection delays, pos-
sibly due to its circuit-switched heritage. However, the traditional SS7 networks are expensive to
lease and to expand, hence to cater for the growing signaling demand and to provide the seamless
interconnectivity between the SS7 and IP networks a new suite of protocols known as Signaling
Transport (SIGTRAN) has been designed to carry SS7 signaling messages over IP.
Due to the intersignaling between the circuit-switched and the packet-switched networks, the mo-
bile networks have now left the “walled garden”, which is a privileged, closed and isolated ecosystem
under the full control of mobile carriers, using proprietary protocols and has minimal security risks
due to restricted user access. Potentially, intersignaling can be exploited from the IP side to disrupt
the services provided on the circuit-switched side.
This study demonstrates the vulnerabilities of SS7 messages to cyber-attacks while being trans-
ported over IP networks and proposes some solutions based on securing both the IP transport and
SCTP layers of the SIGTRAN protocol stack
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