59 research outputs found
Attack-Resistance and Reliability Analysis of Feed-Forward and Feed-Forward XOR PUFs
University of Minnesota M.S.E.E. thesis.May 2019. Major: Electrical/Computer Engineering. Advisor: Keshab Parhi. 1 computer file (PDF); ix, 75 pages.Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are lightweight hardware security primitives that are used to authenticate devices or generate cryptographic keys without using non-volatile memories. This is accomplished by harvesting the inherent randomness in manufacturing process variations (e.g. path delays) to generate random yet unique outputs. A multiplexer (MUX) based arbiter PUF comprises two parallel delay chains with MUXs as switching elements. An input to a PUF is called a challenge vector and comprises of the select bits of all the MUX elements in the circuit. The output-bits are referred to as responses. In other words, when queried with a challenge, the PUF generates a response based on the uncontrollable physical characteristics of the underlying PUF hardware. Thus, the overall path delays of these delay chains are random and unique functions of the challenge. The contributions in this thesis can be classified into four main ideas. First, a novel approach to estimate delay differences of each stage in MUX-based standard arbiter PUFs, feed-forward PUFs (FF PUFs) and modified feed-forward PUFs (MFF PUFs) is presented. Test data collected from PUFs fabricated using 32 nm process are used to learn models that characterize the PUFs. The delay differences of individual stages of arbiter PUFs correspond to the model parameters. This was accomplished by employing the least mean squares (LMS) adaptive algorithm. The models trained to learn the parameters of two standard arbiter PUF-chips were able to predict responses with 97.5% and 99.5% accuracy, respectively. Additionally, it was observed that perceptrons can be used to attain 100% (approx.) prediction accuracy. A comparison shows that the perceptron model parameters are scaled versions of the model derived by the LMS algorithm. Since the delay differences are challenge independent, these parameters can be stored on the server which enables the server to issue random challenges whose responses need not be stored. By extending this analysis to 96 standard arbiter PUFs, we confirm that the delay differences of each MUX stage of the PUFs follow a Gaussian probability distribution. Second, artificial neural network (ANN) models are trained to predict hard and soft-responses of the three configurations: standard arbiter PUFs, FF PUFs and MFF PUFs. These models were trained using silicon data extracted from 32-stage arbiter PUF circuits fabricated using IBM 32 nm HKMG process and achieve a response-prediction accuracy of 99.8% in case of standard arbiter PUFs, approximately 97% in case FF PUFs and approximately 99% in case of MFF PUFs. Also, a probability based thresholding scheme is used to define soft-responses and artificial neural networks were trained to predict these soft-responses. If the response of a given challenge has at least 90% consistency on repeated evaluation, it is considered stable. It is shown that the soft-response models can be used to filter out unstable challenges from a randomly chosen independent test-set. From the test measurements, it is observed that the probability of a stable challenge is typically in the range of 87% to 92%. However, if a challenge is chosen with the proposed soft-response model, then its portability of being stable is found to be 99% compared to the ground truth. Third, we provide the first systematic empirical analysis of the effect of FF PUF design choices on their reliability and attack resistance. FF PUFs consist of feed-forward loops that enable internally generated responses to be used as select-bits, making them slightly more secure than a standard arbiter PUFs. While FF PUFs have been analyzed earlier, no prior study has addressed the effect of loop positions on the security and reliability. After evaluating the performance of hundreds of PUF structures in various design configurations, it is observed that the locations of the arbiters and their outputs can have a substantial impact on the security and reliability of FF PUFs. Appropriately choosing the input and output locations of the FF loops, the amount of data required to attack can be increased by 7 times and can be further increased by 15 times if two intermediate arbiters are used. It is observed adding more loops makes PUFs more susceptible to noise; FF PUFs with 5 intermediate arbiters can have reliability values that are as low as 81%. It is further demonstrated that a soft-response thresholding strategy can significantly increase the reliability during authentication to more than 96%. It is known that XOR arbiter PUFs (XOR PUFs) were introduced as more secure alternatives to standard arbiter PUFs. XOR PUFs typically contain multiple standard arbiter PUFs as their components and the output of the component PUFs is XOR-ed to generate the final response. Finally, we propose the design of feed-forward XOR PUFs (FFXOR PUFs) where each component PUF is an FF PUF instead of a standard arbiter PUF. Attack-resistance analysis of FFXOR PUFs was carried out by employing artificial neural networks with 2-3 hidden layers and compared with XOR PUFs. It is shown that FFXOR PUFs cannot be accurately modeled if the number of component PUFs is more than 5. However, the increase in the attack resistance comes at the cost of degraded reliability. We also show that the soft-response thresholding strategy can increase the reliability of FFXOR PUFs by about 30%
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Threat Analysis, Countermeaures and Design Strategies for Secure Computation in Nanometer CMOS Regime
Advancements in CMOS technologies have led to an era of Internet Of Things (IOT), where the devices have the ability to communicate with each other apart from their computational power. As more and more sensitive data is processed by embedded devices, the trend towards lightweight and efficient cryptographic primitives has gained significant momentum. Achieving a perfect security in silicon is extremely difficult, as the traditional cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to various active and passive attacks. There is also a threat in the form of hardware Trojans inserted into the supply chain by the untrusted third-party manufacturers for economic incentives. Apart from the threats in various forms, some of the embedded security applications such as random number generators (RNGs) suffer from the impacts of process variations and noise in nanometer CMOS. Despite their disadvantages, the random and unique nature of process variations can be exploited for generating unique identifiers and can be of tremendous use in embedded security.
In this dissertation, we explore techniques for precise fault-injection in cryptographic hardware based on voltage/temperature manipulation and hardware Trojan insertion. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these techniques by mounting fault attacks on state-of-the-art ciphers. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are novel cryptographic primitives for extracting secret keys from complex manufacturing variations in integrated circuits (ICs). We explore the vulnerabilities of some of the popular strong PUF architectures to modeling attacks using Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. The attacks use silicon data from a test chip manufactured in IBM 32nm silicon-on-insulator (SOI) technology. Attack results demonstrate that the majority of strong PUF architectures can be predicted to very high accuracies using limited training data. We also explore the techniques to exploit unreliable data from strong PUF architectures and effectively use them to improve the prediction accuracies of modeling attacks. Motivated by the vulnerabilities of existing PUF architectures, we present a novel modeling attack resistant PUF architecture based on non-linear computing elements. Post-silicon validation results are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the non-linear PUF architecture against modeling and fault-injection attacks. Apart from the techniques to improve the security of PUF circuits, we also present novel solutions to improve the performance of PUF circuits from the perspectives of IC fabrication and system/protocol design. Finally, we present a statistical benchmark suite to evaluate PUFs in conceptualization phase and also to enable fine-grained security assessments for varying PUF parameters. Data compressibility analyses for validating the statistical benchmark suite are also presented
Design and Evaluation of FPGA-based Hybrid Physically Unclonable Functions
A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is a new and promising approach to provide security for physical systems and to address the problems associated with traditional approaches. One of the most important performance metrics of a PUF is the randomness of its generated response, which is presented via uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing. In this study, we implement three known PUF schemes on an FPGA platform, namely SR Latch PUF, Basic RO PUF, and Anderson PUF. We then perform a thorough statistical analysis on their performance. In addition, we propose the idea of the Hybrid PUF structure in which two (or more) sources of randomness are combined in a way to improve randomness. We investigate two methods in combining the sources of randomness and we show that the second one improves the randomness of the response, significantly. For example, in the case of combining the Basic RO PUF and the Anderson PUF, the Hybrid PUF uniqueness is increased nearly 8%, without any pre-processing or post-processing tasks required. Two main categories of applications for PUFs have been introduced and analyzed: authentication and secret key generation. In this study, we introduce another important application for PUFs. In fact, we develop a secret sharing scheme using a PUF to increase the information rate and provide cheater detection capability for the system. We show that, using the proposed method, the information rate of the secret sharing scheme will improve significantly
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On Improving Robustness of Hardware Security Primitives and Resistance to Reverse Engineering Attacks
The continued growth of information technology (IT) industry and proliferation of interconnected devices has aggravated the problem of ensuring security and necessitated the need for novel, robust solutions. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as promising secure hardware primitives that can utilize the disorder introduced during manufacturing process to generate unique keys. They can be utilized as \textit{lightweight} roots-of-trust for use in authentication and key generation systems. Unlike insecure non-volatile memory (NVM) based key storage systems, PUFs provide an advantage -- no party, including the manufacturer, should be able to replicate the physical disorder and thus, effectively clone the PUF. However, certain practical problems impeded the widespread deployment of PUFs. This dissertation addresses such problems of (i) reliability and (ii) unclonability. Also, obfuscation techniques have proven necessary to protect intellectual property in the presence of an untrusted supply chain and are needed to aid against counterfeiting. This dissertation explores techniques utilizing layout and logic-aware obfuscation. Collectively, we present secure and cost-effective solutions to address crucial hardware security problems
Comprehensive study of physical unclonable functions on FPGAs: correlation driven Implementation, deep learning modeling attacks, and countermeasures
For more than a decade and a half, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been
presented as a promising hardware security primitive. The idea of exploiting variabilities
in hardware fabrication to generate a unique fingerprint for every silicon chip introduced a
more secure and cheaper alternative. Other solutions using non-volatile memory to store
cryptographic keys, require additional processing steps to generate keys externally, and
secure environments to exchange generated keys, which introduce many points of attack
that can be used to extract the secret keys.
PUFs were addressed in the literature from different perspectives. Many publications
focused on proposing new PUF architectures and evaluation metrics to improve security
properties like response uniqueness per chip, response reproducibility of the same PUF
input, and response unpredictability using previous input/response pairs. Other research
proposed attack schemes to clone the response of PUFs, using conventional machine learning
(ML) algorithms, side-channel attacks using power and electromagnetic traces, and fault
injection using laser beams and electromagnetic pulses. However, most attack schemes to
be successful, imposed some restrictions on the targeted PUF architectures, which make
it simpler and easier to attack. Furthermore, they did not propose solid and provable
enhancements on these architectures to countermeasure the attacks. This leaves many
open questions concerning how to implement perfect secure PUFs especially on FPGAs,
how to extend previous modeling attack schemes to be successful against more complex
PUF architectures (and understand why modeling attacks work) and how to detect and
countermeasure these attacks to guarantee that secret data are safe from the attackers.
This Ph.D. dissertation contributes to the state of the art research on physical unclonable
functions in several ways. First, the thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of secure PUFs on FPGAs using manual placement and manual routing
techniques guided by new performance metrics to overcome FPGAs restrictions with minimum
hardware and area overhead. Then the impact of deep learning (DL) algorithms is
studied as a promising modeling attack scheme against complex PUF architectures, which
were reported immune to conventional (ML) techniques. Furthermore, it is shown that
DL modeling attacks successfully overcome the restrictions imposed by previous research
even with the lack of accurate mathematical models of these PUF architectures. Finally,
this comprehensive analysis is completed by understanding why deep learning attacks are
successful and how to build new PUF architectures and extra circuitry to thwart these types
of attacks. This research is important for deploying cheap and efficient hardware security
primitives in different fields, including IoT applications, embedded systems, automotive
and military equipment. Additionally, it puts more focus on the development of strong intrinsic PUFs which are widely proposed and deployed in many security protocols used
for authentication, key establishment, and Oblivious transfer protocols
Statistical evaluation of PUF implementation techniques as applied to quantum confinement semiconductors
Physically unclonable functions, or PUFs, present a means to securely identify objects, both implicit and attached, alongside several uses in conventional secure communication techniques. Many types of PUF based on varying sources of fingerprint entropy have been suggested, and the higher-level theoretical properties and implications of this primitive have been extensively discussed. However, each different prospective implementation of PUF typically approaches the practical considerations for the conversion from a unique entropy source to ultimate PUF implementation anew. These studies typically treat the intermediate processing schema, such as response binning, solely as a means to an end rather than a subject of explicit discussion and evaluation. As such, there exist few studies into developing a general framework for the optimisation and simulation of the important elements that lie between the measurement of the particular entropy source and the evaluation of the final device as a whole. This thesis seeks to outline and validate a generalised schema for the conversion of entropy source to final results, presenting the fundamental design elements and figures of merit for the process at every stage where applicable. Further to this, each stage of the process is expressed analytically, allowing the direct derivation of the ultimate figures of merit based on the measurement outcomes of the initial source of entropy. To validate, this process is applied towards the resonant tunnelling diode (RTD) as the prospective entropic unit cell. This type of semiconductor device has several properties that make it an interesting candidate upon which to base a PUF, and this work additionally seeks to outline these benefits and enumerate the general comparative figures of merit for a PUF derived therefrom
Compact Field Programmable Gate Array Based Physical Unclonable Functions Circuits
The Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) is a candidate to provide a secure solid root source for identification and authentication applications. It is precious for FPGA-based systems, as FPGA designs are vulnerable to IP thefts and cloning. Ideally, the PUFs should have strong random variations from one chip to another, and thus each PUF is unique and hard to replicate. Also, the PUFs should be stable over time so that the same challenge bits always yield the same result. Correspondingly, one of the major challenges for FPGA-based PUFs is the difficulty of avoiding systematic bias in the integrated circuits but also pulling out consistent characteristics as the PUF at the same time. This thesis discusses several compact PUF structures relying on programmable delay lines (PDLs) and our novel intertwined programmable delays (IPD). We explore the strategy to extract the genuinely random PUF from these structures by minimizing the systematic biases. Yet, our methods still maintain very high reliability. Furthermore, our proposed designs, especially the TERO-based PUFs, show promising resilience to machine learning (ML) attacks. We also suggest the bit-bias metric to estimate PUF’s complexity quickly
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