Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Multilevel Pricing Schemes in a Deregulated Wireless Network Market

Typically the cost of a product, a good or a service has many components. Those components come from different complex steps in the supply chain of the product from sourcing to distribution. This economic point of view also takes place in the determination of goods and services in wireless networks. Indeed, before transmitting customer data, a network operator has to lease some frequency range from a spectrum owner and also has to establish agreements with electricity suppliers. The goal of this paper is to compare two pricing schemes, namely a power-based and a flat rate, and give a possible explanation why flat rate pricing schemes are more common than power based pricing ones in a deregulated wireless market. We suggest a hierarchical game-theoretical model of a three level supply chain: the end users, the service provider and the spectrum owner. The end users intend to transmit data on a wireless network. The amount of traffic sent by the end users depends on the available frequency bandwidth as well as the price they have to pay for their transmission. A natural question arises for the service provider: how to design an efficient pricing scheme in order to maximize his profit. Moreover he has to take into account the lease charge he has to pay to the spectrum owner and how many frequency bandwidth to rent. The spectrum owner itself also looks for maximizing its profit and has to determine the lease price to the service provider. The equilibrium at each level of our supply chain model are established and several properties are investigated. In particular, in the case of a power-based pricing scheme, the service provider and the spectrum owner tend to share the gross provider profit. Whereas, considering the flat rate pricing scheme, if the end users are going to exploit the network intensively, then the tariffs of the suppliers (spectrum owner and service provider) explode.Comment: This is the last draft version of the paper. Revised version of the paper accepted by ValueTools 2013 can be found in Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools (ValueTools '13), December 10-12, 2013, Turin, Ital