4,493 research outputs found
JaxNet: Scalable Blockchain Network
Today's world is organized based on merit and value. A single global currency
that's decentralized is needed for a global economy. Bitcoin is a partial
solution to this need, however it suffers from scalability problems which
prevent it from being mass-adopted. Also, the deflationary nature of bitcoin
motivates people to hoard and speculate on them instead of using them for day
to day transactions. We propose a scalable, decentralized cryptocurrency that
is based on Proof of Work.The solution involves having parallel chains in a
closed network using a mechanism which rewards miners proportional to their
effort in maintaining the network.The proposed design introduces a novel
approach for solving scalability problem in blockchain network based on merged
mining.Comment: 55 pages. 10 figure
Sustainable Development Report: Blockchain, the Web3 & the SDGs
This is an output paper of the applied research that was conducted between July 2018 - October 2019 funded by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and conducted by the Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics at the Vienna University of Economics and Business and RCE Vienna (Regional Centre of Expertise on Education for Sustainable Development).Series: Working Paper Series / Institute for Cryptoeconomics / Interdisciplinary Researc
Sustainable Development Report: Blockchain, the Web3 & the SDGs
This is an output paper of the applied research that was conducted between July 2018 - October 2019 funded by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and conducted by the Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics at the Vienna University of Economics and Business and RCE Vienna (Regional Centre of Expertise on Education for Sustainable Development).Series: Working Paper Series / Institute for Cryptoeconomics / Interdisciplinary Researc
Cryptocurrency Mining Games with Economic Discount and Decreasing Rewards
In the consensus protocols used in most cryptocurrencies, participants called miners must find valid blocks of transactions and append them to a shared tree-like data structure. Ideally, the rules of the protocol should ensure that miners maximize their gains if they follow a default strategy, which consists on appending blocks only to the longest branch of the tree, called the blockchain. Our goal is to understand under which circumstances are miners encouraged to follow the default strategy. Unfortunately, most of the existing models work with simplified payoff functions, without considering the possibility that rewards decrease over time because of the game rules (like in Bitcoin), nor integrating the fact that a miner naturally prefers to be paid earlier than later (the economic concept of discount). In order to integrate these factors, we consider a more general model where issues such as economic discount and decreasing rewards can be set as parameters of an infinite stochastic game. In this model, we study the limit situation in which a miner does not receive a full reward for a block if it stops being in the blockchain. We show that if rewards are not decreasing, then miners do not have incentives to create new branches, no matter how high their computational power is. On the other hand, when working with decreasing rewards similar to those in Bitcoin, we show that miners have an incentive to create such branches. Nevertheless, this incentive only occurs when a miner controls a proportion of the computational power which is close to half of the computational power of the entire network
Blockchain Technology - China\u27s Bid to High Long-Run Growth
Despite having the second largest economy at 1,000 to ). This is a noteworthy accomplishment since many other developing nations have fallen victim to economic stagnation within this range leading to the term âmiddle-income trapâ. This paper will argue that one of the ways in which China escaped the middle-income trap and will continue to grow its economic influence is through the support of blockchain technology. Research and development, early technological adoption and business climate all play a role in explaining how the Chinese public and private sector have used blockchain technology to encourage economic growth. While there are many questions and misconceptions about blockchain technology and its place in China, this paper seeks only to answer a select few
Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions
The buzz surrounding Bitcoin has reached a fever pitch. Yet in academic legal discussions, disproportionate emphasis is placed on bitcoins (that is, virtual currency), and little mention is made of blockchain technologyâthe true innovation behind the Bitcoin protocol. Simply, blockchain technology solves an elusive networking problem by enabling âtrustlessâ transactions: value exchanges over computer networks that can be verified, monitored, and enforced without central institutions (for example, banks). This has broad implications for how we transact over electronic networks.
This Note integrates current research from leading computer scientists and cryptographers to elevate the legal communityâs understanding of blockchain technology and, ultimately, to inform policymakers and practitioners as they consider different regulatory schemes. An examination of the economic properties of a blockchain-based currency suggests the technologyâs true value lies in its potential to facilitate more efficient digital-asset transfers. For example, applications of special interest to the legal community include more efficient document and authorship verification, title transfers, and contract enforcement. Though a regulatory patchwork around virtual currencies has begun to form, its careful analysis reveals much uncertainty with respect to these alternative applications
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