Excluding pairs of tournaments

The Erd\H{o}s-Hajnal conjecture states that for every given undirected graph $H$ there exists a constant $c(H)>0$ such that every graph $G$ that does not contain $H$ as an induced subgraph contains a clique or a stable set of size at least $|V(G)|^{c(H)}$. The conjecture is still open. Its equivalent directed version states that for every given tournament $H$ there exists a constant $c(H)>0$ such that every $H$-free tournament $T$ contains a transitive subtournament of order at least $|V(T)|^{c(H)}$. We prove in this paper that $\{H_{1},H_{2}\}$-free tournaments $T$ contain transitive subtournaments of size at least $|V(T)|^{c(H_{1},H_{2})}$ for some $c(H_{1},H_{2})>0$ and several pairs of tournaments: $H_{1}$, $H_{2}$. In particular we prove that $\{H,H^{c}\}$-freeness implies existence of the polynomial-size transitive subtournaments for several tournaments $H$ for which the conjecture is still open ($H^{c}$ stands for the \textit{complement of $H$}). To the best of our knowledge these are first nontrivial results of this type

Majority rule in the absence of a majority

Which is the best, impartially most plausible consensus view to serve as the basis of democratic group decision when voters disagree? Assuming that the judgment aggregation problem can be framed as a matter of judging a set of binary propositions (“issues”), we develop a multi-issue majoritarian approach based on the criterion of supermajority efficiency (SME). SME reflects the idea that smaller supermajorities must yield to larger supermajorities so as to obtain better supported, more plausible group judgments. As it is based on a partial ordering, SME delivers unique outcomes only in special cases. In general, one needs to make cardinal, not just ordinal, trade- offs between different supermajorities. Hence we axiomatically characterize the class of additive majority rules, whose (generically unique) outcome can be interpreted as the “on balance most plausible” consensus judgment