Opinion Behavior Analysis in Social Networks Under the Influence of Coopetitive Media

Both interpersonal communication and media contact are important information sources and play a significant role in shaping public opinions of large populations. In this paper, we investigate how the opinion-forming process evolves over social networks under the media influence. In addition to being affected by the opinions of their connected peers, the media cooperate and/or compete mutually with each other. Networks with mixed cooperative and competitive interactions are said to be coopetitive . In this endeavor, a novel mathematical model of opinion dynamics is introduced, which captures the information diffusion process under consideration, makes use of the community-based network structure, and takes into account personalized biases among individuals in social networks. By employing port-Hamiltonian system theory to analyze the modeled opinion dynamics, we predict how public opinions evolve in the long run through social entities and find applications in political strategy science. A key technical observation is that as a result of the port-Hamiltonian formulation, the mathematical passivity property of individuals’ self-dynamics facilitates the convergence analysis of opinion evolution. We explain how to steer public opinions towards consensus, polarity, or neutrality, and investigate how an autocratic media coalition might emerge regardless of public views. We also assess the role of interpersonal communication and media exposure, which in itself is an essential topic in mathematical sociology

Link updating strategies influence consensus decisions as a function of the direction of communication

Consensus decision-making in social groups strongly depends on communication links that determine to whom individuals send, and from whom they receive, information. Here, we ask how consensus decisions are affected by strategic updating of links and how this effect varies with the direction of communication. We quantified the co-evolution of link and opinion dynamics in a large population with binary opinions using mean-field numerical simulations of two voter-like models of opinion dynamics: an Incoming model (where individuals choose who to receive opinions from) and an Outgoing model (where individuals choose who to send opinions to). We show that individuals can bias group-level outcomes in their favor by breaking disagreeing links while receiving opinions (Incoming Model) and retaining disagreeing links while sending opinions (Outgoing Model). Importantly, these biases can help the population avoid stalemates and achieve consensus. However, the role of disagreement avoidance is diluted in the presence of strong preferences - highly stubborn individuals can shape decisions to favor their preferences, giving rise to non-consensus outcomes. We conclude that collectively changing communication structures can bias consensus decisions, as a function of the strength of preferences and the direction of communication

Dynamics of Ideological Biases of Social Media Users

Humanity for centuries has perfected skills of interpersonal interactions and evolved patterns that enable people to detect lies and deceiving behavior of others in face-to-face settings. Unprecedented growth of people's access to mobile phones and social media raises an important question: How does this new technology influence people's interactions and support the use of traditional patterns? In this paper, we answer this question for homophily driven patterns in social media. In our previous studies, we found that, on a university campus, changes in student opinions were driven by the desire to hold popular opinions. Here, we demonstrate that the evolution of online platform-wide opinion groups is driven by the same desire. We focus on two social media: Twitter and Parler, on which we tracked the political biases of their users. On Parler, an initially stable group of right-biased users evolved into a permanent right-leaning echo chamber dominating weaker, transient groups of members with opposing political biases. In contrast, on Twitter, the initial presence of two large opposing bias groups led to the evolution of a bimodal bias distribution, with a high degree of polarization. We capture the movement of users from the initial to final bias groups during the tracking period. We also show that user choices are influenced by side-effects of homophily. The users entering the platform attempt to find a sufficiently large group whose members hold political bias within the range sufficiently close to the new user's bias. If successful, they stabilize their bias and become a permanent member of the group. Otherwise, they leave the platform. We believe that the dynamics of users uncovered in this paper create a foundation for technical solutions supporting social groups on social media and socially aware networks.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figures, submitted to IEEE Communications Magazin

Optimal Multiphase Investment Strategies for Influencing Opinions in a Social Network

We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, where two camps aim to maximize adoption of their opinions by the population. In particular, we consider the possibility of campaigning in multiple phases, where the final opinion of a node in a phase acts as its initial biased opinion for the following phase. Using an extension of the popular DeGroot-Friedkin model, we formulate the utility functions of the camps, and show that they involve what can be interpreted as multiphase Katz centrality. Focusing on two phases, we analytically derive Nash equilibrium investment strategies, and the extent of loss that a camp would incur if it acted myopically. Our simulation study affirms that nodes attributing higher weightage to initial biases necessitate higher investment in the first phase, so as to influence these biases for the terminal phase. We then study the setting in which a camp's influence on a node depends on its initial bias. For single camp, we present a polynomial time algorithm for determining an optimal way to split the budget between the two phases. For competing camps, we show the existence of Nash equilibria under reasonable assumptions, and that they can be computed in polynomial time

Attitude Dynamics with Limited Verbalisation Capabilities

This article offers a new perspective for research on opinion dynamics. It demonstrates the importance of the distinction of opinion and attitude, which originally has been discussed in literature on consumer behaviour. As opinions are verbalised attitudes not only biases in interpretation and adoption processes have to be considered but also verbalisation biases should be addressed. Such biases can be caused by language deficits or social norms. The model presented in this article captures the basic features of common opinion dynamic models and additionally biases in the verbalisation process. Further, it gives a first analysis of this model and shows that precision as bias in the verbalisation process can influence the dynamics significantly. Presenting and applying the concept of area of influential attitudes the impact of each parameter (selective attitude, selective interpretation, and precision) is analysed independently. Some preliminary results for combined effects are presented.Opinion dynamics, attitude dynamics, verbalisation, selective attitude, selective interpretation, area of influential attitudes