\u3ci\u3eDemocracy\u27s Discontent\u3c/i\u3e in a Complex World: Can Avalanches, Sandpiles, and Finches Optimize Michael Sandel\u27s Civic Republican Community?

In Democracy\u27s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, Michael Sandel looks about him and finds a vast and complex world governed by impersonal institutions and structures, in which discontented, anxious, and frustrated individuals are losing control over the forces that govern their lives, and in which the moral fabric of community is unraveling. His solution is to revitalize the civic strand of freedom found in republican politics and thus equip individuals to govern themselves. Sandel wonders how civic republicanism can exist in today\u27s world. Historically, republicanism has found a home in small, bounded places, which were largely self-sufficient and inhabited by people whose living conditions, education, and commonality enabled them to deliberate about public concerns. His structural answer is to disperse sovereignty both upwards and downwards of the modem nation state into a multiplicity of political communities and social institutions. His normative answer is to infuse substantive moral discourse back into public political debate

Complex Networks

Introduction to the Special Issue on Complex Networks, Artificial Life journal.Comment: 7 pages, in pres

Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law

Recently, commentators have applied insights from complexity theory to legal analysis generally and to administrative law in particular. This Article focuses on one of the central problems that complexity. theory addresses, the importance and mechanisms of adaptation within complex systems. In Part I, the Article uses three features of complex adaptive systems-emergence from self-assembly, nonlinearity, and sensitivity to initial conditions-and explores the extent to which they may add value as a matter of positive analysis to the understanding of change within legal systems. In Part H, the Article focuses on three normative claims in public law scholarship that depend explicitly or implicitly on notions of adaptation: that states offer advantages over the federal government because experimentation can make them more adaptive, that federal agencies should themselves become more experimentalist using the tool of adaptive management, and that administrative agencies shou Id adopt collaborative mechanisms in policymaking. Using two analytic tools found in the complexity literature, the genetic algorithm and evolutionary game theory, the Article tests the extent to which these three normative claims are borne out

Dynamic Models of Appraisal Networks Explaining Collective Learning

This paper proposes models of learning process in teams of individuals who collectively execute a sequence of tasks and whose actions are determined by individual skill levels and networks of interpersonal appraisals and influence. The closely-related proposed models have increasing complexity, starting with a centralized manager-based assignment and learning model, and finishing with a social model of interpersonal appraisal, assignments, learning, and influences. We show how rational optimal behavior arises along the task sequence for each model, and discuss conditions of suboptimality. Our models are grounded in replicator dynamics from evolutionary games, influence networks from mathematical sociology, and transactive memory systems from organization science.Comment: A preliminary version has been accepted by the 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. The journal version has been submitted to IEEE Transactions on Automatic Contro

Global adaptation in networks of selfish components: emergent associative memory at the system scale

In some circumstances complex adaptive systems composed of numerous self-interested agents can self-organise into structures that enhance global adaptation, efficiency or function. However, the general conditions for such an outcome are poorly understood and present a fundamental open question for domains as varied as ecology, sociology, economics, organismic biology and technological infrastructure design. In contrast, sufficient conditions for artificial neural networks to form structures that perform collective computational processes such as associative memory/recall, classification, generalisation and optimisation, are well-understood. Such global functions within a single agent or organism are not wholly surprising since the mechanisms (e.g. Hebbian learning) that create these neural organisations may be selected for this purpose, but agents in a multi-agent system have no obvious reason to adhere to such a structuring protocol or produce such global behaviours when acting from individual self-interest. However, Hebbian learning is actually a very simple and fully-distributed habituation or positive feedback principle. Here we show that when self-interested agents can modify how they are affected by other agents (e.g. when they can influence which other agents they interact with) then, in adapting these inter-agent relationships to maximise their own utility, they will necessarily alter them in a manner homologous with Hebbian learning. Multi-agent systems with adaptable relationships will thereby exhibit the same system-level behaviours as neural networks under Hebbian learning. For example, improved global efficiency in multi-agent systems can be explained by the inherent ability of associative memory to generalise by idealising stored patterns and/or creating new combinations of sub-patterns. Thus distributed multi-agent systems can spontaneously exhibit adaptive global behaviours in the same sense, and by the same mechanism, as the organisational principles familiar in connectionist models of organismic learning

An evolutionary game model for behavioral gambit of loyalists: Global awareness and risk-aversion

We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by {\em indifference} w.r.t. the game at all: their dynamics is designed to account for risk-aversion as an innovative behavioral gambit. From this point of view, the choice of this solitary strategy is enhanced when innovation starts, while is depressed when it becomes the majority option. This implies that the payoff matrix of the game becomes dependent on the global awareness of the agents measured by the relevance of the population of the indifferent players. The resulting dynamics is non-trivial with different kinds of phase transition depending on a few model parameters. The phase diagram is studied on regular as well as complex networks

Emergence of Hierarchy on a Network of Complementary Agents

Complementarity is one of the main features underlying the interactions in biological and biochemical systems. Inspired by those systems we propose a model for the dynamical evolution of a system composed by agents that interact due to their complementary attributes rather than their similarities. Each agent is represented by a bit-string and has an activity associated to it; the coupling among complementary peers depends on their activity. The connectivity of the system changes in time respecting the constraint of complementarity. We observe the formation of a network of active agents whose stability depends on the rate at which activity diffuses in the system. The model exhibits a non-equilibrium phase transition between the ordered phase, where a stable network is generated, and a disordered phase characterized by the absence of correlation among the agents. The ordered phase exhibits multi-modal distributions of connectivity and activity, indicating a hierarchy of interaction among different populations characterized by different degrees of activity. This model may be used to study the hierarchy observed in social organizations as well as in business and other networks.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures, submitte