3,299 research outputs found

    Energy management in communication networks: a journey through modelling and optimization glasses

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    The widespread proliferation of Internet and wireless applications has produced a significant increase of ICT energy footprint. As a response, in the last five years, significant efforts have been undertaken to include energy-awareness into network management. Several green networking frameworks have been proposed by carefully managing the network routing and the power state of network devices. Even though approaches proposed differ based on network technologies and sleep modes of nodes and interfaces, they all aim at tailoring the active network resources to the varying traffic needs in order to minimize energy consumption. From a modeling point of view, this has several commonalities with classical network design and routing problems, even if with different objectives and in a dynamic context. With most researchers focused on addressing the complex and crucial technological aspects of green networking schemes, there has been so far little attention on understanding the modeling similarities and differences of proposed solutions. This paper fills the gap surveying the literature with optimization modeling glasses, following a tutorial approach that guides through the different components of the models with a unified symbolism. A detailed classification of the previous work based on the modeling issues included is also proposed

    End-to-end resource management for federated delivery of multimedia services

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    Recently, the Internet has become a popular platform for the delivery of multimedia content. Currently, multimedia services are either offered by Over-the-top (OTT) providers or by access ISPs over a managed IP network. As OTT providers offer their content across the best-effort Internet, they cannot offer any Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees to their users. On the other hand, users of managed multimedia services are limited to the relatively small selection of content offered by their own ISP. This article presents a framework that combines the advantages of both existing approaches, by dynamically setting up federations between the stakeholders involved in the content delivery process. Specifically, the framework provides an automated mechanism to set up end-to-end federations for QoS-aware delivery of multimedia content across the Internet. QoS contracts are automatically negotiated between the content provider, its customers, and the intermediary network domains. Additionally, a federated resource reservation algorithm is presented, which allows the framework to identify the optimal set of stakeholders and resources to include within a federation. Its goal is to minimize delivery costs for the content provider, while satisfying customer QoS requirements. Moreover, the presented framework allows intermediary storage sites to be included in these federations, supporting on-the-fly deployment of content caches along the delivery paths. The algorithm was thoroughly evaluated in order to validate our approach and assess the merits of including intermediary storage sites. The results clearly show the benefits of our method, with delivery cost reductions of up to 80 % in the evaluated scenario

    Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

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    We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.National Science Foundation (CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-0735974, CNS-0524477, and CNS-0520166); Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and COLCIENCIAS–Instituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la Tecnología “Francisco Jose ́ de Caldas”

    Information Exchange rather than Topology Awareness: Cooperation between P2P Overlay and Traffic Engineering

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    Solutions to the routing strategic conflict between noncooperative P2P overlay and ISP underlay go separate ways: hyperselfishness and cooperation. Unpredictable (possibly adverse) impact of the hyperselfish topology awareness, which is adopted in both overlay routing and traffic engineering, has not been sufficiently studied in the literature. Topology-related information exchange in a cooperatively efficient way should be highlighted to alleviate the cross-layer conflict. In this paper, we first illustrate the hyperselfish weakness with two dynamic noncooperative game models in which hyperselfish overlay or underlay has to accept a suboptimal profit. Then we build a synergistic cost-saving (SC) game model to reduce the negative effects of noncooperation. In the SC model, through information exchange, that is, the classified path-delay metrics for P2P overlay and peer locations for underlay, P2P overlay selects proximity as well as saving traffic transit cost for underlay, and ISP underlay adjusts routing to optimize network cost as well as indicating short delay paths for P2P. Simulations based on the real and generated topologies validate cost improvement by SC model and find a proper remote threshold value to limit P2P traffic from remote area, cross-AS, or cross-ISP
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