State of the art of pricing policy in air transportation: network carriers vs. low-cost airlines

The modern air transport industry is highly competitive. To survive in the market, the implementation of a successful marketing strategy is fundamental. In particular, an effective pricing policy has become crucial for airlines to remain profitable. Correspondingly, the different types of airline in the market have also established very distinct pricing policies. The present study is based on a literature review and presents the state of the art of pricing policy in air transportation. The aim is to compare and discuss the pricing strategies of network carriers and low-cost airlines. Special attention is paid to Revenue Management, which is a very important management tool used by airlines to take advantage of the differences in willingness to pay of passengers. The pricing policy, however, depends on the overall business strategy of the airline. Results show many differences, resulting from the fact that these two types of airline are characterized by very different fundamental business models and, correspondingly, also target groups. Since network carriers and also low-cost airlines have adjusted their pricing strategies lately, these recent developments will be discussed as well. This paper adds to the knowledge of this topic because it presents the most up-to-date and complete study on pricing regarding network carriers vs. low-cost airlines.A moderna indústria do transporte aéreo é altamente competitiva. Para sobreviver no mercado, a implementação de uma estratégia de marketing bem-sucedida é fundamental. Em particular, uma política de preços eficaz tornou-se crucial para as companhias aéreas continuarem lucrativas. Os diferentes tipos de companhias aéreas no mercado também estabeleceram políticas de preços muito distintas. O presente estudo baseia-se numa revisão da literatura e apresenta o estado da arte da política de preços no transporte aéreo. O objetivo é comparar e discutir as estratégias de preços de companhias aéreas de linha e companhias aéreas de baixo custo. Atenção especial é dada à Gestão de Receitas (Revenue Management), que é uma ferramenta de gestão usada pelas companhias aéreas para aproveitar as diferenças na disposição de pagar dos passageiros. A política de preços, no entanto, depende da estratégia geral de negócios da companhia aérea. Os resultados mostram muitas diferenças, resultantes do facto de que esses dois tipos de companhias aéreas são caracterizados por modelos de negócios fundamentais muito diferentes e, correspondentemente, também grupos-alvo. Como as operadoras de rede e também as companhias aéreas de baixo custo ajustaram as suas estratégias de preços ultimamente, esses desenvolvimentos recentes também serão discutidos. Este documento contribui para o conhecimento deste tópico, pois apresenta o estudo mais atualizado e completo sobre preços de companhias aéreas de linha versus companhias aéreas de baixo custo.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Is airline price dispersion the result of careful planning or competitive forces?

Airlines ; Competition ; Prices

Price discrimination and business-cycle risk

A parsimonious theoretical model of second degree price discrimination suggests that the business cycle will affect the degree to which firms are able to price-discriminate between different consumer types. We analyze price dispersion in the airline industry to assess how price discrimination can expose airlines to aggregate-demand fluctuations. Performing a panel analysis on seventeen years of data covering two business cycles, we find that price dispersion is highly procyclical. Estimates show that a rise in the output gap of 1 percentage point is associated with a 1.9 percent increase in the interquartile range of the price distribution in a market. These results suggest that markups move procyclically in the airline industry, such that during booms in the cycle, firms can significantly raise the markup charged to those with a high willingness to pay. The analysis suggests that this impact on firms' ability to price-discriminate results in additional profit risk, over and above the risk that comes from variations in cost.

Consumer Heterogeneity and Markups over the Business Cycle: Evidence from the Airline Industry

We analyze price dispersion in the airline industry in order to determine the e®ects of the business cycle on markup variations. We ¯nd that the cycle can a®ect the degree to which airlines can price discriminate between di®erent consumer types, ultimately a®ecting the degree of price dispersion. Performing a ¯xed-e®ects panel analysis on 17 years of data covering two business cycles, we ¯nd that price dispersion is highly procyclical. Estimates show that a rise in the output gap of one percentage point increases the interquartile range by 1.6 percent. These results suggest that markups move procyclically in the airline industry, such that during booms in the cycle, the ¯rm can signi¯cantly raise the markup charged to those with high willingness to pay. Our analysis suggests that this impact on the ¯rm's ability to price discriminate imposes extra pro¯t risk to the ¯rm over and above cost variations.

Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry

This papers analyzes dispersion in the prices that an airline charges to different customers on the same route. Such variation in airlines fares is substantial: the expected absolute difference in fares between two of an airline's passengers on a route averages thirty-six percent of the airline's average ticket price on the route. The pattern of price dispersion that we find does not seem to be explained solely by cost differences. Dispersion is higher on more competitive routes, possibly reflecting a pattern of discrimination against customers who are less willing to switch to alternative flights or airlines. We argue that the data support an explanation based on theories of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive industries.

Mergers and Business Model Assimilation: Evidence from Low-Cost Airlines Takeovers

This paper examines mergers that lead to an almost immediate replacement of the target firm’s business model in favor of that of the acquiring firm. We examine the post-merger behavior of the two leading European dedicated low-cost airlines, EasyJet and Ryanair, each acquiring another low-cost airline, respectively Go Fly and Buzz. We find that both takeovers had an immediate and sustained impact on both the pricing structures and the extent of inter-temporal price schedules used on the acquired routes, with early booking fares noticeably reduced and only very late booking fares increased. The analysis suggests that the takeovers had a net beneficial effect as a consequence of the introduction of the acquiring firms’ business models and associated yield management pricing systems. .merger policy; Business model; Low-cost airline; Price discrimination; Yield management .

Joint Opaque booking systems for online travel agencies

This paper analyzes the properties of the advanced Opaque booking systems used by the online travel agencies in conjunction with their traditional transparent booking system. In section 2 we present an updated literature review. This review underlines the interest and the specicities of Opaque goods in the Tourism Industry. It also characterizes properties of the Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) channel introduced by Priceline and oering probabilistic goods to potential travelers. In the section 3 of the paper we present a theoretical model, in which we wonder what kind of Opaque system can be implemented by a given online monopoly. We compare the "Opaque \Hotwire system", a NYOP system without any possibility of rebidding and the joint implementation of these two systems. We nd that the NYOP system and the joint implementation can have challenging properties if consumer's information is complete. Then, in section 4, we analyze the case of incomplete information. We develop an appropriate setting to integrate the lack of complete information of potential passengers on their relative propensity to pay. We analyze three cases corresponding to dierent levels of uncertainty and number of tickets available. We nd that in some relevant cases (average number of tickets, moderate uncertainty), the joint implementation of 2 dierent Opaque booking systems is advantageous for the Online travel Agencies (OTAs) and airlines. This result casts doubt on the current OTAs' strategies.Opaque Selling, Name-Your-Own-Price, Economics of Tourism, Online Travel Agencies, Probabilistic Goods.

Systematic peak-load pricing, congestion premia and demand diverting: Empirical evidence

This paper finds empirical support to systematic peak-load pricing in airlines---higher fares in ex-ante known congested periods. It estimates a congestion premia and supports the main empirical prediction in Gale and Holmes (1993)---less discount seats on peak fights.Airlines; Congestion Premia; Peak-load pricing

The Impact of market structure and price discrimination strategies in the airline sector

This paper investigates which factors influence airlines’ decisions when planning pricing strategies. We explore the impact of market structure and airlines pricing behaviour in a specific geographical context characterised by a low level of intermodal competition. The data used is, in fact, collected on a sample of southern Italian routes, for which alternative accessibility through different modes of transport is limited. We focus primarily on a specific type of pricing strategy: the intertemporal price discrimination (IPD). The IPD consists in charging different fares to different travellers according to the days missing to departure when the ticket is bought. The work aims to verify whether market’s concentration levels play a significant role in defining fare levels and, more in particular, whether airlines are more or less keen to engage in IPD when competition increases or when it reduces. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we survey the relevant literature; the data collection is described Section 3 and in Section 4 we present the empirical strategy. Afterward, in Section 5 we discuss the main outcomes and in Section 6 we draw some conclusions.