Setting Incentives for Collaboration Among Agricultural Scientists: Application of Principal-Agent Theory to Team Work

�The USDA is attempting to shift more research funds into competitive grants involving collaboration across disciplines on large projects. This type of research structure raises a host of information and incentive issues. The objective of this paper is to shed new light on principal-agent problems that are likely to arise in this new funding structure.incentives; Principal-agent model; team research; competitive grants; multi-disciplinary research

Knowledge Integrated Business Process Management for Third Party Logistics Companies

The growing importance of logistics as well as the increasing dynamic complexity of markets, technologies, and customer needs has brought great challenges to logistics. In order to focus on their core competency in such a competitive environment, more and more companies have outsourced a part or the entirety of the logistics process to third party logistics (3PL) service providers. 3PL has played a crucial role in managing logistics processes within supply chain management. Logistics processes require and supply various types of knowledge for planning, developing, operating, controlling and improving business processes. Therefore, in the current knowledge era, knowledge integrated business process management (KIBPM) is of significant importance for 3PL. This work applies KIBPM in 3PL from both a theoretical and practical perspective. The methodology for this study is a combination of literature and primary source research. From the theoretical perspective, it reviews the related literature on knowledge, KM, KIBPM and 3PL. It next analyzes application potentials as well as basic theories of KIBPM in 3PL, and proposes a framework for application. Furthermore, it studies the issues, knowledge sources and content, as well as KM approaches from the strategic and operational perspectives. In particular, it discusses the dynamics, logistics networks, business process networks and tacit knowledge sharing in 3PL. From the practical perspective, a case study of a leading 3PL provider demonstrates the drivers, practices and approaches of KIBPM application. The case study is based on in-depth interviews and extensive access to the secondary data of the firm. It analyzes the core business processes, the process knowledge and key activities of KM in the formulation of business strategy and the operation of business processes in contract logistics. In addition, it applies the proposed framework in this case. Furthermore, it discusses the findings from the literature and case study that relate to the research questions, compares the differences and similarities of KM in 3PL between theory and practice, and puts forward some research and managerial implications. This study has come to the conclusion that it is more effective and efficient to integrate KM in business processes. Knowledge of market, customer requirements, partners, and competitors and collaborative KM in the logistics networks are essential when choosing competitive strategies, process designs and development strategies for business. 3PL needs dynamic capabilities to sustain competitive advantage through KM. In operation, knowledge related business procedures and domains, as well as the results in project management of warehousing, intermodal transport and cooperation between geographic networks, have considerable value for business process execution, evaluation and improvement. 3PL motivates tacit knowledge sharing and effective knowledge acquisition, production, warehousing, distribution and application with a trusting organizational culture, process oriented structure, appropriate technology, and incentive measures. However, while KM is a tool for improving the competency and performance for the organization, learning capability is more important to keeping sustainable competitive advantage in the long term for 3PL. The application of KIBPM in 3PL supports business process management at both the strategic and operational levels. It especially contributes to business development, collaborative projects, intermodal transport, and logistics service improvement

A Pedagogy for Original Synners

Part of the Volume on Digital Young, Innovation, and the UnexpectedThis essay begins by speculating about the learning environment of the class of 2020. It takes place entirely in a virtual world, populated by simulated avatars, managed through the pedagogy of gaming. Based on this projected version of a future-now-in-formation, the authors consider the implications of the current paradigm shift that is happening at the edges of institutions of higher education. From the development of programs in multimedia literacy to the focus on the creation of hybrid learning spaces (that combine the use of virtual worlds, social networking applications, and classroom activities), the scene of learning as well as the subjects of education are changing. The figure of the Original Synner is a projection of the student-of-the-future whose foundational literacy is grounded in their ability to synthesize information from multiple information streams

Knowledge Management What Can Organizational Economics Contribute?

Knowledge management has emerged as a very successful organization practice and has been extensively treated in a large body of academic work. Surprisingly, however, organizational economics (i.e., transaction cost economics, agency theory, team theory and property rights theory) has played no role in the development of knowledge management. We argue that organizational economics insights can further the theory and practice of knowledge management in several ways. Specifically, we apply notions of contracting, team production, complementaries, hold-up, etc. to knowledge management issues (i.e., creating and integration knowledge, rewarding knowledge workers, etc.) , and derive refutable implications that are novel to the knowledge management field from our discussion.Transaction costs, organizational economics

Front-Loading Problem-Solving in Co-Development : Managing the Contractual, Organizational and Cognitive Dimensions

Front-loading ” problem-solving is one of the major strategies to reduce development costs and development lead time. In co-development situations, the implementation of such methodologies rises specific questions, due to the difficult partition in responsabilities and skills between the car manufacturer and the supplier, especially when customer and supplier contributions cannot be clearly interfaced in a “ black-box sourcing ” relation. This results in a difficult and permanent debate about design modifications. The article analyses such a co-development situation in the case of a car manufacturer and its die design and engineering suppliers. The case illustrate how to combine organizational integration (i.e. co-localization, shared development methodologies) with new economic contracting rules which create front-loading problem-solving incentives for the two partners. We compare the economic outcomes of a traditional process with a co-developped project, from the viewpoint of both the customer and the suppliers. The study demonstrates how co-development played a major role in reducing the number and cost of modifications for the customer. The benefits which suppliers can earn depend on their ability to involve in the project in terms of design and engineering capacity at an early stage. These results generate theoretical outputs which bridge the gap between incentive and contract theories on one side, and cognitive and learning fields on the other."concurrent engineering";" co-development";"contracts";" learning";"die design"

Front-Loading Problem Solving in co-Development : Managing the Contractual Organizational and Cognitive Dimensions

“ Front-loading ” problem-solving (Thomke et Fujimoto, 2000) is one of the major strategies to reduce development costs and development lead time (Midler, 1995, p 369). In co-development situations, the implementation of such methodologies rises specific questions, due to the difficult partitions in responsabilities and skills between the car manufacturer and the supplier. The problem is particularly important when customer and supplier contributions cannot be clearly interfaced in a “ black-box sourcing ” relation. The result is a difficult and permanent debate about design modifications.

On the Convergence of Evolutionary and Behavioral Theories of Organizations: A Tentative Roadmap

The behavioral theory of the firm has been acknowledged as one of the most fundamental pillars on which evolutionary theorizing in economics has been built. Nelson and Winter’s 1982 book is pervaded by the philosophy and concepts previously developed by Cyert, March and Simon. On the other hand, some behavioral notions, such as bounded rationality, though isolated from the context, are also at the heart of some economic theories of institutions such as transaction costs economics. In this paper, after briefly reviewing the basic concepts of evolutionary economics, we discuss its implications for the theory of organizations (and business firms in particular), and we suggest that evolutionary theory should coherently embrace an “embeddedness” view of organizations, whereby the latter are not simply efficient solutions to informational problems arising from contract incompleteness and uncertainty, but also shape the “visions of the world”, interaction networks, behavioral patterns and, ultimately, the very identity of the agents. After outlining the basic features of this perspective we analyze its consequences and empirical relevance.

Setting incentives for collaboration among agricultural scientists: application of principal-agent theory to team work

The USDA is attempting to shift more research funds into competitive grants involving collaboration across disciplines on large projects. This type of research structure raises a host of information and incentive issues. The objective of this paper is to shed new light on principal-agent problems that are likely to arise in this new funding structure

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Previous work on the formation and stability of cartels has focused on the case of identical players. This assumption is very restrictive in many economic environments. This paper analyses stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called "optimal sharing" which stabilises all cartels that are possibly stable under any rule. Under optimal sharing the grand coalition is the unique stable cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called "non-essentiality" and determine the set of stable cartels under optimal sharing if spillovers are positive and if the non-essentiality property applies. Finally I analyse cartel stability under optimal sharing in simple public goods game with heterogeneous players. My results show – in contrast to earlier findings for identical players – that large coalitions may well be stable.Cartel stability, Coalition formation games with spillovers, Partition function approach, Optimal sharing rule