Uncertainty and Tobin´s q in a monopolistic competition framework

This paper combines the adjustment cost hypothesis of Tobin's q models with Malinvaud's proposition that demand uncertainty matters in explaining investment. Demand uncertainty allows for ex-post excess capacity and leads firms to look at the expeeted excess capacity in deciding about investment. Marginal q is shown to be smaller than average q, the difference being explained by the degree of capacity utilization (DUC)

Capacity utilization dynamics and market power

In an intertemporal general equilibrium model with imperfect competition, we settle a relationship between factor utilization and markups, via the effect of capacity utilization rate changes on firms' market power when the demand for goods is uncertain. When competition is imperfect, the existence of capacity constraints introduces a distinction between demand and sales price elasticities. At given demand price elasticity, the price elasticity of sales will be smaller the larger the aggregate capacity utilization rateo In such a framework, capacity utilization aifects the propagation mechanism of exogenous disturbances in two ways. The first effect is similar to the effect that bottlenecks and stockouts would have in a perfectly competitive setup; the second effect is related to imperfect competition and works through market power and optimal markup changes. We study these interactions and their implications for the dynamic behavior of sorne key macro variables in response to various "structural" changes. We show that the same shock can have quite different short run effects depending on the characteristics of the initial stationary state (low or high capacity utilization rate)

The Investment Effects of Price Caps under Imperfect Competition. A Note.

This note analyzes a simple Cournot model where firms choose outputs and capacities facing varying demand and price-cap regulation. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment. (author's abstract)Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economic

The Static and Dynamic Efficiency of Instruments of Promotion of Renewables

This paper deals with a comparative analysis of the economic and social efficiency of the instruments used to promote renewable energy sources (RES), first from a static standpoint and then using dynamic criteria to assess their ability to stimulate technological progress and cost reduction. First, the instruments are analysed in relation to the classical discussion of environmental policy that opposes price-based instruments versus quantity-based instruments in an uncertain environment (feed-in tariffs as price based system on one hand, quotas + green certificates, competitive bidding as quantity-based instruments on the other hand). Next, the incentives to invest and innovate in the context of each framework are analysed in relation to the sharing of the surplus associated with each of them between producers/constructors and consumers or the public budget. Finally, the paper looks at the overall cost-efficiency of the policies on the basis of each instrument, by referring to factual evidence in European experiences. It concludes that if social preference is attached to climate change prevention and reflected in a high quantitative objective for renewables, sliding scale feed-in tariffs are a good compromise in order to promote technical progress and national RES industry also. The quota/certificate system also presents a number of advantages in terms of static efficiency, but its ability to stimulate innovation still has to be confirmed by experience.énergies renouvelables;progrès technologique;certificat vert

Strategic Eurasian Natural Gas Model for Energy Security

The mathematical formulation of a large-scale equilibrium natural gas simulation model is presented. Although large-scale natural gas models have been developed and used for energy security and policy analysis quite extensively (e.g., Holz (2007), Egging et al. (2008), Holz et al. (2009) and Lise et al. (2008)), this model differs from earlier ones in its detailed representation of the structure and operations of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) gas sector. In particular, the model represents: (i) market power of transit countries, (ii) transmission pipelines in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia, (iii) differentiation among gas production regions in Russia, and (iv) gas trade relations between FSU countries (e.g., Gazprom’s re-exporting of Central Asian gas). To demonstrate the model, a social benefit-cost analysis of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea is provided. It is found that Nord Stream project is profitable for its investors and the project also improves social welfare in all market power scenarios. Also, if transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus) exert substantial market power then the economic value of Nord Stream to its investors and to society improves substantially. We also found that the value of Nord Stream investment is rather sensitive to the degree of downstream competition in European markets and that lack of downstream competition might result in the negative value of the Nord Stream system to Gazprom

Underemployment and capital irreversivility in a unionized overlaping generations economy

In a unionized OLG model, it is shown that steady-state underutilization of labour and equipment can be due to the combination of the two following elements: (i) Irreversibility of capital, technology and skill decisions, (ii) Firm specific shocks on productivity. The presence of unions is neither sufficient nor necessary for having unemployment. The result of Devereux and Lockwood (1991) that union power affect positively the capital stock in general equilibrium does not always hold under capital irreversibility