35,026 research outputs found
Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice
Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model
strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these
theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they
provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand,
people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these
strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and
psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether
strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated
agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated
agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation
settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory
based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based
argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games
and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729
Structure in the Value Function of Two-Player Zero-Sum Games of Incomplete Information
Zero-sum stochastic games provide a rich model for competitive decision
making. However, under general forms of state uncertainty as considered in the
Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG), such decision making problems are
still not very well understood. This paper makes a contribution to the theory
of zero-sum POSGs by characterizing structure in their value function. In
particular, we introduce a new formulation of the value function for zs-POSGs
as a function of the "plan-time sufficient statistics" (roughly speaking the
information distribution in the POSG), which has the potential to enable
generalization over such information distributions. We further delineate this
generalization capability by proving a structural result on the shape of value
function: it exhibits concavity and convexity with respect to appropriately
chosen marginals of the statistic space. This result is a key pre-cursor for
developing solution methods that may be able to exploit such structure.
Finally, we show how these results allow us to reduce a zs-POSG to a
"centralized" model with shared observations, thereby transferring results for
the latter, narrower class, to games with individual (private) observations
- …