Matching mechanisms for two-sided shared mobility systems

Shared mobility systems have gained significant attention in the last few decades due, in large part, to the rise of the service-based sharing economy. In this thesis, we study the matching mechanism design of two-sided shared mobility systems which include two distinct groups of users. Typical examples of such systems include ride-hailing platforms like Uber, ride-pooling platforms like Lyft Line, and community ride-sharing platforms like Zimride. These two-sided shared mobility systems can be modeled as two-sided markets, which need to be designed to efficiently allocate resources from the supply side of the market to the demand side of the market. Given its two-sided nature, the resource allocation problem in a two-sided market is essentially a matching problem. The matching problems in two-sided markets present themselves in decentralized and dynamic environments. In a decentralized environment, participants from both sides possess asymmetric information and strategic behaviors. They may behave strategically to advance their own benefits rather than the system-level performance. Participants may also have their private matching preferences, which they may be reluctant to share due to privacy and ethical concerns. In addition, the dynamic nature of the shared mobility systems brings in contingencies to the matching problems in the forms of, for example, the uncertainty of customer demand and resource availability. In this thesis, we propose matching mechanisms for shared mobility systems. Particularly, we address the challenges derived from the decentralized and dynamic environment of the two-sided shared mobility systems. The thesis is a compilation of four published or submitted journal papers. In these papers, we propose four matching mechanisms tackling various aspects of the matching mechanism design. We first present a price-based iterative double auction for dealing with asymmetric information between the two sides of the market and the strategic behaviors of self-interested agents. For settings where prices are predetermined by the market or cannot be changed frequently due to regulatory reasons, we propose a voting-based matching mechanism design. The mechanism is a distributed implementation of the simulated annealing meta-heuristic, which does not rely on a pricing scheme and preserves user privacy. In addition to decentralized matching mechanisms, we also propose dynamic matching mechanisms. Specifically, we propose a dispatch framework that integrates batched matching with data-driven proactive guidance for a Uber-like ride-hailing system to deal with the uncertainty of riders’ demand. By considering both drivers’ ride acceptance uncertainty and strategic behaviors, we finally propose a pricing mechanism that computes personalized payments for drivers to improve drivers' average acceptance rate in a ride-hailing system

Online Algorithms for Dynamic Matching Markets in Power Distribution Systems

This paper proposes online algorithms for dynamic matching markets in power distribution systems, which at any real-time operation instance decides about matching -- or delaying the supply of -- flexible loads with available renewable generation with the objective of maximizing the social welfare of the exchange in the system. More specifically, two online matching algorithms are proposed for the following generation-load scenarios: (i) when the mean of renewable generation is greater than the mean of the flexible load, and (ii) when the condition (i) is reversed. With the intuition that the performance of such algorithms degrades with increasing randomness of the supply and demand, two properties are proposed for assessing the performance of the algorithms. First property is convergence to optimality (CO) as the underlying randomness of renewable generation and customer loads goes to zero. The second property is deviation from optimality, is measured as a function of the standard deviation of the underlying randomness of renewable generation and customer loads. The algorithm proposed for the first scenario is shown to satisfy CO and a deviation from optimal that varies linearly with the variation in the standard deviation. But the same algorithm is shown to not satisfy CO for the second scenario. We then show that the algorithm proposed for the second scenario satisfies CO and a deviation from optimal that varies linearly with the variation in standard deviation plus an offset

The microeconometric estimation of treatment effects : an overview

Vocational training programmes have been the most important active labour market policy instrument in Germany in the last years. However, the still unsatisfying situation of the labour market has raised doubt on the efficiency of these programmes. In this paper, we analyse the effects of the participation in vocational training programmes on the duration of unemployment in Eastern Germany. Based on administrative data for the time between the October 1999 and December 2002 of the Federal Employment Administration, we apply a bivariate mixed proportional hazards model. By doing so, we are able to use the information of the timing of treatment as well as observable and unobservable influences to identify the treatment effects. The results show that a participation in vocational training prolongates the unemployment duration in Eastern Germany. Furthermore, the results suggest that locking-in effects are a serious problem of vocational training programmes. JEL Classification: J64, J24, I28, J6