Indicative Conditionals and Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic can be used to give a simple, complete axiomatization of Yalcin's [16] semantic consequence relation for a language with epistemic modals and indicative conditionals. In the other direction, the formal semantics for indicative conditionals due to Kolodny and MacFarlane [9] gives rise to a new dynamic operator that is very natural from the point of view of dynamic epistemic logic, allowing succinct expression of dependence (as in dependence logic) or supervenience statements. We prove decidability for the logic with epistemic modals and Kolodny and MacFarlane's indicative conditional via a full and faithful computable translation from their logic to the modal logic K45.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825

Visibly Linear Dynamic Logic

We introduce Visibly Linear Dynamic Logic (VLDL), which extends Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) by temporal operators that are guarded by visibly pushdown languages over finite words. In VLDL one can, e.g., express that a function resets a variable to its original value after its execution, even in the presence of an unbounded number of intermediate recursive calls. We prove that VLDL describes exactly the $\omega$-visibly pushdown languages. Thus it is strictly more expressive than LTL and able to express recursive properties of programs with unbounded call stacks. The main technical contribution of this work is a translation of VLDL into $\omega$-visibly pushdown automata of exponential size via one-way alternating jumping automata. This translation yields exponential-time algorithms for satisfiability, validity, and model checking. We also show that visibly pushdown games with VLDL winning conditions are solvable in triply-exponential time. We prove all these problems to be complete for their respective complexity classes.Comment: 25 Page

Parametric Linear Dynamic Logic

We introduce Parametric Linear Dynamic Logic (PLDL), which extends Linear Dynamic Logic (LDL) by temporal operators equipped with parameters that bound their scope. LDL was proposed as an extension of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) that is able to express all $\omega$-regular specifications while still maintaining many of LTL's desirable properties like an intuitive syntax and a translation into non-deterministic B\"uchi automata of exponential size. But LDL lacks capabilities to express timing constraints. By adding parameterized operators to LDL, we obtain a logic that is able to express all $\omega$-regular properties and that subsumes parameterized extensions of LTL like Parametric LTL and PROMPT-LTL. Our main technical contribution is a translation of PLDL formulas into non-deterministic B\"uchi word automata of exponential size via alternating automata. This yields a PSPACE model checking algorithm and a realizability algorithm with doubly-exponential running time. Furthermore, we give tight upper and lower bounds on optimal parameter values for both problems. These results show that PLDL model checking and realizability are not harder than LTL model checking and realizability.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2014, arXiv:1408.556

Transition Semantics - The Dynamics of Dependence Logic

We examine the relationship between Dependence Logic and game logics. A variant of Dynamic Game Logic, called Transition Logic, is developed, and we show that its relationship with Dependence Logic is comparable to the one between First-Order Logic and Dynamic Game Logic discussed by van Benthem. This suggests a new perspective on the interpretation of Dependence Logic formulas, in terms of assertions about reachability in games of im- perfect information against Nature. We then capitalize on this intuition by developing expressively equivalent variants of Dependence Logic in which this interpretation is taken to the foreground

Dynamic Logic of Common Knowledge in a Proof Assistant

Common Knowledge Logic is meant to describe situations of the real world where a group of agents is involved. These agents share knowledge and make strong statements on the knowledge of the other agents (the so called \emph{common knowledge}). But as we know, the real world changes and overall information on what is known about the world changes as well. The changes are described by dynamic logic. To describe knowledge changes, dynamic logic should be combined with logic of common knowledge. In this paper we describe experiments which we have made about the integration in a unique framework of common knowledge logic and dynamic logic in the proof assistant \Coq. This results in a set of fully checked proofs for readable statements. We describe the framework and how a proof can beComment: 15

Language Idling and Language in Use Wittgenstein on Following Rules

This paper has a simple goal: it aims to present the difference between static logic and dynamic grammar. At the same time I will stress another difference which traverses logic and grammar: the difference between language idling and language in use. There is a development from static logic to dynamic grammar in Wittgenstein"s philosophy from early to late, whereas the difference between language idling and language in use pervades the whole oeuvre. Therefore I shall distinguish between four different conditions pertaining to the attempt to render the relations that hold language together. We find in early Wittgenstein "idle static logic" and "static logic in use," and in late Wittgenstein "idle dynamic grammar" and "dynamic grammar in use." This four-fold distinction serves to emphasize that the crucial shift to "use," which is usually claimed to be a feature of the Philosophical Investigations, already takes place in the Tractatus. A negligence of this "double shift" from logic to grammar and from idle language to language in use brought about a vast amount of misapprehensions of Wittgenstein"s philosophy, especially of the account of rule following