Synthesis of Deceptive Strategies in Reachability Games with Action Misperception

We consider a class of two-player turn-based zero-sum games on graphs with reachability objectives, known as reachability games, where the objective of Player 1 (P1) is to reach a set of goal states, and that of Player 2 (P2) is to prevent this. In particular, we consider the case where the players have asymmetric information about each other's action capabilities: P2 starts with an incomplete information (misperception) about P1's action set, and updates the misperception when P1 uses an action previously unknown to P2. When P1 is made aware of P2's misperception, the key question is whether P1 can control P2's perception so as to deceive P2 into selecting actions to P1's advantage? We show that there might exist a deceptive winning strategy for P1 that ensures P1's objective is achieved with probability one from a state otherwise losing for P1, had the information being symmetric and complete. We present three key results: First, we introduce a dynamic hypergame model to capture the reachability game with evolving misperception of P2. Second, we present a fixed-point algorithm to compute the Deceptive Almost-Sure Winning (DASW) region and DASW strategy. Finally, we show that DASW strategy is at least as powerful as Almost-Sure Winning (ASW) strategy in the game in which P1 does not account for P2's misperception. We illustrate our algorithm using a robot motion planning in an adversarial environment.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figures, submitted to IJCAI 202

Modeling Deception for Cyber Security

In the era of software-intensive, smart and connected systems, the growing power and so- phistication of cyber attacks poses increasing challenges to software security. The reactive posture of traditional security mechanisms, such as anti-virus and intrusion detection systems, has not been sufficient to combat a wide range of advanced persistent threats that currently jeopardize systems operation. To mitigate these extant threats, more ac- tive defensive approaches are necessary. Such approaches rely on the concept of actively hindering and deceiving attackers. Deceptive techniques allow for additional defense by thwarting attackers’ advances through the manipulation of their perceptions. Manipu- lation is achieved through the use of deceitful responses, feints, misdirection, and other falsehoods in a system. Of course, such deception mechanisms may result in side-effects that must be handled. Current methods for planning deception chiefly portray attempts to bridge military deception to cyber deception, providing only high-level instructions that largely ignore deception as part of the software security development life cycle. Con- sequently, little practical guidance is provided on how to engineering deception-based techniques for defense. This PhD thesis contributes with a systematic approach to specify and design cyber deception requirements, tactics, and strategies. This deception approach consists of (i) a multi-paradigm modeling for representing deception requirements, tac- tics, and strategies, (ii) a reference architecture to support the integration of deception strategies into system operation, and (iii) a method to guide engineers in deception mod- eling. A tool prototype, a case study, and an experimental evaluation show encouraging results for the application of the approach in practice. Finally, a conceptual coverage map- ping was developed to assess the expressivity of the deception modeling language created.Na era digital o crescente poder e sofisticação dos ataques cibernéticos apresenta constan- tes desafios para a segurança do software. A postura reativa dos mecanismos tradicionais de segurança, como os sistemas antivírus e de detecção de intrusão, não têm sido suficien- tes para combater a ampla gama de ameaças que comprometem a operação dos sistemas de software actuais. Para mitigar estas ameaças são necessárias abordagens ativas de defesa. Tais abordagens baseiam-se na ideia de adicionar mecanismos para enganar os adversários (do inglês deception). As técnicas de enganação (em português, "ato ou efeito de enganar, de induzir em erro; artimanha usada para iludir") contribuem para a defesa frustrando o avanço dos atacantes por manipulação das suas perceções. A manipula- ção é conseguida através de respostas enganadoras, de "fintas", ou indicações erróneas e outras falsidades adicionadas intencionalmente num sistema. É claro que esses meca- nismos de enganação podem resultar em efeitos colaterais que devem ser tratados. Os métodos atuais usados para enganar um atacante inspiram-se fundamentalmente nas técnicas da área militar, fornecendo apenas instruções de alto nível que ignoram, em grande parte, a enganação como parte do ciclo de vida do desenvolvimento de software seguro. Consequentemente, há poucas referências práticas em como gerar técnicas de defesa baseadas em enganação. Esta tese de doutoramento contribui com uma aborda- gem sistemática para especificar e desenhar requisitos, táticas e estratégias de enganação cibernéticas. Esta abordagem é composta por (i) uma modelação multi-paradigma para re- presentar requisitos, táticas e estratégias de enganação, (ii) uma arquitetura de referência para apoiar a integração de estratégias de enganação na operação dum sistema, e (iii) um método para orientar os engenheiros na modelação de enganação. Uma ferramenta protó- tipo, um estudo de caso e uma avaliação experimental mostram resultados encorajadores para a aplicação da abordagem na prática. Finalmente, a expressividade da linguagem de modelação de enganação é avaliada por um mapeamento de cobertura de conceitos

Dynamic-Occlusion-Aware Risk Identification for Autonomous Vehicles Using Hypergames

A particular challenge for both autonomous vehicles (AV) and human drivers is dealing with risk associated with dynamic occlusion, i.e., occlusion caused by other vehicles in traffic. In order to overcome this challenge, we use the theory of hypergames to develop a novel dynamic-occlusion risk measure (DOR). We use DOR to evaluate the safety of strategic planners, a type of AV behaviour planner that reasons over the assumptions other road users have of each other. We also present a method for augmenting naturalistic driving data to artificially generate occlusion situations. Combining our risk identification and occlusion generation methods, we are able to discover occlusion-caused collisions (OCC), which rarely occur in naturalistic driving data. Using our method we are able to increase the number of dynamic-occlusion situations in naturalistic data by a factor of 70, which allows us to increase the number of OCCs we can discover in naturalistic data by a factor of 40. We show that the generated OCCs are realistic and cover a diverse range of configurations. We then characterize the nature of OCCs at intersections by presenting an OCC taxonomy, which categorizes OCCs based on if they are left-turning or right-turning situations, and if they are reveal or tagging-on situations. Finally, in order to analyze the impact of collisions, we perform a severity analysis, where we find that the majority of OCCs result in high-impact collisions, demonstrating the need to evaluate AVs under occlusion situations before they can be released for commercial use

Protecting the infrastructure: 3rd Australian information warfare & security conference 2002

The conference is hosted by the We-B Centre (working with a-business) in the School of Management Information System, the School of Computer & Information Sciences at Edith Cowan University. This year\u27s conference is being held at the Sheraton Perth Hotel in Adelaide Terrace, Perth. Papers for this conference have been written by a wide range of academics and industry specialists. We have attracted participation from both national and international authors and organisations. The papers cover many topics, all within the field of information warfare and its applications, now and into the future. The papers have been grouped into six streams: • Networks • IWAR Strategy • Security • Risk Management • Social/Education • Infrastructur