The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector

We construct and estimate a structural principal/agent model of contract renegotiation in the French urban transport sector in a context where operators are privately informed on their innate costs (adverse selection) and can exert cost-reducing managerial effort (moral hazard). This model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice by local public authorities to regulate the service: cost-plus and fixedprice contracts with positive subsidies. Second, these subsidies increase over time. Such increasing subsidies are consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that principals cannot commit not to renegotiate and contracts are renegotiationproof. We compare this situation to the hypothetical case with full commitment. The distribution of innate costs of operators is shifted upwards under this hypothetical scenario. The welfare gains of commitment are significant and accrue mostly to operators. Estimates of the weights that local governments give to the operator´s profit in their objective functions and of the social value of the cost-reducing managerial effort are obtained as by-products

The Value of Delegation in a Dynamic Agency

In this paper we analyze the value of delegation in a two-period agency. A central management hires an agent to perform a personal effort in each period. Due to time constraints or lack of ability this effort can not be performed by central management. Besides personal effort firm value is influenced by the decision to launch a project which has to be made at the beginning of period two. The project decision can either be delegated to the agent (decentralization) or it can be made by central management (centralization). Under decentralization the agent observes the project’s contribution before its decision. While this captures the benefit of delegation its cost is that the project decision is unobservable and must be motivated together with personal effort via the same incentive contract. In the centralized regime, in contrast, no incentives for the project decision are necessary, however, the project’s actual contribution will not be observed such that the project decision has to be made based on expectations. We analyze optimal performance measurement for both regimes in a linear contracting setting and analyze the variables that affect the value of delegation. We do this for two different contracting regimes: long-term commitment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. Trade-offs under both contracting environments differ substantially. In particular, under renegotiation-proof contracts, decentralization might become optimal even if its direct benefit in terms of acquiring specific knowledge about the project vanishes. The reason is that with delegation of the project decision central management implicitly commits to a higher second period incentive rate as personal effort and the project decision must be controlled via the same incentive contract. This is beneficial if renegotiation-proofness requires central management to set too low second-period incentives compared to long-term commitment. A necessary condition for that is, that intertemporal correlation is negative. Contrary to the classical view this result implies that the incentive problem under centralization may become more severe than under decentralization.

The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector

We construct and estimate a structural principal/agent model of contract renegotiation in the French urban transport sector in a context where operators are privately informed on their innate costs (adverse selection) and can exert cost-reducing managerial effort (moral hazard). This model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice by local public authorities to regulate the service: cost-plus and fixedprice contracts with positive subsidies. Second, these subsidies increase over time. Such increasing subsidies are consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that principals cannot commit not to renegotiate and contracts are renegotiationproof. We compare this situation to the hypothetical case with full commitment. The distribution of innate costs of operators is shifted upwards under this hypothetical scenario. The welfare gains of commitment are significant and accrue mostly to operators. Estimates of the weights that local governments give to the operator´s profit in their objective functions and of the social value of the cost-reducing managerial effort are obtained as by-products.

Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle

This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results provide a basic tool for studying dynamic contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. Also, we indicate that the revelation principle cannot be extended to a framework with multiple agents and limited commitment.revelation principle; mechanism design; limited commitment; asymmetric information

Should we pay for ecosystem service outputs, inputs or both?

Payments for ecosystem service outputs have recently become a popular policy prescription for a range of agri-environmental schemes. The focus of this paper is on the choice of contract instruments to incentivise the provision of ecosystem service outputs from farms. The farmer is better informed than the regulator in terms of hidden information about costs and hidden-actions relating to effort. The results show that with perfect information, the regulator can contract equivalently on inputs or outputs. With hidden information, input-based contracts are more cost effective at reducing the informational rent related to adverse selection than output-based contracts. Mixed contracts are also cost-effective, especially where one input is not observable. Such contracts allow the regulator to target variables that are “costly-to-fake” as opposed to those prone to moral hazard such as effort. Further results are given for fixed price contracts and input-based contracts with moral hazard. The model is extended to include a discussion of repeated contracting and the scope that exists for the regulator to benefit from information revealed by the initial choice of contract. The models are applied to a case study of contracting with farmers to protect high biodiversity native vegetation that also provides socially-valuable ecosystem services

Dynamic Yardstick Regulation

This paper shows that the inability of regulators to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when there is some competition between regulated firms and when firms' private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamic of regulation without such competition. The paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long-term contracts. We found that the inability of a regulator to commit not to renegotiate long-term contracts is without consequences even if there is a bound on transfers that a firm can be asked to pay. In contrast, short-term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers. Second, absent current competition, the possibility of future entry allows the regulator to implement the first-best with a renegotiation-proof long-term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short-term contracting.Yardstick regulation, ratchet effect, short and long-term contracts, commitment.

SEARCHING FOR RATCHET EFFECTS IN AGRICULTURAL CONTRACTS

In a dynamic contracting environment, increasing standards over time in light of past performance is known as the ratchet effect. Despite the recent theoretical attention given to the ratchet effect, models that include these effects have not been empirically tested against contract data. In this study, we use farm-level data on modern Great Plains agricultural cash rent and cropshare contracts to test for the presence of ratchet effects in the context of a principal-agent model with moral hazard. We find limited evidence for the ratchet effect within share contracts, and no evidence that it is important for the choice of contract between cash rent and cropshare.Agribusiness,

Systematic Representation of Relationship Quality in Conflict and Dispute: for Construction Projects

The construction industry needs to move towards more relational procurement procedures to reduce extensive losses of value and avoid conflicts and disputes. Despite this, the actual conceptualization and assessment of relationships during conflict and dispute incidents seem to be neglected. Via a review of literature, relationship quality is suggested as a systematic framework for construction projects. General system theory is applied and a framework consistent of four layers respectively labelled as triggering, antecedent, moderation and outcome is suggested. Two different case studies are undertaken to represent the systematic framework; which verifies that changes in contracting circumstances and built environment culture can affect the identified layers.Through system reliability theories a fault tree is derived to represent a systematic framework of relationship quality. The combinations of components, causes, and events for two case studies are mapped out through fault tree. By analysing the fault tree the combination of events that lead to relationship deterioration may be identified. Consequently the progression of simple events into failure is formulized and probabilities allocated. Accordingly the importance and the contribution of these events to failure become accessible. The ability to have such indications about relationship quality may help increase performance as well as sustainable procurement. Paper Type: Research articl

The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies increase over time. We compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators.

Report on relationship management and culture change

Brisbane Water (BW), a commercialised business arm of Brisbane City Council (BCC) entered into an alliance with a number of organisations from the private sector in order to design, construct, commission and undertake upgrades to three existing wastewater treatment plants located at Sandgate, Oxley Creek, and Wacol in Brisbane. The alliance project is called the Brisbane Water Environmental Alliance (BWEA). This report details the efforts of a team of researchers from the School of Management at Queensland University of Technology to investigate this alliance. This is the second report on this project, and is called Stage 2 of the research. At the time that Stage 2 of the research project was conducted, the BWEA project was nearing completion with a further 8 months remaining before project completion. The aim of this report is to explore individuals’ perceptions of the effectiveness and functioning of the BWEA project in the latter stages of the project. The second aim of this report is to analyse the longitudinal findings of this research project by integrating the findings from Stage 1 and Stage 2 of the project. This long-term analysis of the functioning and effectiveness of the alliance is important because at the current time, researchers have little knowledge of the group developmental processes that occur in large-scale alliances over time. Stage 2 of this research project has a number of aims including assessing performance of the BWEA project from the point of view of a range of stakeholders including the alliance board and alliance management team, alliance staff, and key stakeholders from the client organisation (Brisbane Water). Data were collected using semi-structured interviews with 18 individuals including two board members, one external facilitator, and four staff members from the client organisation. Analysis involved coding the interview transcripts in terms of the major issues that were reported by interviewees