459 research outputs found
Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks
This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio
networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to
delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two
paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we
examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary
markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic
shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium
behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents
the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF
channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing
delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU
traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players
employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition
and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators,
two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization
and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator
exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated
separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the
equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal
pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market,
we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and
exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a
backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for
this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac
Asymmetric-valued Spectrum Auction and Competition in Wireless Broadband Services
We study bidding and pricing competition between two spiteful mobile network
operators (MNOs) with considering their existing spectrum holdings. Given
asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-price
sealed-bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful MNOs
and users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize the dynamic game's
equilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing structure and different market share
between two spiteful MNOs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show that
the MNO who acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his service
price despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We also show that
the MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite charing a higher
price, still achieves more market share than the other MNO. We further show
that the competition between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. By
investigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs' profits are switched, it
serves as the benchmark of practical auction designs
Investment and Pricing with Spectrum Uncertainty: A Cognitive Operator's Perspective
This paper studies the optimal investment and pricing decisions of a
cognitive mobile virtual network operator (C-MVNO) under spectrum supply
uncertainty. Compared with a traditional MVNO who often leases spectrum via
long-term contracts, a C-MVNO can acquire spectrum dynamically in short-term by
both sensing the empty "spectrum holes" of licensed bands and dynamically
leasing from the spectrum owner. As a result, a C-MVNO can make flexible
investment and pricing decisions to match the current demands of the secondary
unlicensed users. Compared to dynamic spectrum leasing, spectrum sensing is
typically cheaper, but the obtained useful spectrum amount is random due to
primary licensed users' stochastic traffic. The C-MVNO needs to determine the
optimal amounts of spectrum sensing and leasing by evaluating the trade off
between cost and uncertainty. The C-MVNO also needs to determine the optimal
price to sell the spectrum to the secondary unlicensed users, taking into
account wireless heterogeneity of users such as different maximum transmission
power levels and channel gains. We model and analyze the interactions between
the C-MVNO and secondary unlicensed users as a Stackelberg game. We show
several interesting properties of the network equilibrium, including threshold
structures of the optimal investment and pricing decisions, the independence of
the optimal price on users' wireless characteristics, and guaranteed fair and
predictable QoS among users. We prove that these properties hold for general
SNR regime and general continuous distributions of sensing uncertainty. We show
that spectrum sensing can significantly improve the C-MVNO's expected profit
and users' payoffs.Comment: A shorter version appears in IEEE INFOCOM 2010. This version has been
submitted to IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computin
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
International audienceA cognitive radio network where an incumbent primary operator and an entrant secondary operator compete for users is modeled using queueing and game theory. The economic viability of supporting the secondary operator service using an opportunistic access to the spectrum owned by the primary operator is assessed. Against the benchmark of the primary operator operating as a monopolist, we show that the entry of the secondary operator is desirable from an efficiency perspective, since the carried traffic increases. Additionally, for a range of parameter values, a lump sum payment can be designed so that the incumbent operator has an incentive to let the secondary operator enter. Additionally, the opportunistic access setting has been compared against a leasing-based alternative, and we have concluded that the former outperforms the latter in terms of efficiency and incentive
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