Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Online Auction Market Mechanisms

This paper describes the use of a genetic algorithm (GA) to find optimal parameter-values for trading agents that operate in virtual online auction “e-marketplaces”, where the rules of those marketplaces are also under simultaneous control of the GA. The aim is to use the GA to automatically design new mechanisms for agent-based e-marketplaces that are more efficient than online markets designed by (or populated by) humans. The space of possible auction-types explored by the GA includes the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism (as used in most of the world’s financial exchanges), and also two purely one-sided mechanisms. Surprisingly, the GA did not always settle on the CDA as an optimum. Instead, novel hybrid auction mechanisms were evolved, which are unlike any existing market mechanisms. In this paper we show that, when the market supply and demand schedules undergo sudden “shock” changes partway through the evaluation process, two-sided hybrid market mechanisms can evolve which may be unlike any human-designed auction and yet may also be significantly more efficient than any human designed market mechanism

A Parallelizable Acceleration Framework for Packing Linear Programs

This paper presents an acceleration framework for packing linear programming problems where the amount of data available is limited, i.e., where the number of constraints m is small compared to the variable dimension n. The framework can be used as a black box to speed up linear programming solvers dramatically, by two orders of magnitude in our experiments. We present worst-case guarantees on the quality of the solution and the speedup provided by the algorithm, showing that the framework provides an approximately optimal solution while running the original solver on a much smaller problem. The framework can be used to accelerate exact solvers, approximate solvers, and parallel/distributed solvers. Further, it can be used for both linear programs and integer linear programs

A state-of-the-art review on torque distribution strategies aimed at enhancing energy efficiency for fully electric vehicles with independently actuated drivetrains

© 2019, Levrotto and Bella. All rights reserved. Electric vehicles are the future of private passenger transportation. However, there are still several technological barriers that hinder the large scale adoption of electric vehicles. In particular, their limited autonomy motivates studies on methods for improving the energy efficiency of electric vehicles so as to make them more attractive to the market. This paper provides a concise review on the current state-of-the-art of torque distribution strategies aimed at enhancing energy efficiency for fully electric vehicles with independently actuated drivetrains (FEVIADs). Starting from the operating principles, which include the "control allocation" problem, the peculiarities of each proposed solution are illustrated. All the existing techniques are categorized based on a selection of parameters deemed relevant to provide a comprehensive overview and understanding of the topic. Finally, future concerns and research perspectives for FEVIAD are discussed

Optimization flow control -- I: Basic algorithm and convergence

We propose an optimization approach to flow control where the objective is to maximize the aggregate source utility over their transmission rates. We view network links and sources as processors of a distributed computation system to solve the dual problem using a gradient projection algorithm. In this system, sources select transmission rates that maximize their own benefits, utility minus bandwidth cost, and network links adjust bandwidth prices to coordinate the sources' decisions. We allow feedback delays to be different, substantial, and time varying, and links and sources to update at different times and with different frequencies. We provide asynchronous distributed algorithms and prove their convergence in a static environment. We present measurements obtained from a preliminary prototype to illustrate the convergence of the algorithm in a slowly time-varying environment. We discuss its fairness property

Inattentive Consumers in Markets for Services

In an experiment on markets for services, we find that consumers are likely to stick to default tariffs and achieve suboptimal outcomes. We find that inattention to the task of choosing a better tariff is likely to be a substantial problem in addition to any task and tariff complexity effect. The institutional setup on which we primarily model our experiment is the UK electricity and gas markets, and our conclusion is that the new measures by the UK regulator Ofgem to improve consumer outcomes are likely to be of limited impact