Drivers of international development for born global companies founded by Italian entrepreneurs

The rise of “born global” companies, i.e. companies that internationalize their activities from inception or shortly thereafter led researchers to explore the various aspects related to early internationalization. Nevertheless, authors argue that further evidence and analysis on these firms is required (Oviatt and McDougall, 1997). Based on a multiple case study research the paper aims at providing further evidence on this phenomenon. An in-depth qualitative analysis has been performed based on eight startups founded by Italian entrepreneurs that showed an early internationalization towards the US and the Silicon Valley in particular. They have been interviewed with the goal of validating the major drivers of internationalization the literature attributes to born global companies. The cross case study analysis carried out highlights that not all the drivers seem to be equally relevant. The major findings of the study are twofold. First, the importance of professional networks built by entrpreneurs before establishing the company. Secondly, how the entrepreneur’s prior experience abroad (either as entrepreneur or as employee or for studying reasons) triggers and orients the internationalization path of a companyborn global, early internationalization, innovation, entrepreneurship, startup

Innovation Offshoring:Asia's Emerging Role in Global Innovation Networks

Most analysts agree that critical ingredients for economic growth, competitiveness, and welfare in the United States have been policies that encourage strong investment in research and development (R&D) and innovation. In addition, there is a general perception that technological innovation must be based in the United States to remain a pillar of the American economy. Over the past decade, however, the rise of Asia as an important location for "innovation offshoring" has begun to challenge these familiar notions. Based on original research, this report demonstrates that innovation offshoring is driven by profound changes in corporate innovation management as well as by the globalization of markets for technology and knowledge workers. U.S. companies are at the forefront of this trend, but Asian governments and firms are playing an increasingly active role as promoters and new sources of innovation. Innovation offshoring has created a competitive challenge of historic proportions for the United States, requiring the nation to respond with a new national strategy. This report recommends that such a strategy include the following elements: output forecasting techniques ... Improve access to and collection of innovation-related data to inform the national policy debate; Address "home-made" causes of innovation offshoring by sustaining and building upon existing strengths of the U.S. innovation system; Support corporate innovation by (1) providing tax incentives to spur early-state investments in innovation start-ups and (2) reforming the U.S. patent system so it is more accessible to smaller inventors and innovators; and Upgrade the U.S. talent pool of knowledge workers by (1) providing incentives to study science and engineering, (2) encouraging the development of management, interpretive, cross-cultural, and other "soft" capabilities, and (3) encouraging immigration of highly skilled workers.Innovation Networks, Innovation Offshoring, Asia

Dynamics of High-Technology Firms in the Silicon Valley

The pace of technological innovation since World War II is dramatically accelerating following the commercial exploitation of the Internet. Since the mid 90’s fiber optics capacity (infrastructure for transmission of information including voice and data) has incremented over one hundred times thanks to a new technology, dense wave division multiplexing, and Internet traffic has increased over 1.000 times. The dramatic advances in information technology provide excellent examples of the critical relevance of the knowledge in the development of competitive advantages. The Silicon Valley (SV) that about fifty years ago was an agricultural region became the center of dramatic technological and organizational transformations. In fact, most of the present high-tech companies did not exist twenty years ago. Venture capital contribution to the local economy is quite important not only due to the magnitude of the financial investment (venture investment in SV during 2000 surpassed 25.000 millions of dollars) but also because the extent and quality of networks (management teams, senior employees, customers, providers, etc.) that bring to emerging companies. How do new technologies develop? What is the role of private and public investment in the financing of R&D? Which are the most dynamical agents and how do they interact? How are new companies created and how do they evolve? The discussion of these questions is the focus of the current work.Technological development, R&D, networks

Technological change and regional restructuring in Boston's route 128 area

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies an develop into learning economies which are based on intra-regional production linkages, interactive technological learning processes, flexibility and proximity (Storper, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Gregersen and Johnson, 1997). In the next section of this paper, I will discuss some of the theoretical issues regarding localized learning processes, learning economies and learning regions (see, also, Bathelt, 1999). I will then describe the methodology used. What follows is a brief overview of how Boston s economy has specialized in high technology production. The main part of the paper will then focus on recent trends in Boston s high technology industries. It will be shown that the high technology economy consists of different subsectors which are not tied to a single technological development path. The various subsectors are, at least partially, dependent on different forces and unrelated processes. There is, however, tentative evidence which suggests that cooperative behavior and collective learning in supplierproducer- user relations have become important factors in securing reproductivity in the regional structure. The importance of these trends will be discussed in the conclusions

The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography of Innovation in America

As the United States slowly emerges from the great recession, a remarkable shify is occurring in the spatial geogrpahy of innovation. For the past 50 years, the landscape of innovation has been dominated by places like Silicon Valley - suburban corridors of spatially isolated corporate campuses, accessible only by car, with little emphasis on the quality of life or on integrating work, housing, and recreation. A new complementary urban model is now emerging, giving rise to what we and others are calling "innovation districts." These districts, by our definition, are geographic areas where leading-edge anchor institutions and companies cluster and connect with start-ups, business incubators, and accelerators. They are also physically compact, transit-accessible, and technicall

New venture internationalisation and the cluster life cycle: insights from Ireland’s indigenous software industry

The internationalization of new and small firms has been a long-standing concern of researchers in international business (Coviello and McAuley, 1999; Ruzzier et al., 2006). This topic has been re-invigorated over the last decade by the burgeoning literature on so-called ‘born globals’ (BG) or ‘international new ventures’ (INV) – businesses that confound the expectations of traditional theory by being active internationally at, or soon after, inception (Aspelund et al., 2007; Bell, 1995; Rialp et al., 2005). Until quite recently, this literature had not really considered how the home regional environment of a new venture might influence its internationalization behaviour. However, a handful of recent studies have shown that being founded in a geographic industry ‘cluster’ can positively influence the likelihood of a new venture internationalizing (e.g., Fernhaber et al., 2008; Libaers and Meyer, 2011). This chapter seeks to build on these recent contributions by further probing the relationship between clusters and new venture internationalization. Specifically, taking inspiration from recent work in the thematic research stream on clusters (which spans the fields of economic geography, regional studies and industrial dynamics), the chapter explores how the emergence and internationalization of new ventures might be affected by the ‘cluster life cycle’ context within which they are founded. This issue is examined through a revelatory longitudinal case study of Ireland’s indigenous software cluster. The study investigates the origins and internationalization behaviour of ‘leading’ Irish software ventures but, in contrast to many existing studies, it seeks to understand these firms within the context of the Irish software cluster’s emergence and evolution through a number of ‘life-cycle’ stages

Dynamic cities and creative clusters

The author focuses on how urban policies and the clustering of creative industries has influenced urban outcomes. The set of creative industries include those with output protectable under some form of intellectual property law. More specifically, this sub-sector encompasses software, multimedia, video games, industrial design, fashion, publishing, and research and development. The cities that form the basis for the empirical investigations are those where policy-induced transitions have been most evident, including Boston; San Francisco; San Diego; Seattle; Austin; Washington, D.C.; Dublin (Ireland); Hong Kong (China); and Bangalore (India). The key research questions are: 1) What types of cities are creative? 2) What locational factors are essential? 3) What are the common urban policy initiatives used by creative cities? The author explores the importance of the external environment for innovation and places it in the larger context of national innovation systems. Based on a study of development in Boston and San Diego, he isolates the factors and policies that have contributed to the local clustering of particular creative industries. In both cities, universities have played a major role in catalyzing the local economy by generating cutting-edge research findings, proactively collaborating with industries, and supplying the needed human capital. In addition, these two cities benefited from the existence of anchor firms and active industry associations that promoted fruitful university-industry links. Many cities in East Asia are aspiring to become the creative hubs of the region. But their investments tend to be heavily biased toward infrastructure provision. Although this is necessary, the heavy emphasis on hardware can lead to underinvestment in developing the talents and skills needed for the emergence of creative industries in these cities.Public Health Promotion,ICT Policy and Strategies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Decentralization,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,ICT Policy and Strategies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,Educational Technology and Distance Education,Agricultural Research

The State, Venture Capital and Domestic High-Tech Start-Ups in a Late-Developing Economy - Ireland

Ireland, the “Celtic Tiger” economy of today, had for decades been one of the poorest of the Western European economies. This paper analyses the three-pronged approach of the Irish authorities in promoting successful high-tech start-up firms. An investment climate conducive to the emergence of such firms was first created. Emerging firms were then offered substantial public support in developing their capabilities. Finally, the authorities played a significant role in promoting the emergence of a dynamic venture capital industry. Such interventionist policies would have been highly unlikely to succeed in the absence of strong institutional capacity.

Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands; New economy: new entrepreneurs!

Dit onderzoek beschrijft de belangrijkheid van bestaande en startende bedrijven voor de Nederlandse economie. In drie bijdragen wordt uit verschillende invalshoeken ingegaan op de relatie tussen ondernemerschap en de nieuwe economie. De effecten van ICT op het economische proces worden behandeld. Daarnaast wordt ingegaan op de vraag of de 21ste eeuw een nieuwe gouden eeuw zal zijn voor ondernemerschap. Tot slot komt de rol van kennisgerichte bedrijven in de nieuwe economie uit macro-economisch oogpunt aan de orde.