Perceiving the Good: An Agent Relative Account of Desire

In this project I investigate and develop a theory of desire primarily focused on the metaphysics of desire. Since my theory of desire is an evaluative theory, I address discussions concerning value and goodness, and its relation to the ethics and metaphysics of desire. Defining a desire is a complex endeavor and so is determining how desires fit within our mental economy. To locate my position, I begin with an investigation of various, often opposing, theories of desire. I examine motivational theories, pleasure-based theories, reward/learning accounts, and evaluative models. Ultimately, I argue that none of these theories provides adequate explanation for the metaphysics or phenomenology of desire. After providing arguments against these approaches, I develop my position called the “agent relative” model. I argue that desire is affective and that all affect requires an attachment to the object. Attachments are essentially self-regarding; therefore, desire is essentially self-regarding. I argue that for S to desire P, is for S to see P as good-for S. It may be that for S to desire P, is for S to experience P as good rather than experiencing P as good for S’s own wellbeing. Nevertheless, I argue for the latter and hold that the former can be true of hope, but that hope and desire are different. Finally, I argue that given my evaluative theory of desire, a modified desire satisfaction account of well-being can connect the truths found in standard desire satisfaction models with an objective list model of well-being

Reasons and Normativity

Normative reasons are of constant importance to us as agents trying to navigate through life. For this reason it is natural and vital to ask philosophical questions about reasons and the normative realm. This thesis explores various issues concerning reasons and normativity. The thesis consists of five free-standingpapers and an extended introduction. The aim of the extended introduction is not merely to situate the papers within a wider philosophical context but also to provide an overview of some of the central research questions concerning reasons and normativity. The introduction is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces and outlines the dissertation. Chapter 2 concerns the issue of what a reason is and what different types of reasons there are, such as pro tanto reasons and overall reasons. Chapter 3 discusses the frequently employed weighing metaphor, i.e. that reasons have a certain weight and can be weighed against the weight of other reasons. Chapter 4 covers how reasons relate to other normative notions such as ought, value, and obligation. For example, it discusses whether it is the case that for something to be valuable just is for there to be reasons to favor it. Chapter 5 concludes the introduction by briefly exploring how it all relates.The thesis can be said to be embedded in a recent research trend within philosophy of normativity that has a distinguished focus on reasons.The five papers deal with various issues concerning reasons and normativity. Paper I argues for a novel and theoretically parsimonious way to understand background conditions for values and reasons. Paper II explores an interpretation of the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism about reasons and value so as to accommodate that the distinction does not commit either party to certain first order claims about what reasons there are or what makes objects valuable. Paper III discusses the dictum ‘ought implies can’and how to properly interpret the ‘can’. Paper IV defends principles according to which what we ought and have reasons to do transmit from ends to the necessary means of that action. Paper V analyzes how the Fitting Attitudes analysis of value should best understand degrees of value

Logical disagreement : an epistemological study

While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing

The normativity of truth for the human person: a person-centric approach

After countering claims that truth cannot be a norm of belief, this dissertation argues that truth’s normativity is grounded in personhood. It does so by attending to the fact that truth is a norm for the human person, and to the relationships between the human person and the objective goodness and value of truth. The dissertation develops this argument by critically appropriating writings of Thomas Aquinas and representatives of twentieth-century personalism on the relationship between truth and the human person. The dissertation’s initial chapters rebut objections (1) that the involuntariness of belief rules out any possibility of norms of belief, (2) that truth cannot be a norm of belief because truth is unable to provide guidance in determining what to believe, and (3) that it is incompatible with other norms of belief such as justification. It rebuts the first objection by challenging its general account of belief and outlining an alternative account. It responds to the second argument by criticizing its understanding of guidance as overly narrow and sketching an alternative notion of guidance-by-value. It counters the third objection by arguing for the primacy of the truth-norm. The dissertation then takes up the question of what grounds the truth-norm. Chapter Three surveys recent accounts, drawing from its survey a set of desiderata for any satisfactory account. Chapter Four begins the dissertation’s account of the normativity of truth. Working from Dietrich von Hildebrand’s conception of objective goods, it argues that truth is an objective good for the person by showing how deeply interwoven truth is with friendship. Given that friendship is an objective good for the person, and that truth stands in certain intimate relationships to friendship, it follows that truth is an objective good for the person. Chapter Five rounds out the argument. The objective goodness of truth entails that truth is a value. Values are normative for persons. Therefore, truth is normative for the human person. This chapter defends the claim that values are normative for persons by elucidating the dependency of the realization of personhood—in several of its various dimensions—on value-grasping and value-realizing acts

Self-Knowledge in a Natural World

In this dissertation, I reconcile our knowledge of our own minds with philosophical naturalism. Philosophers traditionally hold that our knowledge of our own minds is especially direct and authoritative in comparison with other domains of knowledge. I introduce the subject in the first chapter. In the second and third chapters, I address the idea that we know our own minds directly. If self-knowledge is direct, it must not be grounded on anything more epistemically basic. This creates a puzzle for all epistemologists. For the naturalist, the puzzle is especially tricky. To say that self-knowledge has no epistemic ground threatens the naturalist\u27s ability to understand it as psychologically real. I argue that the idea that self-knowledge is direct is not well motivated and that models of direct self-knowledge have fundamental problems. In the fourth and fifth chapters, I examine first-person authority. I distinguish between epistemic authority, or being in a better position than others to know, and non-epistemic authority, or being immune to challenge according to some conventional norm. I argue that we have only limited epistemic authority over our own minds. I then consider whether there may be an interesting non-epistemic authority attached to the first-person perspective. This would locate first-person authority in connection with our responsibility for our own minds. I argue that this sort of authority may exist, but is unlikely to threaten naturalism without further anti-naturalist commitments in the philosophy of mind. In the final two chapters, I explore the possibility that the underlying disagreements between naturalists and anti-naturalists are about the nature of belief. I consider what failures of self-knowledge might demonstrate about the nature of belief. I show how, with the proper understanding of belief, a theory of self-knowledge can assuage some of these worries. Having adopted a conception of belief that makes sense for philosophy and empirical psychology, I outline a positive theory of self-knowledge and suggest directions for future research

Mental health without mirrors. A non-descriptivist approach to mental health and the intervention with people with delusions

Tesis Doctoral inédita leída en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Psicología. Departamento de Psicología Biológica y de la Salud. Fecha de Lectura: 16-09-202

Language on Holiday and the Philosophy of Mind: A Linguistically Sensitive Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness, Pain, and Psychological Predicates

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to debates about three topics in the philosophy of mind: phenomenal consciousness, pain, and the extension of psychological predicates. Chapter 1 outlines my metaphilosophical views and gives a roadmap to the thesis. Chapter 2 argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’ phrase as it is characteristically used in the literature on phenomenal consciousness has a technical meaning. I argue that this has the consequence that the phrase says nothing informative about phenomenal consciousness and that lay people’s use of the phrase does not show that they believe in phenomenal consciousness. Chapter 3 argues that eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness is a view worth taking seriously. First, I clarify the eliminativist position, then I explain its motivation. Finally, I draw on the discussion in chapter 2 and argue that there is no compelling evidence for lay belief in phenomenal consciousness, hence that we are currently not in a position to say whether common sense counts in favour of eliminativism or realism. Chapter 4 addresses the main problem for eliminativism – the problem of explaining why people believe in phenomenality. I discuss four recently proposed theories and conclude that we are currently not in a position to tell which of these is the most promising eliminativist-friendly explanation of belief in phenomenality, but that the potential of (at least some of) these theories confirms the claim that eliminativism is a view worth taking seriously. Chapter 5 defends the Bodily Theory of pain, according to which pains are bodily occurrences located in an extra-cranial body part, which contrasts with the Experiential Theory, according to which pains are experiences located in the mind or brain. Chapter 6 discusses what a defender of the Bodily Theory should say about the pain-in-mouth argument, i.e. the step from (1) There is a pain in my finger, and (2) My finger is in my mouth, to (3) There is a pain in my mouth. Several accounts have been offered to explain why (1)-(3) sounds wrong. In chapter 6 I offer a novel account – the mereological view – that entails the Bodily Theory of pain. Chapter 7 discusses cognitive scientists’ ascription of psychological predicates to the brain, i.e. when cognitive scientists say things like ‘The brain thinks’. I propose the Synecdoche View, according to which the locutions of cognitive scientists are figurative, with ‘the brain’ referring to the human being, such that ‘The brain thinks’ reports the thinking of the human being, not the thinking of the brain. One consequence of this is that the locutions of cognitive scientists offer no reason to believe that psychological predicates extend to brains. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by offering a speculative error theory, according to which some of my opponents’ views are based on conceptual conflations.Aker Scholarshi

Between God and Man: Community\u27s Place in Virtue, Practical Reason, and Transcendent Good

Talbot Brewer\u27s Retrieval of Ethics and Robert Adams\u27s Finite and Infinite Goods present distinct theories in ethics and metaethics. Brewer begins with the fundamental ethical perspective of the practical deliberator who experiences his practical deliberations as a continuous, unified, and constantly revised activity which begins with inchoate intimations of goodness and proceeds better or worse to understand and pursue the goodness which pervades his evaluative outlook. From this Brewer aims to account for how we achieve excellence in practical deliberation and arrive at a more tenable and self-consistent evaluative outlook which informs our ethical deliberations. Alternately, Adams begins in the linguistic community and the role suggested by our ordinary language which \u27good\u27 must play to account for the diversity of its predications and suggested instantiations. From this a deeply metaphysical account is developed of ordinary goods as, in a sense, parasitic on a transcendent and infinite good to which their intelligibility is oand upon which traditional moral notions of obligation and the like are appealingly based. This thesis argues that each theory, though similar, has distinct strengths and weaknesses which might complement each other in a synthetic theory strengthened by both. Adams\u27s transcendent Good, while it secures objectivity and maximal sharedness, lacks a criterion for higher and lower order goods. Brewer\u27s epistemology couched in practical reason, while establishing an intriguing picture of the good human life, lacks a firm grounding outside the individual to avoid subjectivism. My solution is to push the two theories together with a dialectical criterion for Adams and a notion of the transcendent community for Brewer