446 research outputs found

    VPT: Privacy Preserving Energy Trading and Block Mining Mechanism for Blockchain based Virtual Power Plants

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    The desire to overcome reliability issues of distributed energy resources (DERs) lead researchers to development of a novel concept named as virtual power plant (VPP). VPPs are supposed to carry out intelligent, secure, and smart energy trading among prosumers, buyers, and generating stations along with providing efficient energy management. Therefore, integrating blockchain in decentralized VPP network emerged out as a new paradigm, and recent experiments over this integration have shown fruitful results. However, this decentralization also suffers with energy management, trust, reliability, and efficiency issues due to the dynamic nature of DERs. In order to overcome this, in this paper, we first work over providing efficient energy management strategy for VPP to enhance demand response, then we propose an energy oriented trading and block mining protocol and named it as proof of energy market (PoEM). To enhance it further, we integrate differential privacy in PoEM and propose a Private PoEM (PPoEM) model. Collectively, we propose a private decentralized VPP trading model and named it as Virtual Private Trading (VPT) model. We further carry out extensive theoretical analysis and derive step-by-step valuations for market race probability, market stability probability, energy trading expectation, winning state probability, and prospective leading time profit values. Afterwards, we carry out simulation-based experiment of our proposed model. The performance evaluation and theoretical analysis of our VPT model make it one of the most viable model for blockchain based VPP network as compared to other state-of-the-art works.Comment: Article Submitted for Revie

    Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

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    Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

    Size Discovery

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    Size-discovery mechanisms allow large quantities of an asset to be exchanged at a price that does not respond to price pressure. Primary examples include "workup" in Treasury markets, "matching sessions" in corporate bond and CDS markets, and block-trading "dark pools" in equity markets. By freezing the execution price and giving up on market clearing, size-discovery mechanisms overcome concerns by large investors over their price impacts. Price-discovery mechanisms clear the market, but cause investors to internalize their price impacts, inducing costly delays in the reduction of position imbalances. We show how augmenting a price-discovery mechanism with a size-discovery mechanism improves allocative efficiency

    A Survey on Dynamic Spectrum Access Techniques in Cognitive Radio Networks

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    The idea of Cognitive Radio (CR) is to share the spectrum between a user called primary, and a user called secondary. Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a new spectrum sharing paradigm in cognitive radio that allows secondary users to access the abundant spectrum holes in the licensed spectrum bands. DSA is an auspicious technology to alleviate the spectrum scarcity problem and increase spectrum utilization. While DSA has attracted many research efforts recently, in this paper, a survey of spectrum access techniques using cooperation and competition to solve the problem of spectrum allocation in cognitive radio networks is presented

    Reinforcement Learning for Mobile Robot Collision Avoidance in Navigation Tasks

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    Collision avoidance is fundamental for mobile robot navigation. In general, its solutions include: {\it map-based} and {\it mapless approaches.} In the map-based approach, robots pre-plan collision-free paths based on an environment map and follow their paths during navigation. On the other hand, the mapless approach requires robots to avoid collisions without referencing to an environment map. This thesis first studies the map-based approach for multiple robots to collectively build environment maps. In this study, a robot following a pre-planned path may encounter unexpected obstacles, such as other moving robots and obstacles inaccurately presented on an environment map. This motivates us to study mapless collision avoidance in the second part of the thesis. Mapless collision avoidance requires a robot to infer an optimal action based on sensor data and operate in real time. Inferring an optimal action in a timely manner is computationally expensive, particularly when a robot has limited on-board computing resources. To avoid the expensive online action inferring, this thesis presents a reinforcement learning approach which learns policies for mapless collision avoidance under real-world settings. We first propose a Real-Time Actor-Critic Architecture (RTAC) to support asynchronous reinforcement learning under real-time constraint. Based on RTAC, we propose asynchronous reinforcement learning methods for mapless collision avoidance of various numbers of robots under different environment configurations. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that RTAC serves as a solid foundation to support multi-task and multi-agent learning for mapless collision avoidance under asynchronous settings

    Agent-based Modeling And Market Microstructure

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    In most modern financial markets, traders express their preferences for assets by making orders. These orders are either executed if a counterparty is willing to match them or collected in a priority queue, called a limit order book. Such markets are said to adopt an order-driven trading mechanism. A key question in this domain is to model and analyze the strategic behavior of market participants, in response to different definitions of the trading mechanism (e.g., the priority queue changed from the continuous double auctions to the frequent call market). The objective is to design financial markets where pernicious behavior is minimized.The complex dynamics of market activities are typically studied via agent-based modeling (ABM) methods, enriched by Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis (EGTA) to compute equilibria amongst market players and highlight the market behavior (also known as market microstructure) at equilibrium. This thesis contributes to this research area by evaluating the robustness of this approach and providing results to compare existing trading mechanisms and propose more advanced designs.In Chapter 4, we investigate the equilibrium strategy profiles, including their induced market performance, and their robustness to different simulation parameters. For two mainstream trading mechanisms, continuous double auctions (CDAs) and frequent call markets (FCMs), we find that EGTA is needed for solving the game as pure strategies are not a good approximation of the equilibrium. Moreover, EGTA gives generally sound and robust solutions regarding different market and model setups, with the notable exception of agents’ risk attitudes. We also consider heterogeneous EGTA, a more realistic generalization of EGTA whereby traders can modify their strategies during the simulation, and show that fixed strategies lead to sufficiently good analyses, especially taking the computation cost into consideration.After verifying the reliability of the ABM and EGTA methods, we follow this research methodology to study the impact of two widely adopted and potentially malicious trading strategies: spoofing and submission of iceberg orders. In Chapter 5, we study the effects of spoofing attacks on CDA and FCM markets. We let one spoofer (agent playing the spoofing strategy) play with other strategic agents and demonstrate that while spoofing may be profitable in both market models, it has less impact on FCMs than on CDAs. We also explore several FCM mechanism designs to help curb this type of market manipulation even further. In Chapter 6, we study the impact of iceberg orders on the price and order flow dynamics in financial markets. We find that the volume of submitted orders significantly affects the strategy choice of the other agents and the market performance. In general, when agents observe a large volume order, they tend to speculate instead of providing liquidity. In terms of market performance, both efficiency and liquidity will be harmed. We show that while playing the iceberg-order strategy can alleviate the problem caused by the high-volume orders, submitting a large enough order and attracting speculators is better than taking the risk of having fewer trades executed with iceberg orders.We conclude from Chapters 5 and 6 that FCMs have some exciting features when compared with CDAs and focus on the design of trading mechanisms in Chapter 7. We verify that CDAs constitute fertile soil for predatory behavior and toxic order flows and that FCMs address the latency arbitrage opportunities built in those markets. This chapter studies the extent to which adaptive rules to define the length of the clearing intervals — that might move in sync with the market fundamentals — affect the performance of frequent call markets. We show that matching orders in accordance with these rules can increase efficiency and selfish traders’ surplus in a variety of market conditions. In so doing, our work paves the way for a deeper understanding of the flexibility granted by adaptive call markets

    Broker-mediated Multiple-Cloud Orchestration Mechanisms for Cloud Computing

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    Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH

    Maximizing Infrastructure Providers' Revenue Through Network Slicing in 5G

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    Adapting to recent trends in mobile communications towards 5G, infrastructure owners are gradually modifying their systems for supporting the network programmability paradigm and for participating in the slice market (i.e., dynamic leasing of virtual network slices to service providers). Two-fold are the advantages offered by this upgrade: i) enabling next generation services, and ii) allowing new profit opportunities. Many efforts exist already in the field of admission control, resource allocation and pricing for virtualized networks. Most of the 5G-related research efforts focus in technological enhancements for making existing solutions compliant to the strict requirements of next generation networks. On the other hand, the profit opportunities associated to the slice market also need to be reconsidered in order to assess the feasibility of this new business model. Nonetheless, when economic aspects are studied in the literature, technical constraints are generally oversimplified. For this reason, in this work, we propose an admission control mechanism for network slicing that respects 5G timeliness while maximizing network infrastructure providers' revenue, reducing expenditures and providing a fair slice provision to competing service providers. To this aim, we design an admission policy of reduced complexity based on bid selection, we study the optimal strategy in different circumstances (i.e., pool size of available resources, service providers' strategy and trafic load), analyze the performance metrics and compare the proposal against reference approaches. Finally, we explore the case where infrastructure providers lease network slices either on-demand or on a periodic time basis and provide a performance comparison between the two approaches. Our analysis shows that the proposed approach outperforms existing solutions, especially in the case of infrastructures with large pool of resources and under intense trafic conditions.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

    Agent-Based Simulations of Blockchain protocols illustrated via Kadena's Chainweb

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    While many distributed consensus protocols provide robust liveness and consistency guarantees under the presence of malicious actors, quantitative estimates of how economic incentives affect security are few and far between. In this paper, we describe a system for simulating how adversarial agents, both economically rational and Byzantine, interact with a blockchain protocol. This system provides statistical estimates for the economic difficulty of an attack and how the presence of certain actors influences protocol-level statistics, such as the expected time to regain liveness. This simulation system is influenced by the design of algorithmic trading and reinforcement learning systems that use explicit modeling of an agent's reward mechanism to evaluate and optimize a fully autonomous agent. We implement and apply this simulation framework to Kadena's Chainweb, a parallelized Proof-of-Work system, that contains complexity in how miner incentive compliance affects security and censorship resistance. We provide the first formal description of Chainweb that is in the literature and use this formal description to motivate our simulation design. Our simulation results include a phase transition in block height growth rate as a function of shard connectivity and empirical evidence that censorship in Chainweb is too costly for rational miners to engage in. We conclude with an outlook on how simulation can guide and optimize protocol development in a variety of contexts, including Proof-of-Stake parameter optimization and peer-to-peer networking design.Comment: 10 pages, 7 figures, accepted to the IEEE S&B 2019 conferenc
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