545 research outputs found

    Voting: a machine learning approach

    Get PDF
    Voting rules can be assessed from quite different perspectives: the axiomatic, the pragmatic, in terms of computational or conceptual simplicity, susceptibility to manipulation, and many others aspects. In this paper, we take the machine learning perspective and ask how ‘well’ a few prominent voting rules can be learned by a neural network. To address this question, we train the neural network to choosing Condorcet, Borda, and plurality winners, respectively. Remarkably, our statistical results show that, when trained on a limited (but still reasonably large) sample, the neural network mimics most closely the Borda rule, no matter on which rule it was previously trained. The main overall conclusion is that the necessary training sample size for a neural network varies significantly with the voting rule, and we rank a number of popular voting rules in terms of the sample size required

    Interpreting the will of the people: a positive analysis of ordinal preference aggregation

    Full text link
    We investigate how individuals think groups should aggregate members’ ordinal preferences – that is, how they interpret “the will of the people.” In an experiment, we elicit revealed attitudes toward ordinal preference aggregation and classify subjects according to the rules they apparently deploy. Majoritarianism is rare. Instead, people employ rules that place greater weight on compromise options. The classification’s fit is excellent, and clustering analysis reveals that it does not omit important rules. We ask whether rules are stable across domains, whether people impute cardinal utility from ordinal ranks, and whether attitudes toward aggregation differ across countries with divergent traditions

    Neural networks would \u27vote\u27 according to Borda\u27s Rule

    Get PDF
    Can neural networks learn to select an alternative based on a systematic aggregation of conflicting individual preferences (i.e. a `voting rule\u27)? And if so, which voting rule best describes their behavior? We show that a prominent neural network can be trained to respect two fundamental principles of voting theory, the unanimity principle and the Pareto property. Building on this positive result, we train the neural network on profiles of ballots possessing a Condorcet winner, a unique Borda winner, and a unique plurality winner, respectively. We investigate which social outcome the trained neural network chooses, and find that among a number of popular voting rules its behavior mimics most closely the Borda rule. Indeed, the neural network chooses the Borda winner most often, no matter on which voting rule it was trained. Neural networks thus seem to give a surprisingly clear-cut answer to one of the most fundamental and controversial problems in voting theory: the determination of the most salient election method

    The Role of Direct Democracy in the European Union

    Get PDF
    In this paper, the introduction of direct-democratic decision-making in all EU decisions is considered when it is feasible without prohibitively increasing decision-making costs. We start with the contractarian argument that each constitution is a contract joining the citizens of a state and requires as such the explicit agreement of (a majority of) citizens. Thus, the future European Constitution as well as future changes of it should be decided by the European citizens. After a discussion of the pros and cons of direct democracy, the ability of direct democracy to help creating a European demos is discussed. Consequently, we propose a mandatory (required and binding) referendum on total and partial revisions of the European Constitution. In addition, we propose a constitutional initiative, a statutory and a general initiative as well as a fiscal referendum for financially important projects.democracy, referenda, initiatives

    Rebuilding Contested States: A comparative study of institutional design during political transition in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, & Tunisia

    Get PDF
    Rebuilding a contested state following an authoritarian breakdown requires widespread support for the new political system from all communal groups. A central theoretical assertion of the institutional design literature is that inclusion of communal groups in institutional frameworks creates support for a political system. However, empirical evidence to either verify or refute this claim is inconclusive. A survey of institutional design literature reveals an implicit distinction between de jure inclusion (inclusive frameworks) and de facto inclusion (inclusion in practice). To date, this distinction has not been sufficiently differentiated and systematically examined, with large-N studies most often examining the impact solely of de jure inclusion on support, and case studies failing to make a clear conceptual distinction between these two elements of inclusion. To address this gap in the research, this study asks: during a period of political transition in a contested state, does de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, build support for a political system? To investigate this question, the study undertakes a small-N comparative study of institutional design during political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa region. Four countries are selected that underwent rebuilding of their political institutions following authoritarian breakdown: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. Four hypotheses are advanced that capture the expectation that either de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, will build support for a political system. The hypotheses are investigated in two key institutional design moments in the selected countries: electoral system design and constitution-making. The study finds that de jure inclusion is not a sufficient mechanism to create support of all communal groups for the political system, whilst de facto inclusion may be sufficient. In no case where de jure inclusion alone was observed, was support for the political system present. In all cases where de facto inclusion was present, there was support for the political system, regardless of whether or not there was de jure inclusion. The study contributes to our understanding of the rebuilding of contested states following authoritarian breakdown, suggesting that, alongside an emphasis on de jure inclusion in electoral system design and constitution-making, de facto inclusion deserves consideration

    The Role of Direct Democracy in the European Union

    Get PDF
    In this paper, the introduction of direct-democratic decision-making in all EU decisions is considered when it is feasible without prohibitively increasing decision-making costs. We start with the contractarian argument that each constitution is a contract joining the citizens of a state and requires as such the explicit agreement of (a majority of) citizens. Thus, the future European Constitution as well as future changes of it should be decided by the European citizens. After a discussion of the pros and cons of direct democracy, the ability of direct democracy to help creating a European demos is discussed. Consequently, we propose a mandatory (required and binding) referendum on total and partial revisions of the European Constitution. In addition, we propose a constitutional initiative, a statutory and a general initiative as well as a fiscal referendum for financially important projects.Direct Democracy, Referenda, Initiatives.

    Democracy and Scientific Expertise: Illusions of Political and Epistemic Inclusion

    Get PDF
    Realizing the ideal of democracy requires political inclusion for citizens. A legitimate democracy must give citizens the opportunity to express their attitudes about the relative attractions of different policies, and access to political mechanisms through which they can be counted and heard. Actual governance often aims not at accurate belief, but at nonepistemic factors like achieving and maintaining institutional stability, creating the feeling of government legitimacy among citizens, or managing access to influence on policy decision-making. I examine the traditional relationship between inclusiveness and accuracy, and illustrate this connection by discussing empirical work on how group decision-making can improve accuracy. I also advance a Generic Epistemic Principle that any evidence-based decision-making procedures must embrace. Focusing on policy-making, I then measure the distance between these standards and the ones actually implemented in U.S. political settings. Psychological research on individual and group decision-making is a source of normative assessment for existing policy judgment, but it neither rationalizes nor legitimates the actual and typical processes used in U.S. institutions of political decision making. To establish this point, I focus on one characteristic government institution—the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology—that displays deliberative processes at odds with the sciences they advocate, and with the Generic Epistemic Principle. I explain this discouraging condition in terms of several inveterate factors in U.S. politics: a limitlessly money-driven and endless campaigning process that effectively forces elected representatives to align themselves with money and vote strategically, the use of procedural arrangements known to make people feel politically included when they are not, and the unresponsiveness of a majoritarian (vs. consensus) democracy

    Reading Ricci and Pyett to Provide Racial Justice through Union Arbitration

    Get PDF
    With the current political climate regarding racial issues, any positive gains in resolving race discrimination claims in the workplace cannot come from new legislation through the Obama administration. Instead, those gains will have to come from within the workplace. Unions and their employee members must work together and with employers to resolve those disputes. Specifically, in this Article, two high-profile employment discrimination cases decided by the Supreme Court during President Obama\u27s first year in office--Ricci v. DeStefano and Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett--help identify a framework whereby employees with racial discrimination claims against their employers may work with their unions to effectively resolve their disputes through arbitration. This solution requires the union to make every effort to deal fairly and directly with all members of the union. The union will have to focus especially on working through these disputes with those members of different races than the claimants and those who may view the claims as invalid or even as a threat to their own employment gains. The key objective for all those involved is to find an interest-convergence when resolving race-based disputes through final arbitration. In Part I, this Article examines the current barriers to developing mechanisms to address race discrimination in our society and particularly in the workplace. Part II offers the historical development of arbitration in the union setting, so-called labor arbitration, and compares and contrasts this history with the separate and more recent development of arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims in the non-union setting, so-called employment arbitration. This history frames the legal landscape as it existed leading up to the Supreme Court\u27s decisions in Ricci and Pyett. This history also explains how and why unions tended to avoid handling statutory employment discrimination matters by keeping them out of labor arbitration. In Part III, this Article discusses the details of the Ricci and Pyett cases and examines how each union involved in those disputes responded to the discrimination claims at issue. Part IV identifies the potential problems involved with creating a clear and unmistakable union waiver of an employee\u27s statutory right to pursue discrimination claims in court as occurred in Pyett. Part IV explains why these waivers should be allowed as long as employees can be provided with a fair arbitration forum to effectively vindicate their statutory rights as a form of interestconvergence that addresses all the dilemmas for employers, employees, and especially unions when resolving statutory discrimination matters in arbitration. Part IV also establishes the analysis that should be used when assessing whether and how unions and employers can agree to these waivers. Part V concludes that by establishing the criteria in which these waivers will create an arbitration process to allow effective vindication of statutory rights, employers, unions, and mostly employees, will now have clarity and fairness in merging labor disputes with employment discrimination disputes. This interest-convergence merger can result in an appropriate arbitration process as allowed by Pyett and as circumvention of the type of court resolution process that arose in Ricci
    • 

    corecore