Does semantic relationism solve Frege's puzzle?

In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we argue, that that the semantics is compositional. We then examine the deep consequences of this result for Fine’s proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle. We argue that Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution–his attempted solution does not deny compositionality. The correct characterization of Fine’s solution fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the puzzle

Threats and challenges to the scientific representation of semantics: Carnap, Quine, and the Lessons of Semantic Skepticism

We will approach the problem of semantic skepticism by comparing Quine's view with Carnap's strategy for finding intensional equivalences that guarantee a solution to the paradox of analysis; and then we will consider how the Intensionalists use these possible solutions to save the scientificity of semantics. Quine disagrees with Carnap that plausible solutions to the question of intensional equivalence provide us with explanations for the difficult problems. These are ones where, in contrast to mere extensional indistinguishability of expressions, we need a stronger determination to choose the right interpretation. And then he has a skeptical answer to which the semanticist-linguist cannot remain insensitive. The problem is that a semanticist can only say that he has an "object" of inquiry if a normative property can be reconstructed, but that is not guaranteed by the mathematical theory used to infer intensional values. Finally, we would like to point out the relevance of skeptical doctrines about semantics that go beyond the mere haunting of relativism or quietism about meaning. Without a skeptical approach, we argue, we lose sight of the unique nature of language and its peculiar property of being an object shaped by pressures on its own ability to be theorized. &nbsp

Propositions : an ontological inquiry

It is more or less agreed that propositions are the meanings of sentences, the fundamental truth-bearers, and the objects of propositional attitudes. Associated with these roles, there are the following three questions: the Composition Question, the Representation Question, and the Attitude Question. Roughly, the first concerns the metaphysical relation between propositions and propositional constituents, the second concerns the ability of representing things as being such-and-so, and the third concerns how propositions can be the objects of propositional attitudes. I examine three mainstream theories of propositions: the Russellian theories, the possible-world accounts, and the Neo-Russellian theories, and argue that each fails to answer at least one of the questions and thus is incapable of providing an account of these propositional roles. Therefore, if a theory of propositions is able to answer these questions in a uniform manner, it would be a better theory of propositions. For what can be explained by other theories can also be explained by this theory, and it can also answer more questions than any other theory. In this dissertation, I defend a broadly Fregean theory of propositions, according to which propositions are sui generis, multi-analysable, and necessary beings, and argue that with respect to these propositional roles, it can provide a better account than other theories of propositions

The Antinomy of the Variable: A Tarskian Resolution

Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous, since sentences differing by the total, proper substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ always agree in meaning. We offer a precise interpretation of the challenge posed by (i) and (ii). We then develop some neglected passages of Tarski to show that his semantics for variables has the resources to resolve the antinomy without abandoning standard compositional semantics

Propositions : an ontological inquiry

It is more or less agreed that propositions are the meanings of sentences, the fundamental truth-bearers, and the objects of propositional attitudes. Associated with these roles, there are the following three questions: the Composition Question, the Representation Question, and the Attitude Question. Roughly, the first concerns the metaphysical relation between propositions and propositional constituents, the second concerns the ability of representing things as being such-and-so, and the third concerns how propositions can be the objects of propositional attitudes. I examine three mainstream theories of propositions: the Russellian theories, the possible-world accounts, and the Neo-Russellian theories, and argue that each fails to answer at least one of the questions and thus is incapable of providing an account of these propositional roles. Therefore, if a theory of propositions is able to answer these questions in a uniform manner, it would be a better theory of propositions. For what can be explained by other theories can also be explained by this theory, and it can also answer more questions than any other theory. In this dissertation, I defend a broadly Fregean theory of propositions, according to which propositions are sui generis, multi-analysable, and necessary beings, and argue that with respect to these propositional roles, it can provide a better account than other theories of propositions

Thinking Alike: Five Essays on the Publicity of Thought = Pensar el mateix: cinc assaigs sobre la “publicitat” del pensament

[eng] In this dissertation, I have investigated several philosophical puzzles associated to the thesis that thoughts are public, i.e. that in successful instances of communication, understanding, and in cases where thinkers are in genuine agreement with each other, the relevant thinkers accept the same thoughts. In chapter 1, I showed that this thesis seems difficult to uphold in the face of cases involving indexical expressions. When subjects successfully communicate with indexical expressions, they are nonetheless disposed to perform different actions, and thus we have reason to deny that they accept exactly the same thoughts. In chapter 2, I showed that this thesis is in conflict with the thesis that thoughts must track the cognitive profile of our attitudes (‘Frege’s Constraint’). In chapter 3, I showed that this thesis is in conflict with a minimal version of semantic internalism and that even the most conservative way of trying to make these two theses compatible involves weakening the claim that thought is public in the sense previously defined. In chapter 4, I investigated criteria of successful communication and argued against one based on match of referential content plus absence of false beliefs. In its place, I suggested we go back to criteria based on match of modes of presentation (thoughts) or successful recognition of the speaker’s referential intentions. In chapter 5, I argued that thought’s publicity cannot be fully accommodated by extant relationist theories of thoughts and concepts. One way to frame the most general conclusion of this dissertation is that it is futile to try to individuate an intersubjective notion of thought which is transitive, or which is equally useful from an intrapersonal perspective. If we have any reason for carving up an intersubjective notion of thought – and not even this is clear, as far as this dissertation is concerned – then it will most likely be orthogonal to the usual subjective one

Conteúdo singular e correferência de jure

Orientador: Marco Antonio Caron RuffinoDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências HumanasResumo: Esta dissertação é composta de três capítulos que, apesar de tratarem sobre temas distintos, igualmente pressupõem que o conceito de coreferência de jure deve estar no cerne das discussões sobre conteúdo e representação singular. No capítulo 2, tentarei reabilitar o principal argumento de Frege (1948) em favor da existência de Sentidos em face da acusação de circularidade recentemente posta por Glezakos (2009). Argumentarei que as diferenças de valor cognitivo entre sentenças, como "Cícero é Cícero" e "Cícero é Túlio", se reduzem à ocorrência (ou não ocorrência) da relação de coreferência de jure entre seus tokens referenciais. Já que, como mostrarei, o reconhecimento desta relação não pressupõe qualquer teoria semântica substancial, ele pode ser usado para fundamentar a introdução de Sentidos. O capítulo 3 avalia caso a introdução de Sentidos tem sucesso em explicar a coreferência de jure já que a última foi demonstrada ser não-transitiva (Fine 2007, Pinillos 2011), ao contrário da identidade de Sentidos. Argumentarei que a postulação de Sentidos pode fundamentar uma relação não-transitiva, já que Sentidos podem instanciar relações mais refinadas que a mera identidade ou diferença, e.g. possuir uma parte comum. Finalmente, o último capítulo contém uma discussão sobre conteúdo singular em cenários diacrônicos envolvendo expressões indexicais. Defenderei a tese de que teorias que rejeitam a factividade, i.e. a tese de que identidade de conteúdo pressupõe coreferência, não são superiores a teorias que rejeitam a transparência, i.e. a tese de que a identidade de conteúdo é conhecível a priori. Já que temos explícitas razões para manter estas duas teses, teremos que adotar uma teoria como a de Recanati (2012, 2015, forthcoming), de acordo com quem a relação de tokens indexicais diacrônicos é geralmente mais fraca que a identidade de conteúdo, porém mais forte que a mera diferença. Todavia, argumentarei que Recanati erra em alguns detalhes, especialmente sobre se pode haver identidade de conteúdo entre representações memoriais e aquelas originando estas memórias. Meu ponto final é que, se meus argumentos são corretos, deveremos distinguir a identidade de modos de apresentação da identidade de valor cognitivo, a primeira sendo mais refinada que a segundaAbstract: This dissertation is composed by three chapters which, albeit dealing with distinct particular issues in the philosophy of language and mind, share the underlying assumption that the concept of de jure coreference must be at the forefront of theorizing about singular thought and representation. In chapter 2, I will try to rehabilitate Frege¿s (1948) master argument for the existence of Senses in face of the accusation of circularity recently posed by Glezakos (2009). I will argue that the differences of cognitive value between sentences, such as "Cicero is Cicero" and "Cicero is Tully", boil down to the occurrence (or lack thereby) of the relation of de jure coreference between their referential tokens. Since, as I will show, the acknowledgement of that relation does not presuppose any substantial semantic theory, it may logically be used to ground the introduction of Senses. Chapter 3 assesses whether the introduction of Senses is successful in explaining de jure coreference in view of the fact that the latter was claimed to be a non-transitive relation (Fine 2007, Pinillos 2011), as opposed to the relation of sameness of Sense. We will argue that the postulation of Senses can ground a relation that is non-transitive, since Senses can instantiate relations more fine-grained than mere identity or difference, e.g. having a part in common. Finally, the last chapter contains a discussion about singular content in diachronic scenarios involving indexical expressions. I will claim that theories rescinding from factivity, i.e. the claim that identity of content entails coreference, stand in no better footing than theories that rescind from transparency, i.e. the claim that identity of content is knowable a priori. Since we have explicit reasons to maintain these two claims, we might need to adopt a theory such as Recanati¿s (2012, 2015, forthcoming), according to which the relation between diachronic indexical tokens is usually weaker than identity of content, but stronger than mere distinctness of content. However, I will claim that Recanati is wrong about some important details, more particularly, about whether there can ever be proper identity of content between memory representations and the representations which they are a memory of. My final point is that, if my arguments are sound, we may need to distinguish the relation of identity of modes of presentation from cognitive value, the former being more fine-grained than the latterMestradoFilosofiaMestre em Filosofia2014/04701-6, 2015/11666-5FAPES

Vehicle relationism : essays on samethinking and samesaying

This thesis is about the nature of samethinking and samesaying. These notions are broad and capture various distinct but related phenomena. I will focus on two particular understandings of ‘samethinking’, and on one particular understanding of ‘samesaying’. Let me address samethinking first. On the first understanding of ‘samethinking’, samethinking occurs whenever two thoughts concern the same referent. We may distinguish between two different ways in which this can occur. First, there are cases in which the sameness of reference is manifest to the subject. Take for instance the two beliefs BOB DYLAN IS A MUSICIAN and BOB DYLAN WON A NOBEL PRIZE. In such cases, the sameness of reference is transparent to the thinker in such a way that she may combine the two beliefs in an inference and conclude directly from these two beliefs alone that a musician won a Nobel Prize. Second, there are cases in which two thoughts concern the same referent, but where the sameness of reference is not manifest to the subject. Take for instance the two thoughts BOB DYLAN IS A MUSICIAN and ROBERT ZIMMERMAN WON A NOBEL PRIZE. ‘Robert Zimmerman’ is Bob Dylan’s birth name, so the two thoughts concern the same individual. However, unless the thinker has a further belief to the effect that Bob Dylan is Robert Zimmerman, she may not rationally infer from these beliefs that a musician won a Nobel Prize. We see, then, that two pairs of thoughts that are referentially equivalent may nonetheless play different roles in cognition. In this thesis, I offer a novel account of how to understand the difference between cases of samethinking such as those above. The second understanding of ‘samethinking’ that I will discuss in this thesis is a broader phenomenon. Two thoughts, typically entertained by distinct individuals or the same individual at different times, can be said to concern the same subject matter despite differing in their overall semantic properties. Likewise, it seems that two utterances may concern the same topic despite differing in their overall semantic properties. Consider for instance someone uttering the sentence “Whales are fish” in the 18th century, where such an utterance would generally be regarded as true. If someone today were to utter the same sentence, however, we would regard it as false. We have reason to think that the meaning of the term ‘fish’ has changed between then and now. Even if this is the case, it seems as though the 18th-century person and the current day individual are, in an interesting way, talking about the same topic when uttering the sentence. This is the notion of ‘samesaying’ I will address in this thesis. I shed light on what it is for two thoughts or two utterances to be the same in this way

In Defence of Acquaintance

The aim of this thesis is to motivate, defend and explore the consequences of an acquaintance view (AV), which holds that acquaintance with an object is required for singular thought about that object. The thesis is divided into two parts. In part one I motivate and defend AV. In part two I explore some of the consequences of adopting AV. In part one I argue that AV is well motivated and defensible given one particular account of singular thought. I call this account ‘aboutness without properties’. I argue it is legitimate for AV to adopt this account of singular thought. I also argue that AV’s take on acquaintance—according to which there are three kinds of acquaintance: perceptual acquaintance, memory acquaintance and communication-based acquaintance—is the best account. It makes acquaintance a unified psychological kind that can explain our capacities for thought. I argue that, given this account of singular thought and of acquaintance, AV is a well-motivated and defensible view of how our thoughts about objects connect up and make contact with the external world. I identify and attempt to solve three puzzles (in part inherited from Russell) which AV faces, given that it allows acquaintance with and singular thought about ordinary objects. I also suggest how AV can deal with apparent counterexample cases, via an account of descriptive names and of thought that purports to be about the non-existent. In part two I argue that AV is committed to structured propositions. The aboutness without properties account of singular thought only works on a structured propositions view. Given some plausible assumptions about how the problem of informative identities needs to be solved, I also argue that AV is committed to a Fregean view of propositions