Segmented switchers and retailer pricing strategies

Empirical studies reveal a surprisingly wide variety of price promotion strategies among retailers, even among Internet sellers of undifferentiated homogenous goods such as books and music CD’s. Several empirical findings remain puzzling, particularly that within the same market some small retailers decide to deeply discount, while other small retailers forgo the price-sensitive switchers and price high to play their niche. We present theoretical and empirical analyses that address these varied pricing strategies. Our model of three asymmetric firms shows that under multiple switcher segments, where different switchers compare prices at different retailers, firm-specific loyalty is not sufficient to explain the variety of retailer pricing strategies. We demonstrate that a retailer’s pricing strategy is driven by the ratio of the size of switcher segments for which the retailer competes to its loyal segment size. The relative switcher-to-loyal ratios among retailers explain when a firm is more or less inclined to discount deeply or frequently. We thereby identify when a small firm finds it optimal to play the niche and price high, despite having few loyals, or to discount and go for the switchers. Our analysis reveals several interesting findings, such as a small firm that benefits from strategically limiting its access to switchers. The results of two empirical studies confirm our model’s predictions for varied retailer pricing strategies in the context of Internet booksellers

COLLUSION AND PRICE DISPERSION

While there are suggestions in applied cartel studies that price dispersion changes when cartelization of a market occurs, there are few theoretical or empirical analyses of this effect. This paper surveys the thin economic literature on the link between overt collusion and price dispersion. Formal theories and observation of cartel behavior suggest that during successfully collusive periods prices become less variable and more negatively skewed compared to relatively competitive periods. Four empirical studies of cartels verify these predictions.collusion, cartel, price dispersion

Consumers and sellers heterogeneity, search costs and spatial price dispersion in retail food markets

— Price dispersion, i.e. a homogeneous product sold at different prices by different sellers, is among the most replicated findings in empirical economics. The paper assesses the extent and determinants of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous food products in more than 400 retailers in a market characterized by the persistence of a large number of relatively small traditional food stores, side by side with large supermarkets. The extent of observed price dispersion is quite high, suggesting that, despite their large number, monopolistic competition prevails among sellers as a result of the heterogeneity of services offered. When prices in an urban area (where the spatial concentration of sellers is much higher and consumer search costs significantly lower) have been compared with those in smaller towns and rural areas, differences in search costs and the potentially higher degree of competition did not yield lower prices; quite the contrary, they were, on average, higher for 11 of the 14 products considered. Supermarkets proved to be often, but not always, less expensive than traditional retailers, although average savings associated to food shopping at supermarkets were extremely low. Finally, the results of the study suggest that sellers behave differently in their pricing decision strategies; these differences emerge both at the firm level and, for supermarkets, within the same chain. The fact that products considered were homogeneous, purchases frequently repeated, the number of sellers large, and search costs relatively low, did not suffice to keep price dispersion low. Based on the results presented in the paper, it is clear that more important in explaining price dispersion is the contemporaneous heterogeneity of retailers (in terms of services rendered) and consumers (in terms of their propensity to search and shopping preferences), which makes it possible for a monopolistic competition structure of the market to emerge and for small traditional food retail stores to remain in business.Price dispersion, retail pricing, food markets., Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Labor and Human Capital,

Information and drug prices: evidence from the Medicare discount drug card program

In early 2004, the U.S. Government initiated the Medicare Discount Drug Card Program (MDDCP), which created a market for drug cards that allowed elderly and handicapped subscribers to obtain discounts on their prescription drug purchases. Pharmacy-level prices for many drugs were posted on the program website weekly from May 29, 2004 to December 31, 2005, as the largest undertaking in the history of government-sponsored information release began with the hope of promoting competition by facilitating access to prices. A large panel of pharmacy-level drug price data collected from the Medicare website indicates that there was significant and persistent dispersion in prices across cards throughout the program. Moreover, the time-path of prices was non-monotonic; the prices declined initially when consumers were choosing cards but rose later when subscribers were unable to switch from one card to another. In contrast, contemporaneous control prices from on-line drug retailers, which were unrelated to the program, rose steadily over time, indicating that MDDCP prices evolved in a way different from the general evolution of prices outside the program. In view of the fact that the program rules prevented consumers from changing their cards at will, the evolution of MDDCP prices is consistent with certain models of dynamic price competition with consumer switching costs, such as Klemperer’s (1987a,b). Estimates of potential savings from purchasing at program prices are also provided.Drugs ; Medical care, Cost of

An Analysis of Pricing Strategy and Price Dispersion on the Internet

Using prices obtained from shopbots, we test several hypotheses regarding the economics of information and optimal search. We find that price dispersion is positively (negatively) related to product price and the number of sellers in cross-sectional (time series) analysis. Price dispersion increases over time when the sample includes new entrants, but decreases in the absence of entry. Controlling for shipping charges and seller heterogeneity reduces, but does not eliminate, price dispersion. Finally, prices appear to be correlated across products and over time – low price sellers for one product (time period) generally charge low prices for all items (time periods).

Inflation: Its Mechanics and Welfare Costs

macroeconomics, inflation

Online Price Dispersion Within and Between Seven European Countries

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of online price dispersion in Europe, across a broad range of product categories and countries. Using the dominant European price comparison site we collected firm specific prices, weekly, from sevcn European countries (Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) for 31 unique products, falling into five distinct product categories (printers, PDAs, scanners, games consoles, computer games and music), over the nine month period October 2001 to June 2002. The resulting data set comprises over 17,000 individual price observations. Using a number of alternative measures of price dispersion we find significant differences in the degree of price dispersion observed in online markets, both between countries and across product categories. We consider alternative explanations for online price dispersion and analyse their significance in explaining the observed differences

Social network externalities and price dispersion in online markets.

Ample empirical studies in the e-commerce literature have documented that the price dispersion in online markets is 1) as large as that in offline markets, 2) persistent across time, and 3) only partially explained by observed eretailers’ attributes. Buying on the internet market is risky to consumers. First of all, consumers and the products they purchase are separated in time. There is a delay in time between the time consumers pay and the time they receive the orders. Second, consumers and the products they purchase are separated in space. Consumers cannot physically touch or examine the products at the point of purchase. As such, online markets involve an adoption process based on the interaction of consumers’ experiences in the form of references, recommendations, word of mouth, etc. The social network externalities introduced by the interaction of consumer’s experiences reduces the risk of seller choice and allows some sellers to charge higher prices for even homogeneous products. This research aims to study online market price dispersion from the social network externalities perspective. Our model posits that consumers are risk averse and assess the risk of having a satisfactory transaction from a seller based on the two dimensions of the seller’s social network externalities: quantity externality (i.e., the size of the seller’s social network) and quality externality (i.e., the satisfactory transaction probability of the seller’s social network). We further investigate the moderating effect of product value for consumers on the impact of social network externality on online market price dispersion. Our model yields several important propositions which we empirically test using data sets collected from eBay. We found that 1) both quantity externality and quality externality of social network are salient in driving online price dispersion, and 2) the salience of social network externality is stronger for purchase behavior in higher value product categories.network externalities, price dispersion, online markets, word of mouth

PRICE DISPERSION, SEARCH COSTS AND CONSUMERS AND SELLERS HETEROGENEITY IN RETAIL FOOD MARKETS

Price dispersion, i.e. a homogeneous product sold at different prices by different sellers, is among the most replicated findings in empirical economics. The paper assesses the extent and determinants of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous food products in more than 400 retailers in a market characterized by the persistence of a large number of relatively small traditional food stores, side by side large supermarkets. The extent of observed price dispersion is quite high, suggesting that monopolistic competition prevails as a result of the heterogeneity of services offered. When prices in an urban area (where the spatial concentration of sellers is much higher and consumer search costs significantly lower) have been compared with those in smaller towns and rural areas, differences in search costs and the potentially higher degree of competition did not yield lower prices; quite the contrary, they were, on average, higher for 11 of the 14 products considered. Supermarkets proved to be often, but not always, less expensive than traditional retailers, although average savings from food shopping at supermarkets were extremely low. Finally, the results of the study suggest that sellers behave differently in their pricing strategies; these differences emerge both at the firm level, and for supermarkets within the same chain. The fact that products considered were homogeneous, purchases frequently repeated, the number of sellers large, and search costs relatively low, did not suffice to keep price dispersion low. From the results presented in the paper, it is clear that what is important in explaining price dispersion is the contemporaneous heterogeneity of retailers (in terms of services) and consumers (in terms of search and shopping preferences), which makes it possible for a monopolistic competition structure of the market to emerge and for small traditional food retailers to remain in business.Price dispersion, Retail pricing, Food markets