Translation into any natural language of the error messages generated by any computer program

Since the introduction of the Fortran programming language some 60 years ago, there has been little progress in making error messages more user-friendly. A first step in this direction is to translate them into the natural language of the students. In this paper we propose a simple script for Linux systems which gives word by word translations of error messages. It works for most programming languages and for all natural languages. Understanding the error messages generated by compilers is a major hurdle for students who are learning programming, particularly for non-native English speakers. Not only may they never become "fluent" in programming but many give up programming altogether. Whereas programming is a tool which can be useful in many human activities, e.g. history, genealogy, astronomy, entomology, in many countries the skill of programming remains confined to a narrow fringe of professional programmers. In all societies, besides professional violinists there are also amateurs. It should be the same for programming. It is our hope that once translated and explained the error messages will be seen by the students as an aid rather than as an obstacle and that in this way more students will enjoy learning and practising programming. They should see it as a funny game.Comment: 14 pages, 1 figur

Software Engineering Laboratory Series: Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Software Engineering Workshop

The Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) is an organization sponsored by NASA/GSFC and created to investigate the effectiveness of software engineering technologies when applied to the development of application software. The activities, findings, and recommendations of the SEL are recorded in the Software Engineering Laboratory Series, a continuing series of reports that includes this document

Pharo by Example

Pharo is a modern, open source, fully-featured implementation of the Smalltalk programming language and environment. Pharo is derived from Squeak1, a re-implementation of the classic Smalltalk-80 system. Whereas Squeak was developed mainly as a platform for developing experimental educational software, Pharo strives to offer a lean, open-source platform for professional software development, and a robust and stable platform for research and development into dynamic languages and environments. Pharo serves as the reference implementation for the Seaside web development framework

A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components

The semiconductor industry is fully globalized and integrated circuits (ICs) are commonly defined, designed and fabricated in different premises across the world. This reduces production costs, but also exposes ICs to supply chain attacks, where insiders introduce malicious circuitry into the final products. Additionally, despite extensive post-fabrication testing, it is not uncommon for ICs with subtle fabrication errors to make it into production systems. While many systems may be able to tolerate a few byzantine components, this is not the case for cryptographic hardware, storing and computing on confidential data. For this reason, many error and backdoor detection techniques have been proposed over the years. So far all attempts have been either quickly circumvented, or come with unrealistically high manufacturing costs and complexity. This paper proposes Myst, a practical high-assurance architecture, that uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, and provides strong security guarantees, even in the presence of multiple malicious or faulty components. The key idea is to combine protective-redundancy with modern threshold cryptographic techniques to build a system tolerant to hardware trojans and errors. To evaluate our design, we build a Hardware Security Module that provides the highest level of assurance possible with COTS components. Specifically, we employ more than a hundred COTS secure crypto-coprocessors, verified to FIPS140-2 Level 4 tamper-resistance standards, and use them to realize high-confidentiality random number generation, key derivation, public key decryption and signing. Our experiments show a reasonable computational overhead (less than 1% for both Decryption and Signing) and an exponential increase in backdoor-tolerance as more ICs are added