Trust conceptualized as a corporate knowledge asset

To most individuals, "trust" can be viewed as a knowledge corporate asset that may add, or rest, value to the company. The role of knowledge in achieving a competitive advantage is becoming and increasingly important management issue in all business and non-business sectors. As such, our Throughput Modeling approach indicates how six different trust behaviors can be guided, how trust decision making can be improved and made defensible, and how special problems facing individuals can be dealt with via decision-making pathways leading to an action

Indenture as a Self-Enforced Contract Device: An Experimental Test

We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the principal signals the intention of payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent half of it as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half after delivering the service. By forward induction, cooperation is incentive-compatibly self-enforcing. The indenture performs very well, inducing a significantly higher level of cooperation than that in a three-stage centipede game, which we use to benchmark the natural rate of cooperation. The difference between cooperation rates in both games increases over time.Cooperation, experiment, contracts, indenture, reciprocity

Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test

How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), if payment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is by itself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent the first half as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half upon delivery of the service. This contract design is known as "indenture". It is selfenforcing and incentive-compatible. This paper experimentally tests the efficacy of the "indenture game" and its implications for cooperation in one-shot environments. We find that cooperation rates are high and stable over time. Its efficacy is moderated by expected losses due to the existence of uncooperative types.Cooperation, Experiment, Contracts, Indenture, Reciprocity

Trust and Formal Control in interorganizational Relationships

There is a tendency to see trust and control by formal agreements as substitutes. According to transaction cost economics trust is unreliable, and some form of control is needed to reduce hazards of opportunism. According to others, high trust allows for a limited extent of formal control. Formal control signals distrust and thereby evokes reciprocal distrust and formal control. This paper studies all combinations of high/low trust and high/low formal control in four longitudinal case studies. We find that trust and formal control are at least as much complements as they are substitutes. We find that like trust contracts can be both the basis and the outcome of relations.governance;inter-organizational relations;trust;contract

Audit and AI: Can Artificial Intelligence Restore Public Trust?

Due to the fallout from a series of corporate fraud scandals in the late 2000s, the auditing world has lost much of the public trust that is very important to the profession. Much of the value of an audit opinion is determined by the trust the public places in the auditors behind the opinion. Without trust in the auditors, the audit opinion has very little value. The recent increase in the usage of artificial intelligence (AI) in many industries presents a solution to the problem of auditors. Increased usage of AI in the audit process has the potential to better meet public demand for an audit as well as restore public trust

Strategies for Foundations: When, Why, and How to Use Venture Philanthropy

This paper investigates the venture philanthropy strategies of foundations. We identified six strategies of foundations engaging in venture philanthropy and explain them through case studies of four foundations based in four European countries. We find that there is a spectrum of engagement models for foundations and that even the same foundation may employ various strategies to fit their individual needs and goals. To most foundations, VP serves as a complement to existing practices and only in one case as an alternative

TRUST IN SUPERIORS AND DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIORS : AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON BUDGETARY SLACK

Purpose: This paper analyzes trust in superiors as an informal control mechanism to reduce budgetary slack. We examine how relationships between trust of subordinates in their superiors and economic incentive reduce the tendency of subordinates to create budgetary slack.Methodology: An experiment was designed with participants who play the role of manager or executive alternativelyFindings: Results show that the introduction of an economic incentive does not affect the relationship between trust and budgetary slack.Implications/limitations: This study will let organizations to further the budgeting process by using informal mechanism, such as trust, as a complement to traditional mechanism (e.g. monetary/ economic incentives). This enhances the effectiveness of the organization’s actions and policies. Originality/Value: The findings of this study complement the results of previous studies on how trust is related to financial and non-financial performance criteria

Living under the ‘right’ government: does political ideology matter to trust in political institutions? An analysis for OECD countries

This paper asks whether trust in political institutions depends on individual’s political leaning and the political ideology of the national government. We employ information on 140'000 individuals in 30 democratic OECD countries from the World Values Survey, 1981 – 2007, and estimate so-called micro-based pseudo-panel two-way fixed effects models. Distinguishing between extreme and moderate versions of leftist and rightist political leaning, our estimates reveal that political trust increases non-linearly in the degree of individual’s conservatism. We also find that political leaning is not instrumental to improving one's own socio-economic situation, thus rather constituting an expressive behavior. If government ideology matches individual’s political preferences, trust in political institutions is increased. In contrast, the ‘apolitical’ appears to distrust the political system as such. We also find evidence for a symmetric, but incomplete convergence of party ideologies to the median voter position. Implications for vote abstention are discussed.political trust; government ideology; political leaning; World Values Survey