The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games

Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best agents to bribe.Bribery, Coalition Formation, Computational Complexity

On improving the performance of optimistic distributed simulations

This report investigates means of improving the performance of optimistic distributed simulations without affecting the simulation accuracy. We argue that existing clustering algorithms are not adequate for application in distributed simulations, and outline some characteristics of an ideal algorithm that could be applied in this field. This report is structured as follows. We start by introducing the area of distributed simulation. Following a comparison of the dominant protocols used in distributed simulation, we elaborate on the current approaches of improving the simulation performance, using computation efficient techniques, exploiting the hardware configuration of processors, optimizations that can be derived from the simulation scenario, etc. We introduce the core characteristics of clustering approaches and argue that these cannot be applied in real-life distributed simulation problems. We present a typical distributed simulation setting and elaborate on the reasons that existing clustering approaches are not expected to improve the performance of a distributed simulation. We introduce a prototype distributed simulation platform that has been developed in the scope of this research, focusing on the area of emergency response and specifically building evacuation. We continue by outlining our current work on this issue, and finally, we end this report by outlining next actions which could be made in this field

Insinking: A Methodology to Exploit Synergy in Transportation

vehicle routing;cooperative games;retailing;insinking;Shapley Monotonic Path;Logistic Service Providers

Distributing Coalition Value Calculations to Coalition Members

Within characteristic function games, agents have the option of joining one of many different coalitions, based on the utility value of each candidate coalition. However, determining this utility value can be computationally complex since the number of coalitions increases exponentially with the number of agents available. Various approaches have been proposed that mediate this problem by distributing the computational load so that each agent calculates only a subset of coalition values. However, current approaches are either highly inefficient due to redundant calculations, or make the benevolence assumption (i.e. are not suitable for adversarial environments). We introduce DCG, a novel algorithm that distributes the calculations of coalition utility values across a community of agents, such that: (i) no inter-agent communication is required; (ii) the coalition value calculations are (approximately) equally partitioned into shares, one for each agent; (iii) the utility value is calculated only once for each coalition, thus redundant calculations are eliminated; (iv) there is an equal number of operations for agents with equal sized shares; and (v) an agent is only allocated those coalitions in which it is a potential member. The DCG algorithm is pre- sented and illustrated by means of an example. We formally prove that our approach allocates all of the coalitions to the agents, and that each coalition is assigned once and only once

Second Roundtable Meeting: Innovations in Building Consumer Demand for Tobacco-Cessation Products and Services

Outlines February 2007 discussions at the National Tobacco Cessation Collaborative's Consumer Demand Roundtable on supporting the quitting process, building demand for products and services among employers and health plans, and design innovations

A tutorial on optimization for multi-agent systems

Research on optimization in multi-agent systems (MASs) has contributed with a wealth of techniques to solve many of the challenges arising in a wide range of multi-agent application domains. Multi-agent optimization focuses on casting MAS problems into optimization problems. The solving of those problems could possibly involve the active participation of the agents in a MAS. Research on multi-agent optimization has rapidly become a very technical, specialized field. Moreover, the contributions to the field in the literature are largely scattered. These two factors dramatically hinder access to a basic, general view of the foundations of the field. This tutorial is intended to ease such access by providing a gentle introduction to fundamental concepts and techniques on multi-agent optimization. © 2013 The Author.Peer Reviewe

Network Formation with Adaptive Agents

In this paper, a reinforcement learning version of the connections game first analysed by Jackson and Wolinsky is presented and compared with benchmark results of fully informed and rational players. Using an agent-based simulation approach, the main nding is that the pattern of reinforcement learning process is similar, but does not fully converge to the benchmark results. Before these optimal results can be discovered in a learning process, agents often get locked in a state of random switching or early lock-in.agent-based computational economics; strategic network formation; network games; reinforcement learning

Economics of Conflict: An Overview

In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conflict and appropriation. Allowing for the possibility of conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced, represents a significant departure from the traditional paradigm of economics. The research we emphasize, however, takes an economic perspective. Specifically, it applies conventional optimization techniques and game-theoretic tools to study the allocation of resources among competing activities— productive and otherwise appropriative, such as grabbing the product and wealth of others as well as defending one’s own product and wealth. In contrast to other economic activities in which inputs are combined cooperatively through production functions, the inputs to appropriation are combined adversarially through technologies of conflict. A central objective of this research is to identify the effects of conflict on economic outcomes: the determinants of the distribution of output (or power) and how an individual party’s share can be inversely related to its marginal productivity; when settlement in the shadow of conflict and when open conflict can be expected to occur, with longer time horizons capable of inducing conflict instead of settlement; how conflict and appropriation can reduce the appeal of trade; the determinants of alliance formation and the importance of intra-alliance commitments; how dynamic incentives for capital accumulation and innovation are distorted in the presence of conflict; and the role of governance in conflict management.Anarchy; Bargaining; Conflict technology; Economic growth; Exchange; Governance; Group formation; Open conflict; Power; Shadow of the future

A framework for evaluating alternate institutional arrangements for fiscal equalization transfers

Fiscal equalization programs are fairly common features of intergovernmental fiscal relations in industrial countries. Some developing countries have also recently introduced these programs and still others are contemplating such programs. Institutional arrangements for fiscal equalization vary across countries with wide variations in the form and membership of the relevant decisionmaking bodies. This paper provides a simple neo-institutional economics framework for assessing alternative institutional arrangements for their impacts on simplicity, transparency, and objectivity of the equalization program, as well as transaction costs for various parties involved. Comparing institutional arrangements across different countries is a daunting task. The success of these arrangements depends on a multitude of factors. The success of governance structures for fiscal matters may depend not only on the incentives regime associated with their inner structures but also their interactions with other formal and informal institutions in the country. This paper presents a simple framework to understand these incentives and interactions and draw implications for their impacts on transactions costs for the society as a whole and achievement of societal objectives. An application of these concepts to the specific case of institutional arrangements for fiscal equalization transfers are carried out and the predictions based on the theory are compared with observed experiences in major federal countries. The paper demonstrates that the simple new institutional framework presented here has a significant power for predicting potential impacts. The paper concludes, both in theory and practice, that the case for independent grants commission to enhance the transparency, equity, and accountability of the intergovernmental finance system is vastly exaggerated.Municipal Financial Management,Public Sector Management and Reform,Regional Governance,Urban Governance and Management,Urban Economics