Dynamic Base Station Repositioning to Improve Spectral Efficiency of Drone Small Cells

With recent advancements in drone technology, researchers are now considering the possibility of deploying small cells served by base stations mounted on flying drones. A major advantage of such drone small cells is that the operators can quickly provide cellular services in areas of urgent demand without having to pre-install any infrastructure. Since the base station is attached to the drone, technically it is feasible for the base station to dynamic reposition itself in response to the changing locations of users for reducing the communication distance, decreasing the probability of signal blocking, and ultimately increasing the spectral efficiency. In this paper, we first propose distributed algorithms for autonomous control of drone movements, and then model and analyse the spectral efficiency performance of a drone small cell to shed new light on the fundamental benefits of dynamic repositioning. We show that, with dynamic repositioning, the spectral efficiency of drone small cells can be increased by nearly 100\% for realistic drone speed, height, and user traffic model and without incurring any major increase in drone energy consumption.Comment: Accepted at IEEE WoWMoM 2017 - 9 pages, 2 tables, 4 figure

Using Hover to Compromise the Confidentiality of User Input on Android

We show that the new hover (floating touch) technology, available in a number of today's smartphone models, can be abused by any Android application running with a common SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to record all touchscreen input into other applications. Leveraging this attack, a malicious application running on the system is therefore able to profile user's behavior, capture sensitive input such as passwords and PINs as well as record all user's social interactions. To evaluate our attack we implemented Hoover, a proof-of-concept malicious application that runs in the system background and records all input to foreground applications. We evaluated Hoover with 40 users, across two different Android devices and two input methods, stylus and finger. In the case of touchscreen input by finger, Hoover estimated the positions of users' clicks within an error of 100 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 79%. Hoover captured users' input by stylus even more accurately, estimating users' clicks within 2 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 98%. We discuss ways of mitigating this attack and show that this cannot be done by simply restricting access to permissions or imposing additional cognitive load on the users since this would significantly constrain the intended use of the hover technology.Comment: 11 page