26 research outputs found

    Review on Radio Resource Allocation Optimization in LTE/LTE-Advanced using Game Theory

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    Recently, there has been a growing trend toward ap-plying game theory (GT) to various engineering fields in order to solve optimization problems with different competing entities/con-tributors/players. Researches in the fourth generation (4G) wireless network field also exploited this advanced theory to overcome long term evolution (LTE) challenges such as resource allocation, which is one of the most important research topics. In fact, an efficient de-sign of resource allocation schemes is the key to higher performance. However, the standard does not specify the optimization approach to execute the radio resource management and therefore it was left open for studies. This paper presents a survey of the existing game theory based solution for 4G-LTE radio resource allocation problem and its optimization

    Resource Allocation and Pricing in Secondary Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

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    The paradigm shift from static spectrum allocation to a dynamic one has opened many challenges that need to be addressed for the true vision of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) to materialize. This dissertation proposes novel solutions that include: spectrum allocation, routing, and scheduling in DSA networks. First, we propose an auction-based spectrum allocation scheme in a multi-channel environment where secondary users (SUs) bid to buy channels from primary users (PUs) based on the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR). The channels are allocated such that i) the SUs get their preferred channels, ii) channels are re-used, and iii) there is no interference. Then, we propose a double auction-based spectrum allocation technique by considering multiple bids from SUs and heterogeneity of channels. We use virtual grouping of conflict-free buyers to transform multi-unit bids to single-unit bids. For routing, we propose a market-based model where the PUs determine the optimal price based on the demand for bandwidth by the SUs. Routes are determined through a series of price evaluations between message senders and forwarders. Also, we consider auction-based routing for two cases where buyers can bid for only one channel or they could bid for a combination of non-substitutable channels. For a centralized DSA, we propose two scheduling algorithms-- the first one focuses on maximizing the throughput and the second one focuses on fairness. We extend the scheduling algorithms to multi-channel environment. Expected throughput for every channel is computed by modelling channel state transitions using a discrete-time Markov chain. The state transition probabilities are calculated which occur at the frame/slot boundaries. All proposed algorithms are validated using simulation experiments with different network settings and their performance are studied

    Auction-based strategy for distributed task allocation in wireless sensor networks

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    Master'sMASTER OF ENGINEERIN

    Enhancing Node Cooperation in Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes

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    In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), nodes depend on each other for routing and forwarding packets. However, to save power and other resources, nodes belonging to independent authorities may behave selfishly, and may not be willing to help other nodes. Such selfish behavior poses a real threat to the proper functioning of MANETs. One way to foster node cooperation is to introduce punishment for selfish nodes. Based on neighbor-monitoring techniques, a fully distributed solution to detect, punish, and re-admit selfish nodes, is proposed here. This solution provides nodes the same opportunity to serve/and be served by others. A light-weight solution regarding battery status is also proposed here. This solution requires neighbor monitoring only when necessary, thereby saving nodes battery power. Another effective way to solve the selfish-node problem is to reward nodes for their service according to their cost. To force nodes to show their true cost, truthful protocols are needed. A low overhead truthful routing protocol to find optimal routes is proposed in this thesis. The most prominent feature of this protocol is the reduction of overhead from existing solutions O(n3) to O(n2). A light-weight scalable truthful routing protocol (LSTOP) is further proposed, which finds near-least-cost paths in dense networks. LSTOP reduces overhead to O(n) on average, and O(n2) in worst case scenarios. Multiple path routing protocols are an effective alternative to single path routing protocols. A generic mechanism that can turn any table-driven multipath routing protocol into a truthful one, is outlined here. A truthful multipath routing protocol (TMRP), based on well-known AOMDV protocol, is presented as an example. TMRP incurs an only 2n message overhead for a route discovery, and can also achieve load balancing without compromising truthfulness. To cope with the selfish-node problem in the area of position-based routing, a truthful geographic forwarding (TGF) algorithm is presented. TGF utilizes three auction-based forwarding schemes to stimulate node cooperation. The truthfulness of these schemes is proven, and their performance is evaluated through statistical analysis and simulation studies

    Game theory for cooperation in multi-access edge computing

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    Cooperative strategies amongst network players can improve network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. Game Theory is very suitable for these emerging scenarios, since it models high-complex interactions among distributed decision makers. It also finds the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g., content providers, cloud providers, edge providers, brokers, network providers, or users). These management policies optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure with a fair utilization of their resources. This chapter discusses relevant theoretical models that enable cooperation amongst the players in distinct ways through, namely, pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information scenarios. These upcoming scenarios are associated to computing and storage at the network edge, as well as, the deployment of large-scale IoT systems. The chapter finalizes by discussing a business model for future networks.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

    Systems-compatible Incentives

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    Originally, the Internet was a technological playground, a collaborative endeavor among researchers who shared the common goal of achieving communication. Self-interest used not to be a concern, but the motivations of the Internet's participants have broadened. Today, the Internet consists of millions of commercial entities and nearly 2 billion users, who often have conflicting goals. For example, while Facebook gives users the illusion of access control, users do not have the ability to control how the personal data they upload is shared or sold by Facebook. Even in BitTorrent, where all users seemingly have the same motivation of downloading a file as quickly as possible, users can subvert the protocol to download more quickly without giving their fair share. These examples demonstrate that protocols that are merely technologically proficient are not enough. Successful networked systems must account for potentially competing interests. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how to build systems that give users incentives to follow the systems' protocols. To achieve incentive-compatible systems, I apply mechanisms from game theory and auction theory to protocol design. This approach has been considered in prior literature, but unfortunately has resulted in few real, deployed systems with incentives to cooperate. I identify the primary challenge in applying mechanism design and game theory to large-scale systems: the goals and assumptions of economic mechanisms often do not match those of networked systems. For example, while auction theory may assume a centralized clearing house, there is no analog in a decentralized system seeking to avoid single points of failure or centralized policies. Similarly, game theory often assumes that each player is able to observe everyone else's actions, or at the very least know how many other players there are, but maintaining perfect system-wide information is impossible in most systems. In other words, not all incentive mechanisms are systems-compatible. The main contribution of this dissertation is the design, implementation, and evaluation of various systems-compatible incentive mechanisms and their application to a wide range of deployable systems. These systems include BitTorrent, which is used to distribute a large file to a large number of downloaders, PeerWise, which leverages user cooperation to achieve lower latencies in Internet routing, and Hoodnets, a new system I present that allows users to share their cellular data access to obtain greater bandwidth on their mobile devices. Each of these systems represents a different point in the design space of systems-compatible incentives. Taken together, along with their implementations and evaluations, these systems demonstrate that systems-compatibility is crucial in achieving practical incentives in real systems. I present design principles outlining how to achieve systems-compatible incentives, which may serve an even broader range of systems than considered herein. I conclude this dissertation with what I consider to be the most important open problems in aligning the competing interests of the Internet's participants

    Economic regulation for multi tenant infrastructures

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    Large scale computing infrastructures need scalable and effi cient resource allocation mechanisms to ful l the requirements of its participants and applications while the whole system is regulated to work e ciently. Computational markets provide e fficient allocation mechanisms that aggregate information from multiple sources in large, dynamic and complex systems where there is not a single source with complete information. They have been proven to be successful in matching resource demand and resource supply in the presence of sel sh multi-objective and utility-optimizing users and sel sh pro t-optimizing providers. However, global infrastructure metrics which may not directly affect participants of the computational market still need to be addressed -a.k.a. economic externalities like load balancing or energy-efficiency. In this thesis, we point out the need to address these economic externalities, and we design and evaluate appropriate regulation mechanisms from di erent perspectives on top of existing economic models, to incorporate a wider range of objective metrics not considered otherwise. Our main contributions in this thesis are threefold; fi rst, we propose a taxation mechanism that addresses the resource congestion problem e ffectively improving the balance of load among resources when correlated economic preferences are present; second, we propose a game theoretic model with complete information to derive an algorithm to aid resource providers to scale up and down resource supply so energy-related costs can be reduced; and third, we relax our previous assumptions about complete information on the resource provider side and design an incentive-compatible mechanism to encourage users to truthfully report their resource requirements effectively assisting providers to make energy-eff cient allocations while providing a dynamic allocation mechanism to users.Les infraestructures computacionals de gran escala necessiten mecanismes d’assignació de recursos escalables i eficients per complir amb els requisits computacionals de tots els seus participants, assegurant-se de que el sistema és regulat apropiadament per a que funcioni de manera efectiva. Els mercats computacionals són mecanismes d’assignació de recursos eficients que incorporen informació de diferents fonts considerant sistemes de gran escala, complexos i dinàmics on no existeix una única font que proveeixi informació completa de l'estat del sistema. Aquests mercats computacionals han demostrat ser exitosos per acomodar la demanda de recursos computacionals amb la seva oferta quan els seus participants son considerats estratègics des del punt de vist de teoria de jocs. Tot i això existeixen mètriques a nivell global sobre la infraestructura que no tenen per que influenciar els usuaris a priori de manera directa. Així doncs, aquestes externalitats econòmiques com poden ser el balanceig de càrrega o la eficiència energètica, conformen una línia d’investigació que cal explorar. En aquesta tesi, presentem i descrivim la problemàtica derivada d'aquestes externalitats econòmiques. Un cop establert el marc d’actuació, dissenyem i avaluem mecanismes de regulació apropiats basats en models econòmics existents per resoldre aquesta problemàtica des de diferents punts de vista per incorporar un ventall més ampli de mètriques objectiu que no havien estat considerades fins al moment. Les nostres contribucions principals tenen tres vessants: en primer lloc, proposem un mecanisme de regulació de tipus impositiu que tracta de mitigar l’aparició de recursos sobre-explotats que, efectivament, millora el balanceig de la càrrega de treball entre els recursos disponibles; en segon lloc, proposem un model teòric basat en teoria de jocs amb informació o completa que permet derivar un algorisme que facilita la tasca dels proveïdors de recursos per modi car a l'alça o a la baixa l'oferta de recursos per tal de reduir els costos relacionats amb el consum energètic; i en tercer lloc, relaxem la nostra assumpció prèvia sobre l’existència d’informació complerta per part del proveïdor de recursos i dissenyem un mecanisme basat en incentius per fomentar que els usuaris facin pública de manera verídica i explícita els seus requeriments computacionals, ajudant d'aquesta manera als proveïdors de recursos a fer assignacions eficients des del punt de vista energètic a la vegada que oferim un mecanisme l’assignació de recursos dinàmica als usuari

    Distributed radio resource allocation in wireless heterogeneous networks

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    This dissertation studies the problem of resource allocation in the radio access network of heterogeneous small-cell networks (HetSNets). A HetSNet is constructed by introducing smallcells(SCs) to a geographical area that is served by a well-structured macrocell network. These SCs reuse the frequency bands of the macro-network and operate in the interference-limited region. Thus, complex radio resource allocation schemes are required to manage interference and improve spectral efficiency. Both centralized and distributed approaches have been suggested by researchers to solve this problem. This dissertation follows the distributed approach under the self-organizing networks (SONs) paradigm. In particular, it develops game-theoretic and learning-theoretic modeling, analysis, and algorithms. Even though SONs may perform subpar to a centralized optimal controller, they are highly scalable and fault-tolerant. There are many facets to the problem of wireless resource allocation. They vary by the application, solution, methodology, and resource type. Therefore, this thesis restricts the treatment to four subproblems that were chosen due to their significant impact on network performance and suitability to our interests and expertise. Game theory and mechanism design are the main tools used since they provide a sufficiently rich environment to model the SON problem. Firstly, this thesis takes into consideration the problem of uplink orthogonal channel access in a dense cluster of SCs that is deployed in a macrocell service area. Two variations of this problem are modeled as noncooperative Bayesian games and the existence of pure-Bayesian Nash symmetric equilibria are demonstrated. Secondly, this thesis presents the generalized satisfaction equilibrium (GSE) for games in satisfaction-form. Each wireless agent has a constraint to satisfy and the GSE is a mixed-strategy profile from which no unsatisfied agent can unilaterally deviate to satisfaction. The objective of the GSE is to propose an alternative equilibrium that is designed specifically to model wireless users. The existence of the GSE, its computational complexity, and its performance compared to the Nash equilibrium are discussed. Thirdly, this thesis introduces verification mechanisms for dynamic self-organization of Wireless access networks. The main focus of verification mechanisms is to replace monetary transfers that are prevalent in current research. In the wireless environment particular private information of the wireless agents, such as block error rate and application class, can be verified at the access points. This verification capability can be used to threaten false reports with backhaul throttling. The agents then learn the truthful equilibrium over time by observing the rewards and punishments. Finally, the problem of admission control in the interfering-multiple access channel with rate constraints is addressed. In the incomplete information setting, with compact convex channel power gains, the resulting Bayesian game possesses at least one pureBayesian Nash equilibrium in on-off threshold strategies. The above-summarized results of this thesis demonstrate that the HetSNets are amenable to self-organization, albeit with adapted incentives and equilibria to fit the wireless environment. Further research problems to expand these results are identified at the end of this document

    A Game-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Resource Allocation Mechanisms in Edge and Fog Computing

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    With the rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT), cloud-centric application management raises questions related to quality of service for real-time applications. Fog and edge computing (FEC) provide a complement to the cloud by filling the gap between cloud and IoT. Resource management on multiple resources from distributed and administrative FEC nodes is a key challenge to ensure the quality of end-user’s experience. To improve resource utilisation and system performance, researchers have been proposed many fair allocation mechanisms for resource management. Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF), a resource allocation policy for multiple resource types, meets most of the required fair allocation characteristics. However, DRF is suitable for centralised resource allocation without considering the effects (or feedbacks) of large-scale distributed environments like multi-controller software defined networking (SDN). Nash bargaining from micro-economic theory or competitive equilibrium equal incomes (CEEI) are well suited to solving dynamic optimisation problems proposing to ‘proportionately’ share resources among distributed participants. Although CEEI’s decentralised policy guarantees load balancing for performance isolation, they are not faultproof for computation offloading. The thesis aims to propose a hybrid and fair allocation mechanism for rejuvenation of decentralised SDN controller deployment. We apply multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) with robustness against adversarial controllers to enable efficient priority scheduling for FEC. Motivated by software cybernetics and homeostasis, weighted DRF is generalised by applying the principles of feedback (positive or/and negative network effects) in reverse game theory (GT) to design hybrid scheduling schemes for joint multi-resource and multitask offloading/forwarding in FEC environments. In the first piece of study, monotonic scheduling for joint offloading at the federated edge is addressed by proposing truthful mechanism (algorithmic) to neutralise harmful negative and positive distributive bargain externalities respectively. The IP-DRF scheme is a MARL approach applying partition form game (PFG) to guarantee second-best Pareto optimality viii | P a g e (SBPO) in allocation of multi-resources from deterministic policy in both population and resource non-monotonicity settings. In the second study, we propose DFog-DRF scheme to address truthful fog scheduling with bottleneck fairness in fault-probable wireless hierarchical networks by applying constrained coalition formation (CCF) games to implement MARL. The multi-objective optimisation problem for fog throughput maximisation is solved via a constraint dimensionality reduction methodology using fairness constraints for efficient gateway and low-level controller’s placement. For evaluation, we develop an agent-based framework to implement fair allocation policies in distributed data centre environments. In empirical results, the deterministic policy of IP-DRF scheme provides SBPO and reduces the average execution and turnaround time by 19% and 11.52% as compared to the Nash bargaining or CEEI deterministic policy for 57,445 cloudlets in population non-monotonic settings. The processing cost of tasks shows significant improvement (6.89% and 9.03% for fixed and variable pricing) for the resource non-monotonic setting - using 38,000 cloudlets. The DFog-DRF scheme when benchmarked against asset fair (MIP) policy shows superior performance (less than 1% in time complexity) for up to 30 FEC nodes. Furthermore, empirical results using 210 mobiles and 420 applications prove the efficacy of our hybrid scheduling scheme for hierarchical clustering considering latency and network usage for throughput maximisation.Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University, Bauchi (Tetfund, Nigeria

    Enhanced Interest Aware PeopleRank for Opportunistic Mobile Social Networks

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    Network infrastructures are being continuously challenged by increased demand, resource-hungry applications, and at times of crisis when people need to work from homes such as the current Covid-19 epidemic situation, where most of the countries applied partial or complete lockdown and most of the people worked from home. Opportunistic Mobile Social Networks (OMSN) prove to be a great candidate to support existing network infrastructures. However, OMSNs have copious challenges comprising frequent disconnections and long delays. we aim to enhance the performance of OMSNs including delivery ratio and delay. We build upon an interest-aware social forwarding algorithm, namely Interest Aware PeopleRank (IPeR). We explored three pillars for our contribution, which encompass (1) inspect more than one hop (multiple hops) based on IPeR (MIPeR), (2) by embracing directional forwarding (Directional-IPeR), and (3) by utilizing a combination of Directional forwarding and multi-hop forwarding (DMIPeR). For Directional-IPeR, different values of the tolerance factor of IPeR, such as 25% and 75%, are explored to inspect variations of Directional-IPeR. Different interest distributions and users’ densities are simulated using the Social-Aware Opportunistic Forwarding Simulator (SAROS). The results show that (1) adding multiple hops to IPeR enhanced the delivery ratio, number of reached interested forwarders, and delay slightly. However, it increased the cost and decreased F-measure hugely. Consequently, there is no significant gain in these algorithms. (2) Directional-IPeR-75 performed generally better than IPeR in delivery ratio, and the number of reached interested forwarders. Besides, when some of the uninterested forwarders did not participate in messages delivery, which is a realistic behavior, the performance is enhanced and performed better generally in all metrics compared to IPeR. (3) Adding multiple hops to directional guided IPeR did not gain any enhancement. (4) Directional-IPeR-75 performs better in high densities in all metrics except delay. Even though, it enhances delay in sparse environments. Consequently, it can be utilized in disastrous areas, in which few people are with low connectivity and spread over a big area. In addition, it can be used in rural areas as well where there is no existing networks
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